$Unique_ID{COW03027}
$Pretitle{360}
$Title{Romania
The Romanian-Soviet Military Protocol of October 26, 1944.}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Major Alesandru Dutu}
$Affiliation{Embassy of Romania, Washington DC}
$Subject{romanian
army
military
soviet
transylvania
national
general
romanians
forces
country}
$Date{1990}
$Log{}
Country:     Romania
Book:        Romanian Military History
Author:      Major Alesandru Dutu
Affiliation: Embassy of Romania, Washington DC
Date:        1990

The Romanian-Soviet Military Protocol of October 26, 1944.

FROM COOPERATION TO DIKTAT

     From the moment Romania joined the United Nations, on August 23, 1944,
the Romanian Staff, which operated on behalf of the the National Military
Command, founded all the drafted documents on the principles of the
relationships established between free, independent and sovereign states.
Telling thereon is the very strategic outlook regarding the military
operations aimed at the defeat of Hitler and Horthy troops on the national
territory, which efficiently and thoroughly met the imperatives, military
and political, of the historical moment, according to which the liberation
of the national territory was to be achieved through the participation of all
the military forces of the country, of the entire Romanian people. That was
in full keeping with the provision included in the King's Proclamation to the
Country, which read: "Upon the courage with which we shall defend, arms in
hand, our independence against any attempt at our right to decide by ourselves
our destiny depends the future of our country." Significant for the relations
of dignity and mutual esteem which should, from the very start, underlie the
cooperation with the Soviet forces is the notification contained in the
Strategic Directive issued by the Romanian Staff, in the evening of August 23,
1944, on the "Behaviour toward the (Soviet) United Nations" which stressed
that this should be "friendly and dignified, without lapsing into servilism."

     Despite the fact that the Romanian forces ceased first the hostilities
in many sectors of the front, the Romanian-Soviet military cooperation began
from the very moment when the country joined the United Nations, even before
the Romanian and Soviet Commands established the political and military
contacts, cooperation materialized into efficient joint actions for the defeat
of great Hitler units of the Southern Ukraine Army Group.

     In various sectors, Romanian commanders or their commissioners
established contacts with the advanced Soviet corps, officially informing them
about the battles fought against Hitler troops, suggesting efficient
cooperation forms, starting - as Lieutenant-Colonel Gheorghe Matei emphasized
on August 27, 1944 - from the "position of an ally and not from an inferior
position detrimental to the morale of military staff and soldiers." On
several occasion, by order of the government and the Staff, Romanian generals
also approached the questions regarding the observance by the Soviet Union of
the "demarcation line" on the Focsani-Namoloasa-Braila-Maritime Danube
alignment, the conservation of a part of the national territory exclusively
under Romanian control, the coordination of the movement of the Soviet Army
over the Romanian Plain, the cessation of the disarmament measures applied to
the Romanian troops and the return of the military captured after August 23,
1944, the cooperation procedures between Romanian-Soviet river and sea forces,
both to quickly defeat the enemy as well as to check the Soviet ultimatums for
the capture of the Romanian fleet, the reinstatement of the Romanian
administration in the eastern part of the country, the settlement of the
supply of Soviet troops on equitable, mutually accepted bases.

     Similar provisions had been in fact included also in the orders issued
on August 23, 1944, by General Gheorghe Mihail, Chief of Staff and head of the
military commission of the Romanian delegation which went to Moscow to sign
the armistice with the United Nations. The orders clearly showed the Romanian
strategic plans to wage war against Hitler and Horthy troops and the
cooperation forms with the Soviet Army: the liberation of the national
territory under the jurisdiction of the Romanian government "only by the
Romanian troops"; the intervention of the Soviet Army "only if needed and only
if requested by the Romanian Army"; the movement of the Soviet troops
southward, if "they need, on the direction Predeal, Ploiesti, Bucuresti,
Giurgiu"; the correlated actions of the Romanian Army for the liberation of
the country's northeast, snatched away by Horthy Hungary under the Vienna
Award of August 30, 1940, with the Soviet Army "which  will leave the
Moldavian Mountain Range"; the control of the military operations by a
Romanian Command and within a "well-defined" sector etc.

