$Unique_ID{COW03252} $Pretitle{241} $Title{South Korea Chapter 4D. Relations with Selected Foreign Countries} $Subtitle{} $Author{Rinn-Sup Shinn} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{korea south states korean united north relations japan policy economic} $Date{1981} $Log{} Country: South Korea Book: South Korea, A Country Study Author: Rinn-Sup Shinn Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1981 Chapter 4D. Relations with Selected Foreign Countries Relations with the United States are the bedrock of South Korean foreign policy. In 1981-the one hundredth year of the treaty of peace, amity, commerce, and navigation between the Yi Dynasty Kingdom of Korea and the United States-the two countries had mutually satisfactory and friendly relations. The United States was regarded by South Korea as the closest, strongest, and staunchest ally. South Korea was in turn valued by the United States as "a key element" in its strategic posture in Northeast Asia. The significance of the tie was also evident in trade relations. In 1980, as in the recent past, the United States was the largest market for South Korean export merchandise, accounting for nearly 30 percent of the country's total exports; it was also a principal seller (second only to Japan) of raw materials and industrial equipment to South Korea, making up about 23 percent of its total commodity imports. No other country has had as much beneficial impact on South Korea as has the United States, which since 1945 has been its single largest source of military and economic aid. Moreover American cultural and educational influence-despite growing indications of nationalistic assertiveness in Seoul-has not been inconsiderable. Many educated South Koreans have had contacts with United States missionaries, military personnel, educators, and businessmen. Of all foreign countries the United States still ranked in 1981 as the most frequently mentioned country to which people wished to emigrate or visit for educational opportunities. Without United States military intervention in June 1950, the country almost certainly would have been overrun by the North Korean forces. After the Korean War the United States continued to underwrite South Korean security under a mutual defense treaty signed in October 1953. This treaty, still in force in 1981, committed the two countries to recognize that "an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control . . . would be dangerous to its own peace and safety" and that each would act "to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." The pact, which was ratified by the United States Senate in January 1954, was to remain in force indefinitely unless terminated by either party one year after notice had been given to the other (see Background, ch. 5). Contrary to some popular views, the treaty offers no provisions for the stationing of United States forces in South Korea; the point was made explicit in a report prepared by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1954. That report reads in part: "The testimony of administration witnesses made it clear that the United States would be under no obligation to station forces in South Korea under the treaty. The United States has the right to do so, if it determines that such action would be in its national security interest. The present political and military situation in Korea . . . makes it apparent that the stationing of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea will be in our national security interest for the time being." As of mid-1981 the United States military presence had become uncritically accepted by the South Koreans as an absolute necessity as long as a "threat" from North Korea continued. This presence had become part and parcel of the consciousness of security; for most South Koreans, in fact, the possibility of a United States military disengagement was inconceivable. That assumption was shaken after 1969 initially because of the United States decision to lower its military profile in Asia under the so-called Nixon Doctrine. The withdrawal of one of the two combat divisions from South Korea in 1970-71 was thus seen in Seoul in the worst possible light. The resulting nervousness was exacerbated by a succession of startling external developments: moves toward detente between the United States and China; Nixon's historic visit to China in early 1972; and the favorable United Nations (UN) vote to seat China in the world organization at the expense of Taiwan, South Korea's ally. Uncertain and feeling besieged, South Korea intensified security diplomacy vis-a-vis the United States. This was designed to ensure continued United States military support for South Korea, especially the latter's effort to modernize the armed forces and strengthen Seoul's self-reliance and capability to cope with North Korea. The United States has consistently reaffirmed its determination to help South Korea preserve peace and security and prevent any renewal of hostilities on the Korean peninsula. Its position has been articulated in many ways, perhaps the most notable one being the annual Korea-United States Security Consultative Meeting, a ministerial level conference held since 1968 to map out common defense strategies (see Foreign Military Assistance, ch. 5). Apart from mutual security, the democratization of South Korea has always been a weighty factor in Seoul-Washington relations. During much of the 1970s these relations were occasionally strained as when the government under Park was believed to be politically repressive and callous in its regard for human rights conditions. The United States frequently expressed its concern, usually through diplomatic channels, to convey the message that denial of human rights could erode congressional support much needed to expedite economic