NetNews Usenet Archive 1992 #26/NN_1992_26.iso/spool/misc/activism/progress/8287

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From: [e-mail] (Rich Winkel)
Subject: Proceso 537: Government resistance to ending militarism
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/** reg.elsalvador: 127.0 **/
** Topic: Proceso 537: Peace Process **
** Written  3:07 pm  Nov  8, 1992 by [e-mail] in cdp:reg.elsalvador **
From: [e-mail] (Centro de Informacion Documentacion y Apoyo a la Invest. - UCAJSC)
Subject: Proceso 537: Peace Process

Center for Information, Documentation and Research Support (CIDAI)
Central American University (UCA)
San Salvador, El Salvador

PROCESO 537
November 4, 1992

PEACE PROCESS:
Government resistance to ending militarism

     Twelve years of an intense and shattering armed conflict -with
all that implies in terms of tragedy for the majority of
Salvadorans- has been incapable of curbing the insatiable lust for
power and the false and self-serving concept of democracy of the
far right and its traditional ally, the hard-line sector of the
army. Over the past few weeks, these recalcitrant sectors have
shown just how effective they are at pressuring Cristiani to assume
positions which undermine the transformation of Salvadoran society
through the peace accords. However, under current conditions, their
efforts are not likely to have a lasting success.

The inevitability of the third rescheduling

     As expected, the government's hysterical campaign to thwart a
third and final rescheduling of the peace accords fell on deaf ears
at the United Nations. Faced with the undeniable fact that in nine
months, the government and the FMLN had managed to comply with
scarcely half of the 100 accords signed on January 16 in Mexico,
Boutros Boutros-Ghali was forced to make the necessary adjustments
to the schedule.
     Basically, Boutros-Ghali proposed to make December 15 the
final deadline for complying with all measures related to putting
an end to the FMLN's military structure. During this same period,
the government had a series of commitments to meet, including the
legal transfer of lands (10/31), the legalization of the FMLN
(11/27), the dissolution of the National Intelligence Unit (11/30),
the demobilization of the Atlacatl Battalion (12/08), and the
effective implementation of the judicial reforms (12/10). Finally,
by December 15 the president must carry out the conclusions of the
Ad Hoc Commission report, which demands that the president
discharge at least 97 officers, including the Minister and Vice-
Minister of Defense, for their involvement in serious human rights
violations.
     As we can see at a glance, the Secretary General did not
accept the government's claim that the FMLN must be demobilized
without further conditions. On the contrary: he is pressing the
government to comply effectively with those measures which aim to
end military hegemony over Salvadoran society.

Government and FMLN positions

     Naturally, this proposal was intolerable for the far right and
the top echelon of the Armed Forces. They have begun a campaign to
heighten FMLN tensions and intimidate the civilian population, and
they have hurled President Cristiani into a confrontation with the
United Nations, the outcome of which is still unclear. Cristiani's
reaction to Boutros-Ghali's proposal has been particularly
characterized by ambiguity, and by a veiled refusal to clean up the
army.
     President Cristiani -against his will- has had no choice but
to break his promise not to accept any prolongation of the accords
beyond October 31, at least as far as demobilizing the FMLN is
concerned. In his letter to Boutros-Ghali, President Cristiani
promised to "do nothing which might obstruct the attainment of your
objective of completing the process of ending the armed conflict as
soon as possible." In the same letter, the government agreed to the
plan proposed by the U.N. and said it would carry out all its
components, except one, although even this one could be negotiated,
it remarked.
     The president's objection to the U.N. proposal, however, is
not on one little point. His objection goes to the heart of the
peace accords. The president would like to condition the reduction
and cleansing of the Armed Forces on the prior dismantling and
disarming of the FMLN. "The government will halt all steps related
to the demobilization, reduction and restructuring of the Armed
Forces, and is not about to recommence that process until all FMLN
weapons are destroyed," said the president in a message to the
nation on October 28. Cristiani also used the speech to lash out
against the FMLN. The former rebels, he said, "have a fundamental
commitment, and it is perhaps the most important commitment: they
must put an end to their military structure. That means that they
will demobilize all their combatants and also turn over all their
weapons to be destroyed."
     The FMLN's response to the U.N. proposal was conciliatory and
committed to the continuity of the peace process. With a clearer
and more energetic position than that of the government, the FMLN
accepted the adjustments proposed by Boutros-Ghali, "even though...
they are not entirely satisfactory." Rebel leader Shafick Handal
said there were points the FMLN did not quite agree with, but felt
it was necessary to accept the plan in order to achieve a positive
conclusion to the peace process. "To reject [Boutros-Ghali's
proposal] would have made no sense... tensions would build and
something would snap. No one is that crazy here, except those who
are definitely opposed to the peace process taking root," said
Handal.
     The government's stance, which seeks to condition and
manipulate any housecleaning in the military, was also flatly
rejected by the FMLN. "It was a warmongering speech, not a peace
speech. It was a verbal fight with the Secretary General, in which
the president rejected his proposal to adjust the schedule of unmet
accords," added Handal. In general, the FMLN leadership feels that
the government's current position contains serious contradictions,
since "on the one hand, it rejects the position that weapons can be
a guarantee for the peace accords, as the FMLN has maintained; yet
on the other hand, it refuses to clean out, reduce or demobilize
the Armed Forces." All in all, the FMLN has often reiterated its
promise to meet its peace commitments while leaving the U.N. with
the task of talking sense into the government.

