NetNews Usenet Archive 1992 #20/NN_1992_20.iso/spool/sci/math/11138

Internet Message Format | 1992-09-08 | 4.2 KB

Path: sparky!uunet!mcsun!uknet!comlab.ox.ac.uk!oxuniv!loader
From: [e-mail]
Newsgroups: sci.math
Subject: Re: GOD - THE FINAL CHAPTER (OR IS IT)
Message-ID: <[e-mail]>
Date: 8 Sep 92 10:01:11 GMT
References: <[e-mail]>
Organization: Oxford University VAX 6620
Lines: 64

In article <[e-mail]>, [e-mail] writes:
> I posted earlier the following argument:
> 1. It is possible to imagine a world epistemically quivalent to ours, in which
> god exists.
> 2. Likewise, where God doesn't exist.
> Thus, given the existence of these worlds, a proof of the existence of God
> is impossible.
> Criticisms that have been recently raised are the following:
> First, is it so clear that both worlds exists?
> Take the first. Imagine simply the scenario of the detatched God, a God who
> made the universe, then completely ignored it; left it to itself and the
> laws of nature, and didn't interfere. Sure, the existence of this god will
> have absolutely no effect on it, apart from its existence, but still, he's
> there. It seems to me that this is an EPISTEMIC possibility, i.e, a
> possibility completely consistent with all your current 'knowledge' of
> the universe. Although it may be unlikely, whatever that may mean, still,
> it's logically possible. It seems that even a hard line aethiest must concede
> this.

How do you know it's "completely consistent with all your current 'knowledge'
of the universe". If for instance, the concept of God is in itself
inconsistent (which some people would argue is the case), then your example
doesn't work. As I've said before, just because you can "imagine simply the
scenario of the detatched God", doesn't mean that this is at all possible.

> Now take the second, and more controversial. Once again, I will suggest a
> possible state of affairs, epistemically equivalent to ours, in which there
> is no God. I'm not denying that what I'm about to suggest is crazy - but
> logically consistent with our epistemic data. Simply this - imagine that you
> (the reader) have been taken since birth, and embedded in a tank by a mad
> psychiatrist who has connected electrodes to every part of your brain. All
> the sense datum - in fact everything (inluding thoughts that aren't sensory
> in nature) are fed to you from him - and no-one else. You have absolutely
> no idea about the 'real' world - only the world the mad scientist has created
> for you. In fact, the real world can consist of anything logically consistent,
> perhaps epistemically wildly different from our own - in particular, a
> world in which God don't exist. It seems likely that even a God fearing
> man must concede this as an EPISTEMIC possibility - no matter how much
> an insult to his dignity this may be.

But perhaps sitting somewhere above the psychiatrist sits (necessarily) God.
" ... in particular, a world in which God doesn't exist" begs the question by
assuming that it is possible that God doesn't exist (And plenty of people have
argued that in fact, God necessarily exists).

> Thus, it seems that these two worlds can exists as EPISTEMIC possibilities -
> i.e, worlds indistinguishable from our own .
> (I challenge anyone to show me otherwise- these sorts of examples, in
> particular the latter, have been running around philosophy since Descartes,
> and, it seems, though silly, can't be resolved. Do not take the bizzare
> but logically possible lightly - this is the whole topic of conversation -
> PROOFS of the existence of God - i.e, where such possibilities can be
> logically eliminated.)

I agree that your original conclusion - that the existence or otherwise of God
can not be established by a priori reasoning - is probably true, but your
arguments are less than convincing to me.

Our concept of God is a rather unusual property (God created the world etc.),
and nothing you have said establishes that the existence of something with
these properties is either (a) possibly true, or (b) possibly false;
statements which it seems to me you are trying to prove.
Indeed, it seems to me, that after Godel, it is unlikely that you will be able
to prove these consistency statements.