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- Newsgroups: sci.crypt
- Path: sparky!uunet!newsgate.watson.ibm.com!yktnews!admin!aixproj!uri
- From: uri@watson.ibm.com (Uri Blumenthal)
- Subject: Re: Bias in ACM and IEEE articles on cryptography
- Sender: news@watson.ibm.com (NNTP News Poster)
- Message-ID: <1992Aug26.204406.30830@watson.ibm.com>
- Date: Wed, 26 Aug 1992 20:44:06 GMT
- Distribution: usa
- Reply-To: uri@watson.ibm.com
- Disclaimer: This posting represents the poster's views, not necessarily those of IBM
- References: <9208261429.AA00938@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU>
- Nntp-Posting-Host: aixproj.watson.ibm.com
- Organization: Could I Ask
- Lines: 23
-
- In article <9208261429.AA00938@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU>, copper@WATSON.IBM.COM ("Don Coppersmith") writes:
- |>
- |> > There's no point in using any more key bits, because differential
- |> > cryptanalysis will find the subkeys in 2**47 operations whatever
- |> > the key length.
- |>
- |> The Biham-Shamir work requires 2**47 _chosen_plaintext_ messages,
- |> not just that many operations. Running 2**47 > 10**14 messages past
- |> the machine that contains the secret key is _much_ trickier than doing
- |> that many operations on your own machine.
-
- Sure. But I think they suggested the method of "converting" chosen
- plaintext message attack inot *known* plaintext attack, with about
- 2**49 known plaintexts required... They assume, that if you have
- sufficient amount of *known* plaintexts - you'd be able to choose
- from it... Comments?
-
- [BTW, I can't recall the exact amount of messages needed, sorry.]
- --
- Regards,
- Uri. uri@watson.ibm.com
- ------------
- <Disclaimer>
-