     The unhindered movement of the Soviet Army south of the envisaged
"demarcation line" within the fortified zone in eastern Romania, through the
Romanian Plain and Dobrudja, as well as the subordination of the Romanian
forces starting September 6/7, 1944 to the Ukrainian 2nd Front, without the
prior notice of the Romanian government, before the conclusion of the
armistice convention, then the incorporation of the Romanian armies in the
Soviet troops' disposal considerably changed the strategic plans of the
National Military Command regarding the homeland's liberation, practically
shunning it from the command of military operations. Notwithstanding that,
General Dumitru Damaceanu informed Moscow, on September 11, 1944, about the
initial Romanian position regarding the participation in the anti-Hitler war
and the cooperation ways with the Soviet forces. Although the representatives
of the great powers agreed, in principle, with some of these claims and
proposals, with the need to arm some Romanian great units included, they
deemed that these were "only application details" and decided to be
subsequently solved by the Romanian and Soviet military authorities and
included in a special bilateral convention. Thus, the Armistice Convention
stipulated only the minimum quantum of forces Romania was to make available
("no less than 12 infantry divisions with suplimentary means") which "will be
put under the general command of the High Allied Command (Soviet)" as well as
the country's obligation to ensure, by communication and on its own expenses,
facilities for the free movement on the teritory, function of military needs
etc.

     On September 25, 1944, Marshal R.I. Malinowski, Commander of the
Ukrainian 2nd Front and Chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Romania
and General Gheorghe Mihail, Chief of Staff, began, at the head of the Soviet
and Romanian delegations, to draft the military protocol. Although, at first,
the debates seemed to be efficient and would soon lead to the conclusion of a
military protocol accepted by both sides, the subsequent discussions carried
with Marshal R.I. Malinowski's delegates proved to be extremely complex, due,
mainly, to the refusal by the Soviet side to include in the protocol the
following facts: the beginning of the military operations against Nazi Reich
in the morning of August 24, 1944 and not on September 12; the cover
operations fulfilled by the Romanian forces for the Soviet army massed north
of the Southern Carpathians and west of the Western Carpathians; the return
of the Romanian military captured by the Soviet troops after August 23, 1944;
the manufacturing at home of the armament, ammunition and other materials
necessary for the army; the keeping of own depots and workshops, as well as of
the captures made from Hitler and Horthy troops during warfare; the keeping
by Romania of German and Hungarian war prisoners etc. The Romanian delegation
categorically opposed the Soviet demand to demobilize and dismantle the great
units and the other units which were not meant to take part in the military
operations, a provision that had not been included in the Armistice Convention
of September 12, 1944. Finally, after the Romanian side put forth three draft
protocols and made several concessions via-a-vis the provisions of the two
Soviets drafts, the works were suspended since no consensus could be reached.

     As the protocol had to be signed, the discussions were resumed on October
23, 1944, the Romanian delegation being headed that time by General Nicolae
Radescu, the new Chief of Staff. During the debates, held over a fresh draft
protocol, worked out by the Soviet delegation only in Russian, General V.P.
Vinogradov, deputy chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Romania
informed about the decision taken by Marshal R.I. Malinovski that the great
units meant to remain at home as a strategic reserve should be 3 divisions
instead of 10 as previously suggested by the Staff. After he declared that
this notification outpassed the mandate given to him, General Nicolae Radescu
informed that he would "let the government know about it," the proceedings
being practically suspended again.

     Nevertheless, after a short while, in the evening of October 25, 1944,
at 9 p.m., at the Council of Ministers a last ultimatum-like meeting took
place in the presence of the prime-minister, General Constantin Sanatescu,
when the Soviet delegation handed the protocol signed by General V.P.
Vinogradov and declared that all the terms "are definitive and can be
discussed no more." If the Romanian side refused to sign it, this would lead
the Soviet side went on, to "a grave situation, even to the demobilization and
dismantlement by Soviet armed forces, of all the great Romanian units which
do not take part in operations according to the provisions included in the
Armistice Convention." Therefore, General Nicolae Radescu, after saying that
he did all he could not only for "the rigorous application of the armistice
terms," but even for "the overfulfilment of the obligations incumbent upon
us" emphasized that unless someone thought that the Staff" does not correctly
interpret the terms written in the Armistice Convention" he would ask for the
advice of the Romanian Commission for the application of the armistice,
following that, if this would consider that the position taken by the Staff
was not wrong, then he would not sign the protocol.