and military modernization programs in South Korea. Park's government asserted, however, that the American people lacked a real understanding of South Korea's peculiar problems-first and foremost, the ever-present threat of subversion and invasion from North Korea. The situation was said to require tougher standards with which to suppress the sources of destabilization, actual and potential. Seoul deplored the American tendency to assess the South Korean political situation using Western democratic standards without allowing for the need to reconcile Korea's tradition against Western political imports. (In 1981 President Chun continued to strike the same theme to the effect that Korean democracy should be created on "the hotbed of Korea's own culture and tradition as well as circumstances within and without the country.") Perhaps the most difficult period in United States-Korean relations was from 1977 to 1978 during which South Korea worried about President Jimmy Carter's plan to phase out United States ground troops within four to five years. Equally worrisome was the disclosure of United States congressional investigations into South Korea's lobbying scandals in the United States. The Lobby was evidently intended to improve the climate of opinion in the United States toward Park's authoritarian political system and, of course, to make sure that the United States continued to honor its security commitments to South Korea. Seoul's anxiety was allayed somewhat in 1978 when the United States reaffirmed its support posture. In July of that year a South Korean spokesman expressed optimism that the removal of United States ground forces would not compromise his country's safety as long as the United States stood by to furnish necessary air and naval support. Furthermore by October of the year the congressional probe of the South Korean lobbying scandals had ended. Much of the uncertainty surrounding the future of Seoul-Washington relations was removed as the result of Park-Carter summit talks held in Seoul on June 30-July 1, 1979. In a joint communique the Carter administration again pledged its military support of South Korea (later South Korea welcomed Carter's decision to "suspend" until 1981 his troop withdrawal plan; also in July the United States reportedly agreed in principle to sell thirty-six F-16 fighters to South Korea in 1982-86). Moreover at the summit talks, the two presidents agreed to promote cultural-educational exchanges, and Carter took the occasion to impress on Park the importance of improving the state of "political and human rights" in South Korea. The subject of political and human rights surfaced again in 1980 as a major source of discord between the two countries. The issue in question concerned Kim Dae Jung, former presidential candidate and opposition leader. In 1980 Kim was arrested in connection with the civil disturbance in Kwangju; he was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. Despite the South Korean position that he was given a fair trial under due process of law, the United States and Japan apparently shared a widely held view that his trial was politically motivated (see Political Developments since October 1979, this ch.). The seriousness with which the United States viewed the Kim affair was conveyed diplomatically to Chun's regime. At that time the outgoing Carter administration reemphasized the point that the foundation of the South Korean-United States alliance stemmed from the linkage of two complementary factors-a shared interest in security and a common devotion to the imperatives of human rights. The importance of the linkage was not lost on the Chun regime, if only because for the first time the annual Korean-United States Security Consultative Meeting was not held in 1980. More revealingly a 1980 Gallup Poll showed only 38 percent of American respondents favoring United States defense of South Korea; 50 percent of them opposed such an option even in the event of a North Korean invasion. Sixty-three percent viewed South Korea's human rights conditions as unfavorable. Clouds hanging over Seoul-Washington relations were cleared up, at least on the government-to-government level, when Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency in January 1981. Elated, the South Korean government expressed confidence that the Reagan era would effectively restore the traditional closeness and reciprocity between the two countries, not to mention the reversal of what was described as "the lack of firm international leadership on the part of the United States in the last several years"-a pointed allusion to Carter's foreign policy in general and his Korea policy in particular. It was predicted that the Reagan administration would surely redeem "America's reliability" as leader of the noncommunist world. The Reagan era indeed began auspiciously for South Korea. Within days of his inauguration in January, Reagan invited Chun to the White House for summit talks in early February. This was made possible in part by Chun's commutation of the death sentence for Kim Dae Jung to life imprisonment as well as the prison terms of Kim's condefendants. This step, announced in January, helped to remove the major unresolved issue between the two countries. It was welcomed by the United States as a step in the right direction toward the improvement of South Korean human rights conditions. The South Korean government attached great significance to the fact that Chun was the first head of a foreign state to have met with Reagan. The results of the summit talks, held amid warmth and conviviality rarely seen at previous South Korea-United States summit meetings, could not have been more satisfying. From its standpoint The Korea Times was elated: "It may not be an exaggeration to say that the summit talks resolved all