Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0325/03252.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 42KB | 641 lines

$Unique_ID{COW03252}
$Pretitle{241}
$Title{South Korea
Chapter 4D.   Relations with Selected Foreign Countries}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Rinn-Sup Shinn}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{korea
south
states
korean
united
north
relations
japan
policy
economic}
$Date{1981}
$Log{}
Country:     South Korea
Book:        South Korea, A Country Study
Author:      Rinn-Sup Shinn
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1981

Chapter 4D.   Relations with Selected Foreign Countries

     Relations with the United States are the bedrock of South Korean foreign
policy. In 1981-the one hundredth year of the treaty of peace, amity,
commerce, and navigation between the Yi Dynasty Kingdom of Korea and the
United States-the two countries had mutually satisfactory and friendly
relations. The United States was regarded by South Korea as the closest,
strongest, and staunchest ally. South Korea was in turn valued by the United
States as "a key element" in its strategic posture in Northeast Asia. The
significance of the tie was also evident in trade relations. In 1980, as in
the recent past, the United States was the largest market for South Korean
export merchandise, accounting for nearly 30 percent of the country's total
exports; it was also a principal seller (second only to Japan) of raw
materials and industrial equipment to South Korea, making up about 23 percent
of its total commodity imports.

     No other country has had as much beneficial impact on South Korea as has
the United States, which since 1945 has been its single largest source of
military and economic aid. Moreover American cultural and educational
influence-despite growing indications of nationalistic assertiveness in
Seoul-has not been inconsiderable. Many educated South Koreans have had
contacts with United States missionaries, military personnel, educators, and
businessmen. Of all foreign countries the United States still ranked in 1981
as the most frequently mentioned country to which people wished to emigrate or
visit for educational opportunities.

     Without United States military intervention in June 1950, the country
almost certainly would have been overrun by the North Korean forces. After the
Korean War the United States continued to underwrite South Korean security
under a mutual defense treaty signed in October 1953. This treaty, still in
force in 1981, committed the two countries to recognize that "an armed attack
in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their
respective administrative control . . . would be dangerous to its own peace
and safety" and that each would act "to meet the common danger in accordance
with its constitutional processes." The pact, which was ratified by the United
States Senate in January 1954, was to remain in force indefinitely unless
terminated by either party one year after notice had been given to the other
(see Background, ch. 5). Contrary to some popular views, the treaty offers no
provisions for the stationing of United States forces in South Korea; the
point was made explicit in a report prepared by the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations in 1954. That report reads in part: "The testimony of
administration witnesses made it clear that the United States would be under
no obligation to station forces in South Korea under the treaty. The United
States has the right to do so, if it determines that such action would be in
its national security interest. The present political and military situation
in Korea . . . makes it apparent that the stationing of United States Armed
Forces in the Republic of Korea will be in our national security interest for
the time being."

     As of mid-1981 the United States military presence had become
uncritically accepted by the South Koreans as an absolute necessity as long as
a "threat" from North Korea continued. This presence had become part and
parcel of the consciousness of security; for most South Koreans, in fact, the
possibility of a United States military disengagement was inconceivable. That
assumption was shaken after 1969 initially because of the United States
decision to lower its military profile in Asia under the so-called Nixon
Doctrine. The withdrawal of one of the two combat divisions from South Korea
in 1970-71 was thus seen in Seoul in the worst possible light. The resulting
nervousness was exacerbated by a succession of startling external
developments: moves toward detente between the United States and China;
Nixon's historic visit to China in early 1972; and the favorable United
Nations (UN) vote to seat China in the world organization at the expense of
Taiwan, South Korea's ally.

     Uncertain and feeling besieged, South Korea intensified security
diplomacy vis-a-vis the United States. This was designed to ensure continued
United States military support for South Korea, especially the latter's effort
to modernize the armed forces and strengthen Seoul's self-reliance and
capability to cope with North Korea. The United States has consistently
reaffirmed its determination to help South Korea preserve peace and security
and prevent any renewal of hostilities on the Korean peninsula. Its position
has been articulated in many ways, perhaps the most notable one being the
annual Korea-United States Security Consultative Meeting, a ministerial level
conference held since 1968 to map out common defense strategies (see Foreign
Military Assistance, ch. 5).

     Apart from mutual security, the democratization of South Korea has always
been a weighty factor in Seoul-Washington relations. During much of the 1970s
these relations were occasionally strained as when the government under Park
was believed to be politically repressive and callous in its regard for human
rights conditions. The United States frequently expressed its concern, usually
through diplomatic channels, to convey the message that denial of human rights
could erode congressional support much needed to expedite economic and
military modernization programs in South Korea. Park's government asserted,
however, that the American people lacked a real understanding of South
Korea's peculiar problems-first and foremost, the ever-present threat of
subversion and invasion from North Korea. The situation was said to require
tougher standards with which to suppress the sources of destabilization,
actual and potential. Seoul deplored the American tendency to assess the South
Korean political situation using Western democratic standards without allowing
for the need to reconcile Korea's tradition against Western political imports.
(In 1981 President Chun continued to strike the same theme to the effect that
Korean democracy should be created on "the hotbed of Korea's own culture and
tradition as well as circumstances within and without the country.")

     Perhaps the most difficult period in United States-Korean relations was
from 1977 to 1978 during which South Korea worried about President Jimmy
Carter's plan to phase out United States ground troops within four to five
years. Equally worrisome was the disclosure of United States congressional
investigations into South Korea's lobbying scandals in the United States. The
Lobby was evidently intended to improve the climate of opinion in the United
States toward Park's authoritarian political system and, of course, to make
sure that the United States continued to honor its security commitments to
South Korea.

     Seoul's anxiety was allayed somewhat in 1978 when the United States
reaffirmed its support posture. In July of that year a South Korean spokesman
expressed optimism that the removal of United States ground forces would not
compromise his country's safety as long as the United States stood by to
furnish necessary air and naval support. Furthermore by October of the year
the congressional probe of the South Korean lobbying scandals had ended. Much
of the uncertainty surrounding the future of Seoul-Washington relations was
removed as the result of Park-Carter summit talks held in Seoul on June
30-July 1,