Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0325/03251.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 20KB | 331 lines

$Unique_ID{COW03251}
$Pretitle{241}
$Title{South Korea
Chapter 4C.   The Power Structure}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Rinn-Sup Shinn}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{party
political
korea
power
military
parties
south
democratic
foreign
national}
$Date{1981}
$Log{}
Country:     South Korea
Book:        South Korea, A Country Study
Author:      Rinn-Sup Shinn
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1981

Chapter 4C.   The Power Structure

     South Korea is a constitutional republic with an elected president and an
elaborate system of checks and balances. The president represents the ruling
Democratic Justice Party. In theory the authority and power of the state,
emanating from the people, are legitimized through constitutional processes.
Most government posts are filled by dedicated civilians with years of
experience in general administration and in specialized fields as well. The
principle of civilian rule was not, in 1981 at least, blatantly breached. The
military appeared to be concerned less with political than strictly
professional matters.

     Appearance is not reality, however. The power structure still bears an
unmistakable imprint of the military, considered by many to be inevitable, if
not desirable, in light of the inter-Korean confrontation and to a degree
because of the continuing weakness and fragmentation of nonmilitary political
forces. From all indications political power and the military were inseparable
in 1981, as in the past. On balance the extent of military influence was
perhaps more pervasive in 1981 than it had ever been, except for the 1961-63
period during which the country was under military rule. In fact, among South
Koreans no one would likely challenge the presumption that the role of the
military as ultimate guardian of order and stability would remain unchanged as
long as their country felt threatened by the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (North Korea), and a number subscribed to the notion that real political
power grew out of the barrel of a gun, not out of the ballot boxes.

     The "power strata" (kwolyok ch'ung) as well as the "special privileged
strata" (t'ukkwon ch'ung) are influenced by Chun and his military cohorts,
some still on active duty and others in retirement, serving in presidentially
appointed or elective positions of trust. The power strata is a term used
mainly to describe the power hierarchy connected with bureaucratic (civil and
military) and political positions, whereas the special privilege strata covers
the economic elites. Without question loyalty and individual competence are
important criteria for membership in the broadly defined power structure but,
as of mid-1981, to be considered as really influential, one must have played a
significant instrumental role in Chun's systematic ascendancy to the top since
December 1979 (see Political Developments since October 1979, this ch.).

     Military influence is neither absolute nor self-perpetuating, but it is
nevertheless pervasive. That influence can be defined in terms of formal
positions held by military officers or in terms of the network of personnel,
civilians or otherwise, who are placed in strategic posts in government
ministries. Almost always the civilian bureaucrats in sensitive positions are
those who are acceptable to the military-controlled inner sanctum of power. In
addition the military has a variety of options in bringing its influence to
bear on the political process. Among these options are a threat of a "coup"
and a warning of "stern actions" against those elements perceived to be
threatening the favored status of the military in the society or endangering
domestic tranquility and external security.

     Negative sanctions may have the desired effect of temporary relief but
certainly are not likely to boost an upturn in the economy nor likely to
endear the military to those segments of the population whose empathy would
contribute significantly to the cause of domestic cohesion through
reconciliation. The logic of political survival may well thus dictate the
broadening of a power base that as of mid-1981 was popularly perceived to be
primarily controlled by the military. The need to shed such an image, and
above all for Chun to demonstrate that he is not a "military" leader and that
he can command respect and support from a broad strata of the population,
would likely pose a political challenge to the president in the years ahead.

     South Korea is not markedly different from other societies where power is
highly centralized, and the way in which power is dispensed or withheld has
profound consequences. Competition for access to the bureaucratic and economic
levers of power has always been fierce and unrelenting. As a result the power
structure is essentially performance oriented with a fairly rapid turnover.
Merit, innovation, new skills, and hard work will continue as determinants of
social mobility. Under Chun's presidency "a new way of doing things" is
strongly encouraged, the rationale being that the power structure should
reflect new, reformist outlook rather than perpetuate "premodern vestiges."
Nevertheless many observers shared the view that other things being equal, an
informal, personal access to the president and his close military associates
was critically important as a real measure of political power.

     In 1981 the power elite, by reputation and by formal functions, included
those who held positions dealing with presidential affairs, national security,
and intelligence. These were the Presidential Secretariat, the Defense
Security Command (DSC), the Capital Garrison Command, the Special Forces, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP), the
Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Home Affairs that controlled
the national police. Cabinet members, members of the National Assembly, and
executives of the Democratic Justice Party could be also considered
influential were they connected personally or through professional association
with Chun and his chief lieutenants. Not to be overlooked was a group of fifty
to eighty generals and colonels commanding regimental, divisional, and corps
units. This nameless group was believed to have been exerting considerable
influence on the inner council of power through informal communications. Many
of these front-line commanders were dedicated professionals, but some of them
were popularly perceived to have been "politicized."

     It is axiomatic that the top echelon of power-and by extension the regime
itself-can be stable only so long as its responsiveness to popular needs is
credibly demonstrated. This is certainly true in South Korea where the levels
of popular expectations have been gradually rising as a function of remarkable
economic development in recent years and, importantly, because of political
promises made by incumbent leaders. This points to the importance to the
political leadership of a second layer of influential persons in the power
hierarchy. These include several hundred executives with technocratic and
military backgrounds placed in key government-run enterprises. They form
essential links in the government strategy of economic production and growth.
No less critical are hundreds of generalist-oriented senior civil servants who
have provided a measure of stability and continuity in various politically
troubled circumstances. A very small number of returnees with advanced degrees
from foreign educational institutions can also be considered influential.
These academic returnees play a role as consultants and formulators of
policies concerning a wide range of complex governmental endeavors.

Political Parties

     Among the pronounced features of Chun's "new politics" was the frequently
enunciated commitment to the creation of a new political consciousness and a
new political pattern. The pledge was premised on the view that political
modernization was not possible as long as the country was strapped by what
Chun called "the r