Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0325/03253.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 28KB | 448 lines

$Unique_ID{COW03253}
$Pretitle{241}
$Title{South Korea
Chapter 5A.   National Security}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Melinda W. Cooke}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{south
korea
forces
military
korean
united
north
states
armed
defense}
$Date{1981}
$Log{Turtle Ship*0325301.scf
Figure 17.*0325304.scf
}
Country:     South Korea
Book:        South Korea, A Country Study
Author:      Melinda W. Cooke
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1981

Chapter 5A.   National Security

[See Turtle Ship: Iron-clad "turtle ship" designed and constructed by national
hero, Admiral Yi Sun-sin]

     The major external threat to South Korea's national security in 1981
continued to be North Korea. Despite the 1953 truce agreements, charges and
countercharges of espionage and hostile provocations had become a permanent
feature of inter-Korean relations-by mid-1980 North Korea had claimed over
298,000 truce violations by South Korea; South Korea claimed over 56,000 by
North Korea. Although both figures were doubtless inflated and reflected less
about the actual incidence of truce violations than the zealousness of those
doing the counting, it was clear that the truce had not signaled the end to
all conflict.

     Whether or not the South Koreans had themselves fueled the fires of
mutual hostility, it seemed clear that they faced real threats from North
Korea-the possible outbreak of another war as well as infiltration, espionage,
and sabotage. In the 1974-80 period South Korea had discovered three large
tunnels built under the four-kilometer-wide Demilitarized Zone that separated
it from North Korea, caught numerous infiltrators, and had broken up several
spy rings. In addition, although the North Koreans claimed the opposite,
intelligence data from domestic and foreign sources indicated that North
Korean armed forces were deployed in an offensive posture. As a result of this
atmosphere of mutual hostility South Korean security was distinguished by four
distinct factors.

     First, the nation supported the world's sixth largest armed force, well
equipped with modern weaponry. Only the Demilitarized Zone separated the
country from its most feared opponent, and continued survival remained a
critical issue to the nation. The offensive deployment of the North Korean
armed forces and the seemingly unpredictable behavior of its leaders
heightened apprehensions in South Korea about the nation's ability to defend
itself and, more importantly, to deter war without the aid of its ally, the
United States. Arms acquisition and modernization, training, and readiness
were primary concerns as was vigilance against espionage, infiltration, and
internal agitation by the enemy.

     A second feature of South Korean security was the highly professional
military establishment, which wielded an effective force in the government. As
ex-generals who achieved power through military coups, both presidents Park
Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan were able to legitimize their rule through
political processes, demonstrating the ability of their military power bases
to mobilize support and to overcome opposition-by whatever means. From the
standpoint of security, this meant that the military was able to promote
successfully many or its own programs and to translate much of its own vision
of South Korea into reality.

     Since the security situation was of overwhelming national concern, the
North Korean threat factor provided the government with a ready-made
justification for authoritarian action-a justification the public viewed with
resignation, if not with favor. Though many of the more overt limits on the
power of the opposition, the judiciary, and the legislature imposed under the
yusin (revitalization) constitution had been eliminated by 1981, the 1980
Constitution put few limits on the power of the executive branch. The
precedent of declaring martial law (thereby suspending regular due process)
was well established, and the legal power to do so remained. The police
ability to dispel assemblies had been strengthened, as had penalties for
promoting vaguely defined antistate acts. Despite constitutional provisions of
freedom from coerced confession and torture and guarantees of habeas corpus,
reports persisted of political prisoners being held under house arrest without
trial and in poor conditions.

     A final factor influencing South Korean security affairs was the
strategic location of the Korean peninsula. Historically an area of
competition among larger nations, subject to suzerainty, occupation, invasion,
and division, the location of the peninsula made a solution to the division
and hostility between north and south all the more difficult-constrained by
the impact reunification would have not only on North Korea and South Korea,
but also on the Soviet Union, the United States and its ally Japan, and China.
No calculation of South Korean security could ignore the role played by
outside actors, especially that played by its major ally, the United States.

     Significant though the interests of outside nations were, however, they
were not the controlling determinant of security affairs on the peninsula.
While in 1981 most observers agreed that none of the outside nations favored
reunification by force, neither China nor the Soviet Union would or could
apply pressure on North Korea to compromise its position. To what extent the
United States was willing and able to do likewise for South Korea was also
debatable. For although superpower rivalry had been largely responsible for
the partitioning of Korea after World War II and continued to affect the
peninsula, hostility between the two halves rapidly became an element in the
situation as well. North Korea and South Korea quickly developed inimical
economic and social arrangements, while at the same time each expressed a
desire for reunification-on its own terms. The resulting tension made peaceful
reunification unlikely, even if the great powers were to reach an agreement.

Armed Forces

     The strategic doctrine of the armed forces was designed to counter the
threat from North Korea. So great was the perceived threat that in 1981 the
South Koreans supported the world's sixth largest armed force, totaling
600,600 active duty personnel. Even given the size of the armed forces, their
high degree of readiness, and their modern weaponry, South Korean military
analysts were not particularly sanguine regarding their nation's ability to
deter or defend against an attack from North Korea. During the 1970-79 period
the North Korean ground forces had nearly doubled in size to become the
world's fifth largest. The country was self-sufficient in ground armaments and
was considered capable of launching a surprise attack on South Korea that
could be sustained for at least thirty days given the size of weapons
stockpiles. The generally offensive deployment, training, and doctrine of
North Korean forces worked to persuade South Koreans that their nation's
security was seriously threatened.

     South Korea would not be helpless in any confrontation. Should North
Korea attack, it would enjoy the benefit of initiative, but South Korea would
be fighting on home ground from prepared defensive positions in terrain
favorable to defense. South Korean troops were well trained and well led.
South Korea was well equipped with modern weapons, and under the terms of the
Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and South Korea (ratified by
the United States Senate in 1954), it would enjoy United States military
assistance were the nation attacked (see Foreign Military Assistance, this
ch.).

     Whether or not North Korea actually would once again attack South Korea
was open to question. The opinions of foreign analysts varied. It could be
argued that its steady barrage  of hostile propaganda over three decades,
offensive deployment, and regular attempts at infiltrating and subverting
South Korea were for domestic consumption as much as anything else-actions
necessary to legitimize