the issues, in diplomatic, economic, and defense areas, in a clean admirable manner . . . Chun's visit raised the prestige of the nation internationally." Specifically the joint communique issued by the two presidents touched on what the South Korean government would want from the United States most-Reagan's assurance that "the United States has no plans to withdraw United States ground combat forces from the Korean peninsula." This laid to rest any nagging South Korean concern that the status of United States ground forces might be reviewed in 1981 (as the Carter administration had intended to do). Reagan also "confirmed that the United States will make available for sale appropriate weapons systems and defense industry technology necessary for enhancing Korea's capabilities to deter aggression." Chun and Reagan announced also their accord on reopening "immediately the full range of consultations" on matters relating to security, economic relations, and "United States-Korea policy planning talks." The consultations in question were generally viewed in less than positive light by South Korea during Carter's four-year presidency. The two presidents also expressed their satisfaction with the expanding scope of Korean-American economic relations. Reagan took the occasion to promise that "the United States would remain a reliable supplier of nuclear fuel, generation equipment and power technology." People-to-people cooperation was also stressed in terms of "a need for further promotion of mutual understanding and exchanges" through private and public channels. To this end the two presidents agreed to "an early activation of the Korean-American Cultural Exchange Committee to be funded jointly by the two Governments." The South Korean president took the occasion to make what the communique calls a "significant contribution to the Smithsonian Institution for the construction of a new Museum of Eastern Art on the Mall in Washington." (This was to commemorate in 1982 the centennial anniversary of the opening of Korean-American relations.) The joint communique also touched on inter-Korean relations. It mentioned United States support for South Korea's efforts to "resume a constructive dialogue with North Korea," including Chun's proposal made on January 12, 1981, calling for an exchange of visits by the presidents of the two countries. On the touchy issue of the United States attitude toward talks with North Korea, Reagan reaffirmed the United States position that South Korea must be "a full participant in any United States negotiations with North Korea." The two presidents also shared the view that "any unilateral steps toward North Korea which are not reciprocated toward South Korea by North Korea's principal allies would not be conducive to promoting stability or peace in the area." Japan remains a critical factor in the South Korean nexus of foreign policy for economic, political, and security reasons. In 1981 South Korean-Japanese relations were cordial but were not entirely free of friction. This was nothing new for the two countries that had experienced ups and downs in their relations since they began their intermittent and complicated efforts to normalize relations in 1951. These efforts eventually led to the signing of a treaty in 1965, under which Japan agreed to provide grants, loans, and credits to South Korea. By the end of the 1960s Japan had become indispensable to Seoul's economic development as a supplier of equipment, capital, and technology. In 1981 one of the irritants from Seoul's perspective was Japan's alleged reluctance or refusal to redress the chronic imbalance in trade relations-the trade deficits of US $19 billion against South Korea accumulated since 1966. In recent years South Korea, Japan's third largest market for its commodity exports after the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), ran an annual deficit of US $3 billion in trade with Japan-a situation Seoul regards as unfair and exploitative. Furthermore it is no secret that South Korea was bitter about the way Japan, which in 1973 had replaced the United States as the principal source of economic aid to South Korea, was believed to be using its public loan to South Korea as an instrument of political pressure. As recently as 1980 Japan withheld a loan package from South Korea in the dispute over the Kim Dae Jung controversy. The Kim Dae Jung incident became a cause celebre after August 1973 when former President Park's most outspoken critic was abducted from Tokyo by South Korean agents (see The Military in Politics, ch. 1). Maintaining that its sovereignty was blatantly breached, the Japanese government suspended all new aid to Seoul; the resumption of the aid was made conditional on the settlement of the case to Japan's full satisfaction. In November 1973 a South Korean envoy was dispatched to Tokyo to offer personal apology for the abduction and also to pledge that such an incident would not be allowed to happen again. Nonetheless South Korean-Japanese ties remained cloudy, the Japanese suspecting continued KCIA intimidation of Korean residents in Japan and even Japanese nationals inside Japan. Meanwhile South Korea feels irritated by what it regards as Japan's "lukewarm" posture toward North Korea and toward a group of pro-P'yongyang Korean residents in Japan. It felt constrained to step up surveillance against a possible infiltration of subversives into South Korea from Japan posing as tourists; and the authorities occasionally detained Japanese nationals who were suspected of having committed offenses during their stay in South Korea by supporting local antigovernment dissidents. Publicly Japan maintains that a stable and peaceful Korean peninsula is essential to the security of Japan itself, but South Korea asserts that the Japanese government has