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- From: jaske@abacus.bates.edu (Jon Aske)
- Subject: Chomsky (Z-9/92): Vain hopes, part 4/7
- Message-ID: <1992Sep3.213432.24018@mont.cs.missouri.edu>
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- Date: Thu, 3 Sep 1992 21:34:32 GMT
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-
- ------------------------------------------------------
- The following article by Noam Chomsky appeared in:
- Z Magazine, September 1992
- and is reprinted here with the magazine's permission.
- ------------------------------------------------------
-
- Vain Hopes, False Dreams (Part 4 of 7, 7.5KB)
- ========================
-
- 4. LBJ and the Kennedy Doves
- ----------------------------
-
- Kennedy's more dovish advisers recommended the policies that
- Johnson pursued, and generally approved of them until the 1965
- escalation, often beyond. They lost no time in making clear that
- JFK's commitment to victory would not be abandoned. On December
- 10, Forrestal, Ball, Harriman and Hilsman, reiterating JFK's
- consistent stand, assured Lodge that "we are against neutralism
- and want to win the war." The same unwavering commitment was
- reiterated by Ball, who informed Lodge on Dec. 16 that "Nothing
- is further from USG mind than `neutral solution for Vietnam.' We
- intend to win." A year later (Nov. 1964), Ball held that the
- Saigon regime must continue to receive US aid until the Viet Cong
- is defeated and that "the struggle would be a long one, even with
- the DRV out of it." Ball and other doves continued to support
- Johnson's policies, which they regarded as a continuation of
- Kennedy's. On May 31, 1964, Ball praised "the President's wise
- caution" and refusal to "act hastily."
-
- Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, later portrayed as an
- advocate of withdrawal, had raised only tactical objections to
- JFK's escalation. He advised JFK to abandon "rhetorical
- flourishes" about the great stakes (advice that the President
- rejected, as noted). And recognizing that Diem was not fighting
- the war effectively, he advised withdrawal of some advisors "as a
- symbolic gesture, to make clear that we mean business when we say
- that there are some circumstances in which this commitment will
- be discontinued." Mansfield generally supported Johnson's
- policies. At an NSC meeting on April 3, 1964, LBJ rejected
- Senator Morse's proposal for "using SEATO and the UN to achieve a
- peaceful settlement" in favor of McNamara's view that withdrawal
- or neutralization would lead to a Communist takeover and
- therefore remain unacceptable options. Mansfield agreed, urging
- "that the President's policy toward Vietnam was the only one we
- could follow." He firmly rejected the withdrawal option and the
- diplomatic moves counselled by Morse. In January 1965, Mansfield
- publicly supported "the President's desire neither to withdraw
- nor carry the war to North Vietnam" (_PP_). Later, he bitterly
- condemned critics of Johnson's escalation.
-
- Quite generally, Kennedy's most dovish advisers sensed no change
- at the transition and lent their support to Johnson. Some
- praised his "wise caution," while others called for more
- aggressive action. By mid-1964, Forrestal was coming to support
- escalation of actions against the North. Hilsman's position was
- similar. In a March 14 memorandum he stressed the need "to take
- whatever measures are necessary in Southeast Asia to protect
- those who oppose the Communists and to maintain our power and
- influence in the area," including "whatever military steps may be
- necessary to halt Communist aggression in the area" (crucially,
- VC "aggression"). We should station a Marine battalion in Saigon
- on the pretext of protecting American dependents. Attacks
- against the North might be "a useful _supplement_ to an
- effective counterinsurgency program," but not "an effective
- _substitute_" for it. We must "continue the covert, or at
- least deniable, operations" against the North in order to keep
- "the threat of eventual destruction alive in Hanoi's mind."
- Recall that he had made the same recommendations in April 1963,
- in virtually the same words, including the advice to "continue"
- the ongoing covert operations against the North with their
- implicit threat of destruction.
-
- The support for LBJ among the Kennedy doves comes as no surprise,
- given their familiarity with the internal record, which shows no
- deviation on the President's part from Harriman's judgment that
- "there are no quitters here." As the optimistic predictions of
- 1962-3 collapsed after the coup that overthrew Diem, undermining
- the precondition for withdrawal, they advocated a change of
- tactics to achieve the "fundamental objective" always sought.
-
- We might note, at this point, that the military leadership was
- divided over the war. General Douglas MacArthur and his
- successor as Army Chief of Staff, Matthew Ridgway, were strongly
- opposed to the use of combat troops. The top US military
- commander in Vietnam, MAAG Chief General Lionel McGarr, informed
- JFK on February 22, 1962 that "in providing the GVN the tools to
- do the job," the US "must not offer so much that they forget that
- the job of saving the country is theirs -- only they can do it."
- General Taylor and Pacific Commander Admiral Henry Felt shared
- these qualms about combat troops. As plans to overthrow the
- Diem-Nhu regime were underway in September 1963, Taylor expressed
- his "reluctance to contemplate the use of U.S. troops in combat
- in Vietnam," while agreeing with the President and his other top
- advisers that "our sole objective was to win the war." A year
- after the assassination, agreeing with McGarr, Taylor continued
- to urge that the US keep to the "principle that the Vietnamese
- fight their own war in SVN" (Nov. 3, 1964). He therefore opposed
- sending logistical forces for flood relief because that would
- require dispatch of "US combat troops in some numbers to provide
- close protection." Two weeks later, he informed President Johnson
- directly that he was now "quite certain [US combat troops] were
- not needed...as the estimates of the flood damage diminish." In
- September 1964, Taylor had explained that the military command
- "did not contemplate" committing combat forces because Commanding
- General Westmoreland, also echoing McGarr, felt that use of
- American troops "would be a mistake, that it is the Vietnamese'
- war."
-
- In later years, great import has been attributed to JFK's public
- reiteration of the McGarr-Westmoreland-Taylor "principle" in his
- Sept. 1963 statement that "In the final analysis it is their war.
- They have to win it or lose it." It is, therefore, worth
- stressing that the "principle" was standard throughout in
- internal and public discussion, through 1964, including LBJ's
- public statements.
-
- General David Shoup, Marine Commandant through the Kennedy years,
- reports that when the Joint Chiefs considered troop deployment,
- "in every case...every senior officer that I knew...said we
- should never send ground combat forces into Southeast Asia."
- Shoup's public opposition to the war from 1966 was particularly
- strong, far beyond anything said by the civilian leadership,
- media doves, or others who later presented themselves as war
- critics.
-
- These observations add further weight to the conclusion based on
- the record of internal deliberations, in which JFK insists upon
- victory and considers withdrawal only on this condition. Had he
- intended to withdraw, he would have been able to enlist respected
- military commanders to back him, so it appears, including the
- most revered figures of the right. He made no effort to do so,
- preferring instead to whip up pro-war sentiment with inflammatory
- rhetoric about the awesome consequences of withdrawal.
-
-
-
-
-