     Although the answer given the following day by the Romanian Commission
for the application of the armistice stressed that "the text quoted cannot be
interpreted to the effect that the dismantlement and demobilization of
Romanian divisions remained within the country should be called", the Chief
of Staff was forced to sign the protocol, with the reserve as specified in the
additional note to the protocol: "As a representative of the government and a
representative of the Romanian High Command I declare the settlement by the
Allied Control Commission (Soviet) of the number of great Romanian units which
could remain within the country's territory as underiving from the obligations
imposed upon Romania by the Armistice Convention of September 12, 1944 (Art.
1, Art. 18, annex to Art. 18), terms that cannot be modified by this protocol.
The protocol I sign as being imposed upon us by the Allied Control Commission
(Soviet) and with a view to avoiding damaging consequences to the joint
operations against' Germany and Hungary." In his turn, General Constantin
Sanatescu, referring to the conditions in which this protocol was signed,
informed the King on May 14, 1945: "My predecessor, General Radescu, signed
a military protocol, a protocol imposed upon us and contrary to the terms of
the armistice. My opposition as Chairman of the Council (of Ministers - e.n.)
and also of General Radescu, as Chief of Staff, brought us no favourable
result.

     Finally, the protocol included provisions on the command structure of the
operational Romanian army, including the number and name of the units and
great units taking part in the military operations and the ways the losses
should be completed - accepted by the Romanian side - but also terms which
seriously affected, further on, both the defense capacity of the country as
well as the combat force of the Romanian army. Among the latter mention should
be made of certain provisions regarding the dismantlement, till December 1,
1944, of the commands of the 3rd Army, army 1st and 3rd corps, of cavarly and
of motorized troops, of 10 infantry and mountain divisions, 1 motorized
division and 3 divisions of cavalry, as well as thedemobilization down to
peace effectives of the commands of army 5th corps and mountain corps and of 3
infantry or mountain division, all meant to form, according to the Staff
plans, a strategic reserve to make up for the losses suffered by the Romanian
troops on the anti-Hitler front.

THE ARMY DURING THE REVOLUTION

An Interview with Colonel-General VICTOR STANCULESCU Minister of National
Defence

by Commander ILIE MANOLE

     Your Excellency, the first victory of the revolution bore the name of
Timisoara. You were there and therefore you know the truth. We would like you
to tell us this truth, to tell it again and again until even the enemies of
this country understood it, those enemies who shot during that blood-stained
December, who are sowing now dissention, waging the most diabolical
psychological war ever known so far. What can you tell us, therefore, about
Timisoara in mid December 1989?

     Timisoara was, as you have already said, the first triumph of our
Revolution. This would be in fact the first truth of the series of truths you
asked me to unveil... On December 17, General Vasile Milea ordered me to leave
for Timisoara, as I used to know well the local military. I flew on board of
a plane together with Ion Coman and Generals Stefan Gusa and Mihai Chitac.
There had already been shooting in Timisoara and two vehicles were burning
in front of the barracks. Numerous dangerous speculations are being made about
what had happened there. Those who - under the complicated and misleading
circumstances of December 17-19 - could not manage to lure the army to produce
a terrible bloodshed and to determine afterwards the implementation of some
diabolical, previously concocted schemes had been subsequently buttressed,
after December 25-30, by an "infusion" of foreign individuals and groups, and,
by joining their actions, have changed their tactics aiming at the very
defender and warrant of the revolution which is the army. But they are aiming
their targets by the 'bullets' of rumours, incriminations and discrediting.
They manage to lay a trap only for those who are ignoring several things which
I - and some others who are acquainted with the events - am considering as
unitary and relevant. It must be known that Ion Coman had been empowered in
Timisoara with a similar mandate of the 'supreme commander' and that the
forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and of the Securitate had already
known and occupied their combat disposition, when the army units received the
order to take action. It must also be known that the reaction of the army was
incredibly moderate, though the military had been instructed in such a way as
to believe that a sly group had launched a local revolt correlated with
concentrations of foreign troops on the borders, so that, taking advantage of
Romania's destabilization, they could infringe the territorial integrity,
though our units had been given the command to make use of weapons, though
they had been subjected to mounting pressure and to aggressions unknown so
far - wounded and killed military, damaged or burned vehicles, agressors who
had forced barracks, attacks on other targets, a.s.o. It is beyond any doubt
that the army has always been on the people's side and that should they shot,
for instance, only the machine gun of a single troops carrier, the result
would have been awful: 2,400-3,600 casualties during a single minute. And how
many minutes and troop carriers were there at that time? And it is a hard fact
that the 'eyes burning with revolutionary passion' (to quote a civilian
journalist) did not belong to the Romanian military; they have always had
limpid eyes and souls free from the burden of crimes. As a natural follow-up
of their attitude during those dreadful nights and days the same military and
commanders managed to get rid of the trap they had been pushed into and to
ensure the victory of the revolution in Timisoara; at about noon time, I
ordered the military in front of the former county seat to withdraw in the
building leaving there the demonstrants who had gathered and I refused to
read the crowds the decree on the curfew, which would have unleashed the
repression. I wrote an application to be put in reserve and I was told that
'a death sentence was in store for me.' The following day, on December 21,
at about 5.30 a.m., I was admitted into hospital and after 10 p.m. I was
allowed by General Vasile Milea to come back to Bucharest.