failed to do anything about it. Japan's so-called equal distance diplomacy toward the two Koreas has not been warmly received in Seoul. Differing assessments of the North Korean threat seem likely to remain a major irritant between Seoul and Tokyo. As early as 1974 Japan stirred a political storm in Seoul by stating that South Korea no longer faced any military threat from North Korea and that Japan should "broaden" the scope of interest to include "the whole peninsula." This was interpreted in Seoul as portending Japan's modification of its hitherto one-sided commitment to South Korea. In Seoul's view, Japan's Korea policy was still unsatisfactory in 1981. The progovernment Korea Herald commented in March that Japan was unresponsive to Seoul's protest against the Japanese export to North Korea of "some sensitive if not outright strategic materials" that could be used for "aggressive or subversive action against the South." Evidently echoing the government, the newspaper editorialized: "Perhaps Japan can best translate its security concern into reality, in a nonmilitary form, in its relations with this Republic. The often-emphasized economic cooperation between the two neighbor nations may be further promoted in such a way as to enable this country to devote more materials and resources to economic development, in addition to meeting its heavy defense burdens." The economic equation aside, South Korea also wants a more "realistic" security posture from Japan, urging the latter to reconsider the degree of its contribution to the security of the western Pacific and Northeast Asia, South Korea included. Specifically South Korea has asked Japan, which is barred from any foreign military role under its no-war constitution, to boost its defense expenditures commensurate with its economic superpower status. Moreover since 1969 South Korea has expressed that Japan should be brought into a tripartite mutual security framework involving the United States, South Korea, and Japan. In 1981 despite the absence of indications that Japan would abandon its "balanced" policy toward the two Koreas anytime soon, relations with Japan appeared to be improving. After January 1981 when Chun reduced Kim Dae Jung's death sentence, the Japanese government agreed to extend a loan package to South Korea. The two countries expressed their intension to review economic and security issues as soon as practicable. The policy of all-out open-door diplomacy toward other nations is based on political and economic necessity. Politically South Korea's aim is to convince other nations that it alone inherits the "historical legitimacy" of Korea and hence the rightful role as the eminent and exclusive representative of the Korean people. Seoul is thus committed to a policy of "outperforming" North Korea in every category in inter-Korean competition. Increasingly evident since 1980 is South Korea's diplomatic effort to portray North Korea as an unreliable and risky partner for any international transaction and to portray itself as more concerned about the reduction of tension in the Korean peninsula. A major focus in the inter-Korean war of propaganda aimed at the nonaligned nations was the North Korean proposal for the "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo," unveiled by President Kim Il Sung at the Sixth Congress of the Korean Workers Party in P'yongyang in October 1980, as a modified and conciliatory version of his confederation scheme first announced in 1960 (see Relations with North Korea, this ch.). Seoul was intent on creating the impression that Kim Il Sung's proposal was a disguised attempt to deceive the world opinion and to communize South Korea "by force of arms." Economically Seoul's need for dependable sources for raw materials and markets is multiplying rapidly, and it has tailored its foreign policy accordingly. As a case in point, South Korea in December 1973 shifted its previous "even-handed policy" toward the Arab-Israeli conflict to a "pro-Arab policy"; a corollary of the shift was the enunciation in August 1979 of the South Korean decision to improve relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization, which it recognized as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. As of mid-1981 no formal ties were established, but Seoul continued to affirm the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinian people, supporting the Arab demand for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied by Israel since 1967. Apart from the need for crude oil, South Korea could not ignore the lucrative opportunities some of the Middle Eastern nations could provide to South Korea's bullish construction industry. For the same economic reason South Korea continued to maintain close and friendly relations with West European countries. Increasingly during the 1970s Britain, West Germany, and France became new sources of foreign capital and technology and markets for Seoul's booming exports. But there were also growing indications of protectionism among these countries against South Korean goods. In 1981 because of economic, political, and security considerations. South Korea ventured into a regional diplomacy with a view to establishing multifaceted cooperation with countries in Southeast Asia. In July Chun paid a fifteen-day state visit to the five member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN-Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). His principal message was that South Korea and the ASEAN countries could gain mutual benefit by establishing complementary economic relationships. Specifically South Korea would provide technology and share its experiences as a newly industrializing nation in exchange for energy, timber, and other mineral resources of the Southeast Asian nations. During the trip Chun also gained