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- Newsgroups: sci.crypt
- Path: sparky!uunet!ornl!utkcs2!darwin.sura.net!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!cs.utexas.edu!milano!cactus.org!ritter
- From: ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter)
- Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
- Message-ID: <1992Nov12.202206.22517@cactus.org>
- Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx
- References: <1992Nov11.061210.9933@cactus.org> <1992Nov11.194933.8724@shearson.com>
- Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 20:22:06 GMT
- Lines: 48
-
-
- In <1992Nov11.194933.8724@shearson.com> pmetzger@snark.shearson.com
- (Perry E. Metzger) writes:
-
- >Why stop there? Why not outlaw the computer itself? Obviously, without
- >the computer, no harm could have been done, right?
-
- >There is a key problem that the sensationalizers have -- they only
- >consider one half of a problem. They note that cryptography can be
- >used to aid in criminal activity -- they don't, however, look at the
- >benefits.
-
- Apparently you have mistaken this thread for some other. This
- thread is not about winning some sort of scholastic debate, nor is
- it about diddling around while waiting for the courts to throw out
- any law affecting cryptography. Maybe they will, but I doubt it.
-
- This thread is the place to consider how to confront legislative
- arguments, and thus prevent or influence legislation.
-
-
- >Using the "only look at the harm" argument, I could showt
- >that steak knives should be outlawed -- after all, people get murdered
- >with steak knives.
-
- Get prepared for that argument; the opposition will use any argument
- which is effective. Personally, I did not find your counter-argument:
-
- >When will people learn that not everything can be fixed by a law, but
- >that much can be destroyed by one?
-
- to be nearly as effective.
-
-
- >Similarly, no law banning cryptography will make the world
- >into the place you want.
-
- The issue is not "banning" cryptography (or computers!); the issue
- is the ability of law-enforcement to access secret material (which
- was presumably passed on regulated lines or public "airwaves")
- *after* due process. Maintaining future access might be the
- responsibility of the user (in return for the right to use
- cryptography on public or regulated facilities); the inability to
- give access might itself be considered a crime.
-
- ---
- Terry Ritter ritter@cactus.org
-
-