     "The renewal of the army is a necessity, a support for its stability and
unity. The constructive dialogue in military units, institutions, in command
and in the General Staff proves to be extremely useful for solving the army's
problems within the framework of the army. The results are most
encouraging."

     What happened in Bucharest? What happened in the other barracks during
the Revolution?

     I have to make clear one more thing: though the military units in the
municipality of Timisoara had been withdrawn within the barracks for about 24
hours, on December 21, 1989, the revolutionary process in the other Romanian
localities had not taken shape yet and those who intended to take advantage
of the 'protest meeting' organized in the Capital City by the dictators as of
a favourable opportunity of galvanizing the masses' revolutionary mood
expected it to be rather a new 'Brasov '87' than a victory. It is a well-known
fact that the history of those days is now, after more than four months from
the victory, the object of the research work of numerous scientific bodies in
the army had in other parts of the country in order to point out with utmost
objectivity the role and the place of all social forces that contributed to
the elimination of the totalitarian dictatorship of the Ceausescus, to the
Romanian nation's rebirth unto freedom, dignity and democracy. Though these
efforts will be further continued during the following stages, the conclusion
that the army has played a decisive role in obtaining and consolidating the
victory against the dictatorship and, after that, in ensuring the stability of
the Romanian society under the difficult conditions of the previsional
situation preceding the free elections. I could mention only a few crucial
moments of the revolutionary process which may fully confirm this conclusion.
Thus, the army's fraternization with the revolutionaries during the night of
December 21/22 and the morning of December 22, an action grounded on the
determination and spirit of sacrifice of the command of the Ministry of
National Defence unchained first of all the revolutionary forces and,
secondly, produced a sudden, decisive change of the relation of forces in
their favour. And it couldn't have happened otherwise, as the whole history
of our people is a certain proof of the fact that the army has always been and
will ever be on the people's side and that it has identified with the people
at all times, including the most difficult moments, with its sacred and
legitimated social and national interests. On December 23, 24 and 25 and the
following days, until the end of '89 and the beginning of '90, organized gangs
of terrorists, well armed and long trained by the dictator, following a
pre-established nation-wide plan were unleashed against the revolutionary
forces, among which the army was at the time the main component, and also
against the civilian population. The strategic goal of that diabolic and
thoroughly anti-human plan was the destruction of the newly created state
bodies, the obstruction of the armed forces and, most probably, the creation
of favourable conditions for a military intervention to bring the Ceausescu
clan back to power. The army acted like an entity to annihilate the repressive
apparatus of the Securitate and to defend throughout the country the strategic
targets of the revolution (the television, the broadcasting company, the post
palace and the telecommunications centres, the headquarters of the new state
bodies, the headquarters of the Ministry of National Defence and of other
ministries, etc.). Highly important were the action for the defence of the
vital economic and social objectives (electric power generating plants, water
stations, hydroenergetic dams, warehouses, etc.) and, no less important, the
protection of the population and of the material and spiritual assets of the
national patrimony. I have to say that all these actions took place under the
circumstances of an extremely hard radio-electronic and psychologic war of
desinformation.

And yet...?