the general endorsement of ASEAN nations concerning Seoul's initiatives in inter-Korean relations, its suggestion to North Korea for simultaneous entry of the two Koreas into the UN, and its contention that the peace and security of Northeast Asia were closely linked to those of Southeast Asia. Although stridently anticommunist at home, South Korea in 1981 pursued a flexible policy toward the so-called "nonhostile" communist nations. Such a policy dates from August 1971 when South Korea proclaimed for the first time its willingness to establish formal relations with the Soviet Union and China if these countries were willing to recognize South Korea, cease their "hostile" activities, and suspend their aid to North Korea. By 1981 no diplomatic ties had been established with any of the communist nations because of consistent opposition by their ally, North Korea. Prospects for formal relations with either the Soviet Union or China were bleak at best because the interests of the United States, Japan, and the two communist powers relative to the Korean peninsula were in some issues at cross-purposes. Moreover despite its open-arm policy, the South Korean government itself had apprehensions about the communist nations. In January 1981 the foreign minister stated that it would be "unrealistic to expect any progress" in the near future since, as he put it, "the support of some communist countries for North Korea's bellicosity against the Republic of Korea . . . remains unmitigated." Nonetheless linkages with the communist world were not entirely absent. South Korea has telecommunications connections with most of the communist countries, and its nationals were allowed to visit some of these states in unofficial capacities. It also carried on some indirect trade with communist countries. With China, for instance, the volume of two-way trade reportedly reached US $300 million in 1980, the result of a steady increase since Seoul's unpublicized China trade began in the mid-1970s, though neither Seoul nor Beijing officially acknowledged the trade connection. Relations with North Korea One of the crowning ironies of contemporary Korean affairs is that the more the leaders of divided Korea articulate their respective policies on reunification, the more suspicious they become of each other's ulterior motives. In 1981 the two Koreas remained deadlocked in their rancorous and frigid relations, bedeviled as they were by distrust and enmity. Intermittent attempts to bring an end to their hostile confrontation had been futile. But there has been no lack of rhetorical expression by either, each claiming to be more sincere than the other about the imperative of unification. This is because an appearance of neglect would be popularly regarded as a betrayal of the "most sacred mission of the nation"-the unification of the divided fatherland. There is, however, growing pessimism across the board in South Korea about the future of inter-Korean peace and cooperation. Many are resigned to the notion that, the Korean peninsula being an historical pawn of rivalry among the major powers, the settlement of the Korean question must wait until the major powers can themselves first square their conflicting interests relative to Korea. The inter-Korean arms race is deplored as wasteful by thoughtful South Koreans but is still accepted as unavoidable because of what they regard as the hostile intentions and posturings of North Korean leaders. The tragedy of the Korean War is not easily forgotten, and anticommunism continues as a dominant theme in South Korean political socialization, serving in effect as what might be called "political religion" of the society. In inter-Korean relations South Korea has shown itself to be decidedly against any risky venture and hence its commitment to a policy of "peace first, unification later." South Korean policies toward North Korea, though rigid through the 1960s, have since been flexible and well attuned to the shifting currents of international politics both on regional and global levels. Generally these policies, depending on circumstances, have accentuated representation based on population, gradualism, government-to-government contact, and noninterference in each other's domestic and external affairs. Through 1969 in terms of overtures for inter-Korean reconciliation, the situation was one-sided; North Korea was clearly on the offensive with frequent proposals to South Korea for economic and cultural exchanges and for mutual reduction of the armed forces. Dismissing these as propaganda, South Korea, which has a two-to-one edge in population, called for an all-Korean legislature based on the one-man, one-vote principle and for the settlement of the Korean question through the UN. During the era of Syngman Rhee, South Korea also declared a policy of "unification by marching northward." After Rhee fell from power in April 1960 his successor government disavowed Rhee's "reckless policy of trying to unify Korea by force," but South Korea's basic position on inter-Korean relations, announced at Geneva in 1954, remained essentially unchanged. In fact for nearly a decade after Rhee, the term "peaceful unification" had a strong pro-North Korean connotation if only because North Korea had preempted its usage in appeals and overtures addressed to the South Korean government. Predictably the North Korean proposal in August 1960 for the establishment of a "confederation" with South Korea as an interim basis for cooperation-and eventual unification-was rejected as a disguised effort to take over South Korea. The battle of overtures for inter-Korean reconciliation was no longer one-sided after August 1970, at which time South Korea for the first time issued a challenge to P'yongyang to join in a peaceful competition to decide which side could better satisfy