Goulding and De Soto: Shoring up the process

     The government's unprecedented reply to Boutros-Ghali's
proposal has created serious additional complications for the
U.N.'s delicate role as mediator and peacemaker. The Secretary
General has, once again, taken extraordinary measures to keep the
peace process on course. For the fourth time, he sent the Secretary
General Adjunct for Peacekeeping Operations, Marrack Goulding, this
time accompanied by Assistant Secretary General Alvaro De Soto. The
presence of De Soto, one of the chief architects of the peace
accords and an especially talented negotiator, shows how interested
the Secretary General is in preventing the peace process from
flying out of control in the final stretch.
     Upon their arrival on October 30, both U.N. officials
acknowledged that their presence in El Salvador was due to the
crucial juncture facing the peace accords. They also admitted that
the Secretary General was highly interested in persuading President
Cristiani to accept changes in the peace calendar. The two promised
to remain in El Salvador until agreements could be reached around
the schedule of compliance with the accords, particularly those
related to the end of the armed conflict, calling it one of the
most important accords contained in the peace process.
     The U.N. is thus aware that it cannot permit the government to
have its way on one particular point -the cleansing of the Armed
Forces- which is so decisive for the future and for the stability
of Salvadoran society. A government victory on this point would be
a poor precedent for the U.N.'s hopes for peacemaking and mediating
in other conflicts.

Progress made

     Tensions between the government and the FMLN, together with
right-wing efforts to sabotage the peace process, have still not
entirely prevented progress in demilitarization and national
reconciliation. On October 30, after two months of waiting and
after hearing Boutros-Ghali's new proposed calendar, the FMLN once
again began dismantling its military structure. The demobilization
of the third 20% of rebel combatants was a good-faith gesture on
the part of the FMLN, and one more step toward the end of its
military structure.
     The demobilization of approximately 1,800 rebel combatants
took place in the guerrilla concentration points known as La Reina,
San Antonio Los Ranchos, El Ocotal, El Paisnal, Guazapa, El
Murillo, Tecoluca, Santa Marta, El Zapote, Las Isletas, San
Francisco Javier, Las Marias, Perquin and Nueva Granada. Just as in
the two previous ceremonies, the former combatants received ONUSAL
certificates in exchange for their weapons, as well as coupons for
government aid channeled through a number of non-governmental
organizations. The largest activities were held in Guarjila and San
Antonio Los Ranchos, and were attended by ONUSAL military chief
Gen. Victor Suanzes Pardo, who attested to the normality of the
process.
     The second step forward during this delicate period was
related to land transfers. Along with the demobilization of the
third rebel contingent, on October 30, a ceremony was held in
ONUSAL headquarters in which the president of the Salvadoran
Institute for Agrarian Transformation (ISTA), Jose Roberto Molina,
and members of the FMLN Land Commission, signed an official
agreement to transfer seven State properties to former combatants
and current landholders. The lands, which total 5,363 acres, are
located in San Vicente, Usulutan and Cuscatlan, and will be
distributed among approximately 783 persons.
     The peace process continues to struggle forward, even if
upstream, but it will not have achieved its true goals if it is
unable to end the army's domination of civil society. Building an
authentic and legitimate democracy depends on the work of the
United Nations, but also on the contribution of the majority of
Salvadorans in pushing the process toward its final goal.


** End of text from cdp:reg.elsalvador **