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- Path: sparky!uunet!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!pacific.mps.ohio-state.edu!linac!att!ucbvax!virtualnews.nyu.edu!brnstnd
- From: brnstnd@nyu.edu (D. J. Bernstein)
- Newsgroups: sci.crypt
- Subject: Re: RSA-129 contest
- Message-ID: <18885.Aug2623.38.5292@virtualnews.nyu.edu>
- Date: 26 Aug 92 23:38:52 GMT
- References: <9208260234.AA05450@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU>
- Organization: IR
- Lines: 36
-
- In article <9208260234.AA05450@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU> jbs@WATSON.IBM.COM writes:
- > Well if you actually had a complete GFNS implementation for
- > general numbers I believe you would obtain more reliable estimates by
- > performing a whole bunch of "wimpy" factorizations as opposed to a
- > single factorization of RSA-129.
-
- Unfortunately not. Example: Arjen Lenstra and I tried our MasPar GNFS
- implementation on a 66-digit general number. We used the smallest
- sensible factor bases for that architecture---namely 16384 primes on
- each side of the sieve---and without any tuning found that we had more
- than enough relations *from ff's alone*. No partials were necessary.
-
- When you want to make predictions, the statistics from such a tiny
- factorization are worse than useless. One can safely predict how long
- GNFS will need to factor a 130-digit number---within an order of
- magnitude.
-
- > You might also have a reliable figure of merit for what con-
- > stitutes a good polynomial representation.
-
- This is, unfortunately, an open research problem. The best procedure I
- know is to generate many polynomials with relatively small coefficients,
- then look for polynomials with ``many'' small algebraic primes in a
- certain sense. This is exactly what the RSA-129 contest is meant to
- achieve.
-
- (For those who missed the start of the discussion: If your mail address
- is joe@foo.bar and you want to see the contest announcement, send mail
- to factor@src.dec.com with the two lines
-
- path#joe@foo.bar
- rsastatus#
-
- and wait a few minutes.)
-
- ---Dan
-