     Despite all these, the military successfully took part, during all this
interval, in searching the terrorists' locations (such as, for example,
180.underground places, bunkers and galleries), in supplying the population of
the Capital City with food, in guarding the foreign donations, etc. They also
checked certain buildings imperilled by possible mining and ensured the guard
and security of aircraft, the surveillance of air, maritime space and of state
boundaries. The efforts made by the military can be illustrated by the
effectives involved in these actions which rallied over 19,000 persons and 250
armoured vehicles, out of which only in the Capital there were about 6,000
people, 150 tanks and 74 armoured troop carriers. To these effectives we have
to add those of the Ministry of Internal Affairs which had been transferred
to the authority of the army to be controlled and commanded. But the noble
sacrifice of the 185 killed and 469 wounded, officers, masters,
non-commissioned officers, young recruits in the military service and civilian
employees, enhance the glory of the military within the Ministry of National
Defence, a lofty tribute laid on the sacred altar of our freedom, of national
dignity, democracy, progress and wellbeing.

     The army knows you and recognizes you as its head. But there have been a
lot of refined and anchronical actions meant to accuse the army and discredit
its command. Can you give us more detail on this aspect and tell us who and
why is acting in such a way?

     You are right. The psychologic war has unfortunately reached an apparent
climax and a special 'ammunition' - rumours, incriminations, distortions,
malicious interpretations, discreditings, etc. - is directly used even against
those who fought, most of whom laid down their lives for the revolution. For
instance: the fact that in the beginning, to prevent a worsening of the
situation, we did not give the due reply to certain assertions about the
attacks of the Special Anti-Terrorist Troops against the headquarters of our
ministry is now turning against us, the defence mission we carried out being
labelled by the Zig Zag newspaper of April 23-29 as 'a crime that has to be
unveiled.' And to make the distortion and diversion more successful, they are
launching rhetorical questions like: 'Who is interested in dissolving the
Special Anti-Terrorist Troops?' and 'Who is interested to have Romania
disarmed in front of international terrorism?' In fact the question should
sound otherwise: 'Who is interested in asking such questions and in making up
inexistent crimes?' The necessary revelations will be made in due time to make
clear the facts.

     Our dead and wounded - both military and civilians - the mourning and the
pain of those who have lived to carry on the revolution force us not to
forget what happened. That is why I am asking you, Your Excellency, as anybody
else would do, where are the killers? The Minister of Internal Affairs
declared that 600 or 800 terrorists had been arrested. Where are they?

     II think that the answer to this question is a simple one from a
statistical point of view. But such an approach would be unrealistical and
would mainly diminish the importance of the problem. So, before giving away
the data we have, we must make clear certain essential conceptual and
operative aspects. First of all, the term of 'terrorist' as understood at
present by the masses is much wider than the dictionary definition. Therefore,
the term refers now to any person who opposed somehow the revolutionary
forces, openly with or without arms, to which whole categories of people are
added (former Securitate people, militia men, party activists, state officials
and even certain military), who are suspected to have taken part in various
forms in the anti-revolutionary action, because of their connections to the
former dictatorship. This is in fact the idea promoted by certain newspapers
and political forces, who have obvious destabilizing intentions or who want to
increase their popularity in the elections by unfair means. The fact that the
terrorists' violent actions ended almost immediately after the two dictators
had been sentenced to death and executed and that the terrorists had not
made up combat dispositions defined as such by our military theory, as well as
their disappearance among the population (making it impossible to find them
out by usual means) brought about a situation which, on one hand, left the
juridic responsibility for criminal acts only on those captured by the army,
national guards, detachments of revolutionaries until January 4, 1990, while
on the other had, the popular masses still nurtured the suspicion that anybody
around us could be a participant to the genocide. This is one of the big
problems of the present stage, used by those who wish to destabilize the
society and to maintain sine die a provisional status, by those who are not
patient enough to wait for the clear and lawful discovery of the guilt or
innocence of the people under arrest. Mr Robu, the Attorney General,
referred to this patience in his interview to the Free Romanian Television.
Coming back to your direct question, I have to say that we, the Ministry of
National Defence, captured in combat or retained as suspects a big number of
persons (1,222), including cadres of the former State Security Department or
of the Militia, as well as suspect civilians, whom we arrested temporarily in
barracks and handed them afterwards to competent criminal law investigators
as shown in the report we made to the Chairman of the Provisional Council of
National Union. We have also offered these investigators all documents and
information we had, as well as the arms, ammunition and technical and material
means found with them, in order to help the investigation. Our ministry,
therefore, has no terrorist under arrest; it has no competence to organize
such a detention, by the way. As to those over 600 or 800 killers declared by
the Minister of Internal Affairs allegedly under arrest, His Excellency is the
only person entitled to give answers to such questions as who and where are
they?' as the ministry he is in charge of deals with such cases.

