Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0302/03027.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 43KB | 655 lines

$Unique_ID{COW03027}
$Pretitle{360}
$Title{Romania
The Romanian-Soviet Military Protocol of October 26, 1944.}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Major Alesandru Dutu}
$Affiliation{Embassy of Romania, Washington DC}
$Subject{romanian
army
military
soviet
transylvania
national
general
romanians
forces
country}
$Date{1990}
$Log{}
Country:     Romania
Book:        Romanian Military History
Author:      Major Alesandru Dutu
Affiliation: Embassy of Romania, Washington DC
Date:        1990

The Romanian-Soviet Military Protocol of October 26, 1944.

FROM COOPERATION TO DIKTAT

     From the moment Romania joined the United Nations, on August 23, 1944,
the Romanian Staff, which operated on behalf of the the National Military
Command, founded all the drafted documents on the principles of the
relationships established between free, independent and sovereign states.
Telling thereon is the very strategic outlook regarding the military
operations aimed at the defeat of Hitler and Horthy troops on the national
territory, which efficiently and thoroughly met the imperatives, military
and political, of the historical moment, according to which the liberation
of the national territory was to be achieved through the participation of all
the military forces of the country, of the entire Romanian people. That was
in full keeping with the provision included in the King's Proclamation to the
Country, which read: "Upon the courage with which we shall defend, arms in
hand, our independence against any attempt at our right to decide by ourselves
our destiny depends the future of our country." Significant for the relations
of dignity and mutual esteem which should, from the very start, underlie the
cooperation with the Soviet forces is the notification contained in the
Strategic Directive issued by the Romanian Staff, in the evening of August 23,
1944, on the "Behaviour toward the (Soviet) United Nations" which stressed
that this should be "friendly and dignified, without lapsing into servilism."

     Despite the fact that the Romanian forces ceased first the hostilities
in many sectors of the front, the Romanian-Soviet military cooperation began
from the very moment when the country joined the United Nations, even before
the Romanian and Soviet Commands established the political and military
contacts, cooperation materialized into efficient joint actions for the defeat
of great Hitler units of the Southern Ukraine Army Group.

     In various sectors, Romanian commanders or their commissioners
established contacts with the advanced Soviet corps, officially informing them
about the battles fought against Hitler troops, suggesting efficient
cooperation forms, starting - as Lieutenant-Colonel Gheorghe Matei emphasized
on August 27, 1944 - from the "position of an ally and not from an inferior
position detrimental to the morale of military staff and soldiers." On
several occasion, by order of the government and the Staff, Romanian generals
also approached the questions regarding the observance by the Soviet Union of
the "demarcation line" on the Focsani-Namoloasa-Braila-Maritime Danube
alignment, the conservation of a part of the national territory exclusively
under Romanian control, the coordination of the movement of the Soviet Army
over the Romanian Plain, the cessation of the disarmament measures applied to
the Romanian troops and the return of the military captured after August 23,
1944, the cooperation procedures between Romanian-Soviet river and sea forces,
both to quickly defeat the enemy as well as to check the Soviet ultimatums for
the capture of the Romanian fleet, the reinstatement of the Romanian
administration in the eastern part of the country, the settlement of the
supply of Soviet troops on equitable, mutually accepted bases.

     Similar provisions had been in fact included also in the orders issued
on August 23, 1944, by General Gheorghe Mihail, Chief of Staff and head of the
military commission of the Romanian delegation which went to Moscow to sign
the armistice with the United Nations. The orders clearly showed the Romanian
strategic plans to wage war against Hitler and Horthy troops and the
cooperation forms with the Soviet Army: the liberation of the national
territory under the jurisdiction of the Romanian government "only by the
Romanian troops"; the intervention of the Soviet Army "only if needed and only
if requested by the Romanian Army"; the movement of the Soviet troops
southward, if "they need, on the direction Predeal, Ploiesti, Bucuresti,
Giurgiu"; the correlated actions of the Romanian Army for the liberation of
the country's northeast, snatched away by Horthy Hungary under the Vienna
Award of August 30, 1940, with the Soviet Army "which  will leave the
Moldavian Mountain Range"; the control of the military operations by a
Romanian Command and within a "well-defined" sector etc.

     The unhindered movement of the Soviet Army south of the envisaged
"demarcation line" within the fortified zone in eastern Romania, through the
Romanian Plain and Dobrudja, as well as the subordination of the Romanian
forces starting September 6/7, 1944 to the Ukrainian 2nd Front, without the
prior notice of the Romanian government, before the conclusion of the
armistice convention, then the incorporation of the Romanian armies in the
Soviet troops' disposal considerably changed the strategic plans of the
National Military Command regarding the homeland's liberation, practically
shunning it from the command of military operations. Notwithstanding that,
General Dumitru Damaceanu informed Moscow, on September 11, 1944, about the
initial Romanian position regarding the participation in the anti-Hitler war
and the cooperation ways with the Soviet forces. Although the representatives
of the great powers agreed, in principle, with some of these claims and
proposals, with the need to arm some Romanian great units included, they
deemed that these were "only application details" and decided to be
subsequently solved by the Romanian and Soviet military authorities and
included in a special bilateral convention. Thus, the Armistice Convention
stipulated only the minimum quantum of forces Romania was to make available
("no less than 12 infantry divisions with suplimentary means") which "will be
put under the general command of the High Allied Command (Soviet)" as well as
the country's obligation to ensure, by communication and on its own expenses,
facilities for the free movement on the teritory, function of military needs
etc.

     On September 25, 1944, Marshal R.I. Malinowski, Commander of the
Ukrainian 2nd Front and Chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Romania
and General Gheorghe Mihail, Chief of Staff, began, at the head of the Soviet
and Romanian delegations, to draft the military protocol. Although, at first,
the debates seemed to be efficient and would soon lead to the conclusion of a
military protocol accepted by both sides, the subsequent discussions carried
with Marshal R.I. Malinowski's delegates proved to be extremely complex, due,
mainly, to the refusal by the Soviet side to include in the protocol the
following facts: the beginning of the military operations against Nazi Reich
in the morning of August 24, 1944 and not on September 12; the cover
operations fulfilled by the Romanian forces for the Soviet army massed north
of the Southern Carpathians and west of the Western Carpathians; the return
of the Romanian military captured by the Soviet troops after August 23, 1944;
the manufacturing at home of the armament, ammunition and other materials
necessary for the army; the keeping of own depots and workshops, as well as of
the captures made from Hitler and Horthy troops during warfare; the keeping
by Romania of German and Hungarian war prisoners etc. The Romanian delegation
categorically opposed the Soviet demand to demobilize and dismantle the great
units and the other units which were not meant to take part in the military
operations, a provision that had not been included in the Armistice Convention
of September 12,