Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0302/03026.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 26KB | 401 lines

$Unique_ID{COW03026}
$Pretitle{360}
$Title{Romania
Romania in the Summer of 1939}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu, D Hist}
$Affiliation{Embassy of Romania, Washington DC}
$Subject{romania
pact
august
romanian
moscow
romania's
soviet
bucharest
war
political}
$Date{1990}
$Log{}
Country:     Romania
Book:        Romanian Military History
Author:      Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu, D Hist
Affiliation: Embassy of Romania, Washington DC
Date:        1990

Romania in the Summer of 1939

     In the period prior to the second world flare-up, Romania remained, at
all costs, consistent with the alliances orchestrated by the French-British
diplomacy and initiated multiple actions to forestall, on a general, and
particularly on a local plane, an all-out aggression. Like always before,
Romania's diplomatic contacts pursued the defence of the state's territorial
integrity, the improvement of relations with the neighbouring states in the
belief that the establishment of normal relations could prevent territorial
revisions in the area, and remove the specter of war. Yet the Big Powers, by
their diplomatic games in the summer of 1939 did not meet the legitimate hopes
of Bucharest. Romania was in no way involved in the evolution of events in the
summer of 1939, events rolling to an outbreak of hostilities.

     To attain such objectives, Bucharest diplomacy had put out feelers,
especially in the capitals of the big allied powers, Paris and London, with a
view to keeping southeast Europe out of the oncoming conflict. Along this
line, besides attempts to sound the real intentions of the big powers, Romania
had shown its preoccupation for a British-French-Soviet understanding to bar
the ascent of the Third Reich within southeast Europe as well as to normalize
its relations with some neighbouring revisionist states at a time when the
major goal was to safeguard the peace.

     A basic rationale of Romania was to consolidate its alliance with the
states in the Balkan Entente. Proof thereof stands the August 1939 visit by
the Romanian head of state to Turkey. The Bucharest authorities were relying
on Turkey even in the eventuality of a non-aggression pact concluded with the
Soviet Union, provided the latter acknowledged Romania's territorial
integrity. Confronted with Ismet Inonu and N. Menemencioglu, Carol II
expressed Romania's resolve to resist "in case of attacks" and confessed that
his country had until then pursued a "policy of precautions" in order to shun
"German antagonism". Moreover, the Romanian head of state proved skeptical
with regard to collaboration with the Soviet Union which Romania could not
trust as long as it did not assure "de jure acknowledgment of Bessarabia's
frontier. Carol II grounded his opinions on the impasse of the tripartite
negotiations, and on certain information relayed by the Romanian and foreign
diplomatic offices in connection with Soviet-German negotiations on the
conclusion of a political and economic treaty. An agreement was reached that
the two parties take common stands in London and Paris in order to determine
the "western democracies" to "immediately" assume the obligations provided in
the guarantee declarations.

     After his return to Bucharest, the king gave an audience to Adrien
Thierry, on August 19. The French diplomat found Carol II "very firm in his
resolve to put up resistance". Yet, he transmitted to Quai d'Orsay that "his
firmness depends, above all, on the country's potential for resistance in the
face of the aggressor." Moreover, the French ambassador noted that "the
Romanians are decided to defend themselves in case of armed aggression and
maintain that they are ready to resist an economic ultimatum from Germany." In
the face of the worsening international situation following the headway of the
Third Reich, Carol II expressed Romania's wish to remain neutral "as long as
possible provided she is not subject to a direct attack."

     The Romanian means of information showed special interest in the
development of the tripartite talks. Public opinion, in consensus with
Bucharest diplomacy considered the tripartite alliance a vital necessity,
meeting the desire of all independent states in Europe to be sheltered from
war. On August 8, 1939 Armand Calinescu noted that these talks "can lead to
positive results." Romania pinning great hopes in the power of understanding
of the three Big Powers. The conclusion of a mutual assistance treaty between
the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France would have essentially changed the
balance of forces in the world to the detriment of the fascist states, new
aggressions being thus prevented.

     The discussions between military missions, as well as the political
negotiations, threw into relief the disagreement between the British
viewpoint, supported by the French, and the Soviet one. Two days after the
beginning of the talks, W. Seeds contacted the Foreign Office to inform on his
first observations. From the very start, he reported, Marshal K. Voroshilov
tried to learn whether the Soviet troops could act against the German troops
on Polish and Romanian territories. Remarking that Poland and Romania "are
independent states" Admiral Drax suggested to the Soviet representative to
apply for a direct answer from these governments, this being "the simplest and
most direct solution." "Competent observers" Seeds relayed, "are impressed
with Voroshilov's apparent sincerity, he seeming most willing to have the
military operations carried on outside the Soviet territory." The head of the
Foreign Office confessed in a cable to John Le Rougetel, on August 17, that,
as far as the Romanian government was concerned, there was no intention "to
contact it on this matter for the time being."

     On August 17, since Great Britain and France had not yet answered
Voroshilov's questions, the tripartite talks were adjourned for a few days, in
order to give the London and Paris governments the possibility to send the
clarifications required by the Soviets.

     The Soviet Union was leading in parallel two rounds of negotiations; an
official one, through K. Voroshilov, with the British-French and secret
negotiations with Germany through V.M. Molotov. Because the Soviet's
bargainings with the British-French were going on very slowly Stalin decided,
on August 19, to strike the agreement with the Nazi Reich. He accepted, for
August 23, a Moscow visit by the German foreign minister, Joachim von
Ribbentrop.

     The Foreign Office had acted without haste during the tripartite
negotiations out of a desire to succeed. The hesitations, vague proposals and
complicated wording had created doubts as to Great Britain's decision to make
a military intervention. On September 3, the doubt was to prove unfounded.
Anyway France had offered much more, sensing the catastrophic effects the
failure of the tripartite negotiations could trigger off. Nevertheless, the
action of the two "western democracies" bore the onus of the Munich Pact.
During the negotiations, Moscow had not mentioned the pact signed in the
Bavarian capital. Yet mistrust in connection with this past move had hovered
over the talks. To offset this the negotiators would have had to pull out of
their sleeves a further trump: Poland's formal adhesion. And this adhesion was
unfortunately missing. The head of the Sanocja showed no discomfort when
learning about von Ribbentrop's trip to Moscow which he saw as one "more
reason" justifying his lack of confidence in the Soviet Union. Great Britain
and France had to take into account, during the Moscow negotiations, several
factors: their delayed military preparations, the diverging views of public
opinion, the refusal of the Baltic states and of Poland to let the Soviet Army
enter their territories. The reasons behind the protracted talks and their
final failure must be sought in the deep-going contradictions between the
governments interested, and in the ambiguities implied. As far as Romania is
concerned, she did not participate in the final act of t