     The revolution ousted the dictatorship and the totalitarian regime. We
are building a new society with its structure and infrastructure. It is a
complex, contradictory and long process. The army is, naturally, no
exception, though it has been said, jokingly I hope, that 'democracy stops at
the barracks gate.' But you assert that 'democracy is the army's status.'
Could you detail that?

     The renewal of the army is a necessity, a support for its stability and
unity. The constructive dialogue in military units, institutions, in command
and in the General Staff proves to be extremely useful for solving the army's
problems within the framework of the army. The results are most encouraging.
The ideas, suggestions, notifications, propositions, etc., concerning the
process of the army's democratization aim at all its subsystems: organization,
training, equipment, quartering, catering, the interrelations among
departments, interhuman relations, cadre promotion, other specific regulations
in our field. It has been said indeed that 'democracy stops at the barracks
gate." Most untrue! It is as if one could believe that there could be a sentry
anywhere in the world to ask the sun for the password and in case it did not
know it, he would stop the sun from rising! I would like you to note that the
army democratization is given a wide scope. We have met several times and had
fruitful dialogues. There have unfortunately cropped up some dissidents as
well. Some of them asked - mind you! - to forbid the army to vote on May 20!
That would have been absurd, a denial of the equation
democracy-responsibility, a resumption of its former status when it was dubbed
'the dumb sea.' Is it so impossible for these initiators to make the
distinction between being apolitical and not belonging to a party, don't they
know that voting is a fundamental criterion of democracy? But, despite these
isolated cases, the army is aware of the role it plays in society and it has
always been and will ever be powerful, united, faithful to its sacred
missions. Democracy turns the army into a solid support for the country's
stability, for the nation's confidence and peace.

     We do thank you, Your Excellency, for your explanations, for this
dialogue, which is part of the wider context of the dialogue taking place at
all ranks of the army.

TRANSYLVANIA

the Heart of the Ancestors' Hearth
from Times of Yore

Lieutenant-Colonel GHEORGHE VARTIC

     Grieved for the hard and nasty blows that the Romanian people received in
the sad summer of 1940 when the country's body had been treacherously maimed
through the most loathsome agreement between fascism and communism, our great
writer Liviu Rebreanu was writing bitterly about Transylvania's crippling
through the Vienna Diktat. "For us, Transylvania cannot exist but entire,
flesh of our flesh. For others, it represents historical ambitions only or
feudal castles built through the toils of generations of Romanian slaves. For
us, it means everything: past, present, future or non-existence. We did not
come from anywhere: we were moulded, born and grown up from the Transylvanian
land."

     Really we did not come from anywhere but we have been here, between the
Tisza, the Danube and the Dniester from time immemorial. Proofs given by the
necropoles of the Geto-Dacian and Roman forefathers dissipated throughout the
entire Carpatho-Danubiano-Pontic Transylvania, the strongholds of the "fairest
and bravest of all Thracians", the Dacian calendar at Sarmizegetusa, the Roman
aqueducts, thermae, amphitheatres and temples in Transylvania or the Dobrudja,
the faces of the conquerors and conquered - but never disappeared from
history - on Trajan's Column; proofs speaks of us through the rivers, hills,
mountains and the towns which preserved their names as they preserved their
language of Latin origin despite the barbarian storms rushed upon the
ancestors' hearth for almost one millennium. The dark epoch of the migrations
could not dislocate the autochthonous people who lived incessantly on the land
inherited from their forerunners. Voivode Menumorut invoked the suzerainty of
the Constantinople emperor and energetically rejected the territorial claims
raised by the Hungarian duke Arpad by answering with dignity that "We will not
yield even one inch of our land either out of love or out of fear". The
Hungarian invasion which followed had to cope with the long-term resistance
of the Romanians, the oldest inhabitants of Transylvania who preserved the
traditional political and cannonical structures semblable to the ones extant
in Moldavia and Wallachia. Referring to this reality the French historian A.
de Gerando wrote down: In Transylvania the Romanians are the oldest
inhabitants of this land. They had already lived in this country and had a
principality when the Hungarians extended their rule, beyond the mountains,
over old Dacia. The German and Szekler colonization, the subsequent
infiltrations of other ethnical populations could not alter the Romanian
character of Transylvania.

