NetNews Usenet Archive 1992 #26/NN_1992_26.iso/spool/misc/activism/progress/8288

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From: [e-mail] (Rich Winkel)
Subject: Proceso 537: The Armed Forces is the key
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/** reg.elsalvador: 128.0 **/
** Topic: Proceso 537: Editorial **
** Written  3:07 pm  Nov  8, 1992 by [e-mail] in cdp:reg.elsalvador **
From: [e-mail] (Centro de Informacion Documentacion y Apoyo a la Invest. - UCAJSC)
Subject: Proceso 537: Editorial

Center for Information, Documentation and Research Support (CIDAI)
Central American University (UCA)
San Salvador, El Salvador

PROCESO 537
November 4, 1992

EDITORIAL:
The Armed Forces is the key

     The long-awaited speech by President Cristiani, in which he
explained his reply to the new U.N. proposal for rescheduling the
peace process, produced confusion and fear among the Salvadoran
people. The overall impression left by the president was that he
had rejected the Secretary General's proposal.
     In his speech, the president explained that he accepted the
proposal to postpone the deadline for the FMLN to demobilize and
turn over its weapons, since the October 31 deadline was impossible
to meet for "mechanical reasons". At the same time, Cristiani
announced that he would hold up the demobilization, reduction and
restructuring of the Armed Forces. In his letter to the Secretary
General, he promised to meet all the government's obligations under
the peace accords, and to do everything asked of him in the October
23 letter, except those measures related to the Armed Forces. He
also pledged to take no action which might jeopardize the
conclusion of the peace process.
     Cristiani has thus made a unilateral decision about how and
when he will meet his commitments with regard to the Armed Forces.
He has broken with one of the fundamental tenets of negotiation by
ignoring the position of the other side as well as that of the
United Nations. The latter had presented its new proposal in a
similar fashion to the land proposal: take it or leave it. It is
difficult to reconcile the president's promises with his decision
on the Armed Forces. This unheard-of stance has led to an open
confrontation between the president and the United Nations, pushing
the peace process to the brink of an abyss.
     The new U.N. proposal, although formally offering the
government a graceful way out of its intransigence, was not meant
to be a "grace period" for demobilizing and disarming the FMLN, but
rather contains a series of commitments which both sides must meet
by December 15. In his letter, the Secretary General notes that "no
one can ignore the fact that there have been serious government
delays in executing a number of important measures which, according
to the original calendar, should have begun to be implemented, and
in some cases completed, before the FMLN's military structure could
be dismantled."
     According to the letter, then, neither the government nor the
Armed Forces have met all their commitments. Therefore, the 45 days
left between October 31 and December 15 are not a grace period for
the FMLN, but rather a new deadline for both sides to meet their
pending commitments.
     The new calendar proposes four phases, which are actually four
sets of measures to implement and four key dates. The first phase
is the demobilization of the third contingent of FMLN combatants
(October 31), as well as guarantees to respect the current state of
landholding in former conflict zones. The second phase includes the
demobilization of the fourth contingent (November 20) and the
definitive legalization of the FMLN as a political party (November
27). The third is a package of measures covering the Armed Forces,
the normal operation of the new civilian police force, and the
formalization of international verification, as well as an update
of the FMLN weapons inventory (November 30). The fourth and final
phase includes the effective demobilization of the Atlacatl
Battalion (December 8), followed by judicial and electoral reforms,
the conclusion of the process to verify the FMLN land inventory,
and the implementation of the decisions of the Ad Hoc Commission
(December 15). Also on December 15, the FMLN's final contingent is
to be demobilized and all its weapons destroyed.
     This new schedule of measures is conceived of as a progressive
set of steps for both sides, with the FMLN scheduled to take the
first steps. The most decisive steps are at the end of the process.
It is up to the president to reconsider his position or thumb his
nose at the entire international community. It is crucial for the
Salvadoran people to understand the purpose and content of this new
schedule so that they can carefully monitor compliance around each
key date. This will prevent new delays from accumulating as
December 15 draws near.
     The real problem with the military-related accords is not that
of demobilizing the elite battalions, since the Atlacatl must be
demobilized on December 8 (and the remaining two in early 1993), by
which time the FMLN will have only one contingent left to
demobilize, and will have turned over practically all its weapons.
Nor is there a problem with the other measures aimed at
transforming the Armed Forces. The problem is that the High Command
and a part of the officer corps have rejected the Ad Hoc Commission
report. Almost all the nation's generals and colonels are on the
list to be discharged, but none of them agrees with the measure.
This is why they are pressing to remain on active duty until
February 1993, when they are scheduled to retire. This is what
Cristiani calls "flexibility," and from that standpoint we can
begin to understand the contradictions and confusions heard in the
president's speech.
     To accept the officers' plan would mean nullifying the healthy
effects of the Ad Hoc Commission report. In that case, its creation
would have been needless; it would have been easier just to wait
for these top-ranking officers (almost all of whom belong to the
Tandona) to retire. This Armed Forces, tied to a history of abusing
the lives of Salvadoran citizens, would like to come of out the
peace accords unscathed, and feels it has the right to decide when
and how the accords will be implemented.
     The extraordinary visit by top U.N. officials is a response to
this tenacious resistance and to the support it has found in the
president's office. But we should not be surprised by the officers'
stance, since it only exposes the fact that, as the decisive
accords approach, demilitarization is the key.


** End of text from cdp:reg.elsalvador **