home *** CD-ROM | disk | FTP | other *** search
- Newsgroups: sci.crypt
- Path: sparky!uunet!ornl!utkcs2!darwin.sura.net!jvnc.net!yale.edu!qt.cs.utexas.edu!cs.utexas.edu!milano!cactus.org!ritter
- From: ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter)
- Subject: Re: the Right of Privacy
- Message-ID: <1992Nov12.202606.22666@cactus.org>
- Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx
- References: <7553@transfer.stratus.com> <1992Oct28.111437.1@zodiac.rutgers.edu> <1992Nov12.063300.12408@seanews.akita.com>
- Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 20:26:06 GMT
- Lines: 31
-
-
-
- In <1992Nov12.063300.12408@seanews.akita.com>
- billmcc@seanews.akita.com (Bill McCormick) writes:
-
-
- >The "safe" analogy seems to be the best model. Requiring registration
- >of crypto-keys is *exactly* the same as requiring registration of safe
- >keys and combinations.
- >
- >Why is it that it's immediately obvious that being required to give
- >the government copies of your safe or house keys is incredibly intrusive but
- >that requiring registration of crypto keys doesn't evoke the same
- >response.
-
- Suppose the issue is *not* (necessarily) giving the government keys
- in advance, but rather "providing access *after* due process": The
- Constitution specifically provides that people are secure only from
- *unreasonable* search and seizure, and this certainly implies that
- *reasonable* search and seizure is accepted and constitutional.
-
- If government agents *have* a warrant, would an attempt to prevent
- their entry into a house be considered "legal"? Is secretly-held
- information really different from other "effects" mentioned in the
- Fourth Amendment?
-
- >Something to think about.
-
- ---
- Terry Ritter ritter@cactus.org
-
-