     Old Latin or Hungarian documents speak of numerous Romanian districts
(districtus olahales) in different regions of Transylvania as early as in
the 14th century, districts whose beginnings cannot be but those Romanian
"Lands" mentioned in the early 13th century. In fact, according to historical
sources - especially the account books for papal quitrents before the great
Tartar invasion in 1241 - Transylvania was inhabited by about 400,000
Romanians as against 150,000 Magyars, Saxons and Szeklers what offered the
Romanian population a share of 65 per cent. This proportion would maintain
in the following centuries, a fact also recorded in the papal bulla of Pope
Gregory IX which speaks of the "numerous nation of the Romanians" or of the
"mass of the Romanian people" in Transylvania. The Transylvanian Romanians'
anteriority and share of overwhelming majority would be recognized after many
a century even by Emperor Joseph II: "The Romanians are undoubtedly the oldest
and most numerous inhabitants of Transylvania".

     And if they, the Romanians, are the oldest masters of this land, if they
have always and permanently represented the overwhelming majority of the
population living here, which other arguments should any more invoked in order
to prove the Romanian character of Transylvania?

     Is not yet really known that Transylvania and its inhabitants coalesced,
many a time, with the extra Carpathian Romanian countries into a joint front
of struggle against common foes? Who could forget that the Transylvanian
voivode, Iancu of Hunedoara, later on Hungary's governor, was the Christians'
most dreaded commander against the Crescent? And how many other sons of the
Romanian people were to become voivodes of Transylvania even if they
magyarized their names in order to make way for themselves among the elite of
the high nobility which had passed to Catholicism! The Szeklers fought many a
time in the army led by Stephen the Great and the Saxons of the Brasov town
enjoyed large commercial privileges granted by the Moldovain voivode.
Transylvania always gravitated towards the two Romanian sister-countries- the
inhabitants on both sides of the Carpathians were speaking the same
language -, so that the intra-Carpathian voivodate succeeded to maintain its
autonomy vis-a-vis the Hungarian voivodate, disappeared as a State after the
Mohacs defeat (1526) and the Ottomans' seizing over the fortress of Bude.

     Transylvania's new status facilitated the intensification of its
relations with Moldavia and Wallachia. The entrance of Petru Rares led
Moldavian army in Transylvania "did not meet any obstacles - the Polish
historian Petru Perembsky wrote down - because this country was inhabited by
the Romanians who due to the identity in their language easily joined the
Moldavians". Michael the Brave's triumphal entrance in Alba lulia, the great
Unifier, in 1600, aroused the acclamations of the Transylvanian Romanians who
were hoping for a betterment of their situation.

     The anti-Ottoman war in 1683-1699 was to replace the Porte's suzerainty
with the Habsburg domination in Transylvania. The Leopold's Diplome recognized
the autonomous character of the Romanian Principality, but it perpetuated and
sanctioned the famous "union" concluded in 1437 by the representatives of the
three privileged nations - Magyars, Szeklers, Saxons - and the four religions,
the Romanians becoming a "tolerated" nation in their own country. So, from
tolerant into tolerated people on their ancient land. Awful historical truth!
Moreover, so-called Austrian historians resort to forging the immigrationist
theory which - by mystifying the past - contested the Romanians' autochthony
and continuity in Transylvania. All this at a time when honest
researchers - even Austrian or Magyar - ascertained at the beginning of the
last century that "The Romanians ranks beyond any doubts the first among the
oldes nations (in Transylvania - o.n.) in point of number. Their number could
be estimated really to four sevenths of the entire population" (J.A. Danian)
or "one may travel many days in Transylvania without hearing a single
Hungarian word so that one may believe he is in Wallachia" (Laszlo Kovari).

     How anachronistic was therefore the stipulation of the Hungarian
Constitution of March 1848 concerning Transylvania's incorporation into
Hungary! And how lawful and legitimate were the cheers of the 40,000 people
gathered at Blaj, in the Liberty Field: "We want to unite with the Country!".
Like the war for national liberation waged by the Transylvanian Romanians led
by Avram Iancu. The creed of the Romanian revolutionaries was then expressed
by Alexander Papiu Ilarian: "We don't want to rule over other people but
neither shall we accept, we, the most numerous and oldest (our italics) that
any law be brought in our country which is ours (our italics) without our
consent".