the varied needs of the Korean people. Although rejected by North Korea as a meaningless gesture, this challenge in effect ended P'yongyang's previous monopoly on the rhetoric of unification. Relations entered a new phase in August 1971 when the two sides agreed to hold dialogue through their Red Cross societies, with a view to an eventual reunion of separated families. Preliminary talks led to full-dress conferences a year later, alternately in Seoul and P'yongyang. The Red Cross contact was paralleled by behind-the-scenes efforts to open political talks starting in the fall of 1971, apparently on South Korea's initiative. These efforts culminated in a dramatic announcement by both Koreas of a joint communique on July 4, 1972. In this historic accord they pledged to collaborate on unification through "independent" Korean efforts without allowing foreign interference or depending on "outside force"; through "peaceful means"; and by seeking a "great national unity" that should transcend "differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems." The July 4 communique also contained an agreement to ease tensions and foster mutual trust by refraining from mudslinging, preventing inadvertent armed clashes, initiating multifaceted functional exchanges, expediting the Red Cross talks, installing a hot line between Seoul and P'yongyang, and establishing the North-South Coordinating Committee as the machinery for substantive negotiations and for implementing the agreed points. The committee met in November 1972 and agreed to set up five subcommittees dealing with political, military, foreign, economic, and cultural affairs. The formation of these bodies was contingent on progress at the North-South Coordinating Committee level. The dialogue was carried on through the coordination committee on one side and the Red Cross channel on the other. It became quickly obvious, however, that the disagreement was fundamental. South Korea was under no illusion about the difficult task of creating a unified Korea out of the two ideologically and structurally disparate systems. Equally formidable was the business of fostering mutual trust and confidence. In fact in July 1972, within days of the dramatic July 4 joint agreement, the then Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil declared that he would not trust "the communists who would throw away promises like a pair of old shoes"-until the North Koreans proved otherwise by faithfully carrying out the spirit and letter of the July 4 accord. He also ruled out what he called "gray unification" through any compromises. South Korea formally outlined its policy on inter-Korean relations in late 1972, calling on North Korea to accept "the present reality" of the Korean peninsula and to collaborate in what it called "the less sensitive" areas, i.e., humanitarian, cultural, and economic issues. The so-called easy-steps-first or gradualist approach would pave the way for the solution of more "complicated" political and military issues. For its part North Korea argued that the most effective way to promote mutual trust for cooperation was to end the military confrontation and arms race, since distrust stemmed from the mutual fear of surprise armed attack; furthermore it maintained that political factors could and should not be separated from the humanitarian, economic, and cultural considerations. The contrast was brought into a sharper focus in June 1973 when the two Koreas restated their positions. In reaffirming its resolve to preserve peace on the Korean peninsula at all costs, South Korea asked North Korea to refrain from interfering in the other's affairs and to recognize the existing reality of divided Korea. It also declared an intention to continue dialogue with North Korea, to seek UN membership for both Koreas if this would not prejudice unification, and to initiate an open-door policy toward all nations including communist nations. Predictably North Korea laid a heavy emphasis on the termination of military confrontation. This was to be done by halting the arms race, securing the removal of foreign forces from South Korea, reducing the size of military establishments, refusing to bring in weapons from foreign countries, and concluding an inter-Korean peace agreement. Additional overtures included a broad-gauged collaboration in political, military, diplomatic, economic, and cultural affairs; the convening of "a great national congress" comprising representatives of people from all walks of life from both sides; the naming of the confederation after the unified kingdom of Koryo (A.D. 932-1392); and a membership in the UN under the single name of the "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo"-but not before the establishment of the confederation. By mid-1973 the inter-Korean negotiations had become deadlocked. In March 1974 a new element of uncertainty was introduced. At that time North Korea proposed to the United States to negotiate directly on the question of reducing military tensions in the Korean peninsula including the issue of withdrawing foreign troops from South Korea. Its rationale was that South Korean authorities had neither the intention nor capability to address questions of peace, allegedly because real control over the South Korean armed forces had been exercised by the United States, not South Korea. The United States let it be known that it would have no negotiations with North Korea unless South Korea was also a full participant. In 1975 the fall of South Vietnam to the North Vietnamese Communists was cause for Seoul's heightened insecurity; the familiar cry of "threat from the North" became progressively more shrill in the media of mass communications and in countless mass rallies. The imminence of surprise attack was underscored; pointed reminders were made that