     The Austro-Hungarian Dualism in 1867 brought Transylvania's enforced
annexation to Hungary for a half of century against the will of the Romanians
who represented the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants. The cruel policy
of denationalization launched at the time by the Hungarian government could
not wipe off the Romanian character of the intra-Carpathian Principality. Even
the censuses made in Transylvania by the Hungarian officials in 1880, 1890,
1900 and 1910 were compelled to the recognize the Romanians' great share
versus the other nationalities in this province (namely 47.44%, 47,98%, 47,20%
and 46,20% as compared to 18,94% 21.50% and 12.5% for Magyars).

     Transylvania's and Banat's Union with Romania on December 1, 1918 in the
wake of the decision taken by the Grand National Assembly at Alba lulia and
the sanctioning of this lawful act by the Peace Treaty at Trianon ended, as an
apotheosis, the century old struggle of the Transylvanian Romanians for the
accomplishment of the national ideal. A great justice of history was done then
at Alba lulia: Transylvania, the craddle of the Romanian world, the "heart of
political Romania", but also the "heart of geographic Romania", as Nicolae
Titulescu said, came back for ever to the motherland. "Through the historic
act of Alba lulia - the American publicist Milton Lehrer wrote - an end was
put to a painful chapter from the history of the Transylvanian Romanians, a
new era having been innaugurated but which was not either spared by difficult
moments at the beginning or saved by profound sufferings in a more recent
epoch". Because the Hungarian revizionism - under its bolshevik form in 1919
or fascist in 1940 - did not stop to manifest and succeeded, in fact, fifty
years ago, with the support of Hitler and Mussolini, to cripple Romania's
body. But each time the Romanian people and his army properly answered the
enemy. In 1919 against the communist government led by Bela Kun who refused to
recognize Transylvania's appurtenance to Romania, and in 1944-45 against
Horthyst Hungary which had annexed our country's northwestern part. The peace
treaty between Romania and the Allied and Associated Powers, signed at Paris
on February 10, 1947 was to sanction the re-establishment of the
Romanian-Hungarian border as it had been on January 1, 1938.

     So, Transylvania was, is, and will be Romanian land for ever like the
other historical provinces of Romania. The popular Revolution of December
1989 removed the totalitarian communist regime and opened largely the road
to the liberalization and democratization of the Romanian political, social
and economic life, the new Constitution following to secure, de jure and de
facto, full equality in rights for all citizens of the country, irrespective
of nationality. At the same time, the sure guarantee for the accomplishment
of these deziderata is the securing of Romania's national independence and
sovereignty and territorial integrity. The country's army has sworn in face of
the people that we shall never suffer a new shame coming from a new diktat as
it happened in summer 1940. Because, as a Romanian General appreciated in 1939
"the entire history of the Romanian people is not but a struggle in defense
of the own frontiers".

MEMENTO

senior-lieutenant LAURENTIU SFINTES

     - In consensus with history, in the full awareness of all the Romanians
the day of December 1, has been unanimously sanctioned by Romania's Senate and
Deputies' Assembly, as Romania's national fete. This day was chosen from the
dearest holidays for the Romanian hearts as it is the day in which, 72 years
ago, almost 100,000 people from all quarters of Transylvania decided in the
historical fortress of the Romanian nation - Alba lulia - to unite with
Romania.

     - The Treaty of Trianon made but sanction juridically what history,
through the will of the Romanian masses, had already recorded as an
irrefutable reality.

     - The National Military Museum is further receiving donations in books
and documents meant to complete the documentary stock of this cultural
establishment. One should note among the last valuable acquisitions; the
enciclopaedias Armi e Armature Asiatiche, Rizzoli Larousse Enciclopedia (26
volumes), Enciclopedia del Novecento.

     Mr. Michael Brown, military attache of Great Britain to Bucharest has
donated a videocasette with a movie about the Romanian revolution in December
1989 which was broadcasted by the well-known BBC-1 to the British people.

     - At Oarba de Mures, a place of soul in the Pantheon of our sufferings,
a nice tradition was reinstated: eleven sculptors (one for each thousand of
heroes, fallen dead on the Sin-Georgiu hill) will take part to the new summer
sculpture campus.

     Every year they and others will meet here in order to carve in stone the
Romanians' endurance in loving and defending their hearth. (Right picture:
The Memorial in Oarba de Mures).