North Korea continued to send agents into South Korea, dig tunnels under the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and enjoy a superior offensive edge in air power (see Armed Forces, ch. 5). Inter-Korean relations became strained more than ever, each blaming the other for the escalation of tensions. Given the mass appeal associated with the symbolism of unification and its implication for the rival governments, each claiming to be the sole representative of the Korean people, neither side wanted to appear less sincere than the other about the "historic mission of peaceful unification." Thus although there has been no significant breakthrough since the early 1970s, the two Koreas have continued their intermittent and predictably fruitless efforts to revive the stalled talks. In January 1979 South Korea proposed an unconditional resumption of negotiations, but working-level contacts in the ensuing weeks produced little other than restatement of their basic positions. Between February and August 1980 another round of preliminary talks was held, this time on the North Korean initiative made in January 1980, with the purpose of convening a premier-level conference. In making the proposal North Korea called its counterpart by its official name for the first time, and in accepting the overture South Korea reciprocated by calling North Korea by its formal name-another first in inter-Korean relations. But a total of ten working-level sessions failed to narrow differences on what should be included in the agenda. Mutual distrust and discord were so entrenched that the rival governments could not agree on the meaning of such terms as "collaboration," "unity," and "peaceful unification." Another contentious issue in 1980, as in the past, was whether the premier-level talks should be part of broader contacts including nongovernmental groups (as North Korea wanted) or whether they should be on what South Korea insisted was a more "manageable" government-to-government level. In September 1980 the talks were suspended by North Korea. In January 1981 South Korea went on the offensive in proposing an exchange of visits between the presidents of the two countries. In a New Year policy speech, Chun offered "a historic movement to unconditionally resume the suspended dialogue" and to address the unification question that takes into account "the prevailing circumstances." Specifically he announced: I invite President Kim Il Sung of North Korea to visit Seoul without any condition attached and free of any obligation on his part. I will ensure that his personal safety is fully guaranteed during his stay in Seoul. I will extend all possible cooperation to him if he wishes to travel to any place of his choice in order to take a firsthand look at the actual situation in Seoul, other cities or rural areas. I also want to make it clear that I am prepared, at any time, to visit North Korea if he invites me on the same terms as I offer. In expressing the view that an avenue to the solution of any inter-Korean problems could be found after the exchange of presidential visits, Chun also let it be known where his country stood on the question of reconciliation: "The day of reunification, our nation's long-cherished goal, will not be far away if only both sides begin reaching agreement on the most amenable matters in the least sensitive areas and progress toward the more difficult ones." Chun's overture was turned down. In doing so North Korea contented that any effort toward unification that glossed over certain "basic problems" would be futile. The solution of these basic issues was said to require Chun to "apologize to the whole nation" for the civil disturbance of Kwangju in May 1980; to release Kim Dae Jung and all other political prisoners along with the restoration of all dissolved "democratic political parties and organizations"; to remake the "two Koreas" policy of South Korea said to have been proclaimed on June 23, 1973; and to "demand the withdrawal of the United States troops from South Korea." * * * A number of works on South Korean domestic politics and foreign affairs are available, but most of these are in Korean, published in Seoul. Among those works readily available in English deserving mention for introductory reading are: Han Sung-Joo's The Failure of Democracy in South Korea; Gregory Henderson's Korea: The Politics of the Vortex; Political Participation in Korea: Democracy, Mobilization, and Stability by Chong Lim Kim (ed.); Joungwon A. Kim's Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945-1972; Strategies of Survival: The Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States by Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrke; The Security of Korea: U.S. and Japanese Perspectives on the 1980s by Franklin B. Weinstein and Kamiya Fuji (eds.); Nathan White's U.S. Policy Toward Korea: Analysis, Alternatives, and Recommendations, and Korean Politics in Transition edited by Edward Reynolds Wright. In addition Studies on Korea: A Scholar's Guide, edited by Han-Kyo Kim, may be consulted for further reading. Critical works on internal politics during the 1970s and through mid-June 1981 are notably scarce either in Korean or English. Generally objective accounts of the political scene may be found in the Far Eastern Economic Review, a Hong Kong-based weekly, and in the annual summary articles on South Korea published in the January issues of Asian Survey. The London-based Financial Times often carries very perceptive items on varied aspects of South Korea, as do the Christian Science Monitor, The New York Times, and the Washington Post. The English-language daily Korea Herald, published in Seoul, is useful because it consistently mirrors the views and policies of the South Korean government. (For further information see Bibliography.)