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- From: jaske@abacus.bates.edu (Jon Aske)
- Subject: Chomsky (Z-9/92): Vain hopes, part 3/7
- Message-ID: <1992Sep3.213424.23959@mont.cs.missouri.edu>
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- Date: Thu, 3 Sep 1992 21:34:24 GMT
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-
- ------------------------------------------------------
- The following article by Noam Chomsky appeared in:
- Z Magazine, September 1992
- and is reprinted here with the magazine's permission.
- ------------------------------------------------------
-
- Vain Hopes, False Dreams (Part 3 of 7, 20KB)
- ========================
-
- 3. JFK and Withdrawal: the Denouement
- -------------------------------------
-
- By the end of August, JFK and his most dovish advisers (Averell
- Harriman, Roger Hilsman, George Ball) agreed that the client
- government should be overthrown. On August 28, the President
- "asked the Defense Department to come up with ways of building up
- the anti-Diem forces in Saigon," and called on his advisers to
- devise actions in Washington or "in the field which would
- maximize the chances of the rebel generals." Harriman said that
- without a coup, "we cannot win the war" and "must withdraw."
- Hilsman "agreed that we cannot win the war unless Diem is
- removed," as did Ball, while Robert Kennedy also called for
- efforts to strengthen the rebel generals. Secretary Rusk warned
- JFK that "Nhu might call on the North Vietnamese to help him
- throw out the Americans."
-
- Hilsman urged that if Diem and Nhu make any "Political move
- toward the DRV (such as opening of neutralization negotiations),"
- or even hint at such moves, we should "Encourage the generals to
- move promptly with a coup," and be prepared to "hit the DRV with
- all that is necessary" if they try to counter our actions,
- introducing US combat forces to ensure victory for the coup group
- if necessary. "The important thing is to win the war," Hilsman
- advised; and that meant getting rid of the Saigon regime, which
- was dragging its feet and looking for ways out. The President
- concurred that "our primary objective remains winning war," Rusk
- cabled to the Saigon Embassy.
-
- The basic principle, unquestioned, is that we must "focus on
- winning the war" (Hilsman). On September 14, Harriman wrote to
- Lodge that: "from the President on down everybody is determined
- to support you and the country team in winning the war against
- the Viet Cong... there are no quitters here."
-
- In particular, JFK is no quitter. There is not a phrase in the
- internal record to suggest that this judgment by a high-level
- Kennedy adviser, at the dovish extreme, should be qualified in
- any way.
-
- On September 17, President Kennedy instructed Ambassador Lodge to
- pressure Diem to "get everyone back to work and get them to focus
- on winning the war," repeating his regular emphasis on victory.
- It was particularly important to show military progress because
- "of need to make effective case with Congress for continued
- prosecution of the effort," the President added, expressing his
- constant concern that domestic support for his commitment to
- military victory was weak. "To meet these needs," he informed
- Lodge, he was sending his top aides McNamara and Taylor to
- Vietnam. He emphasized to them that the goal remains "winning
- the war," adding that "The way to confound the press is to win
- the war." Like Congress, the press was an enemy because of its
- lack of enthusiasm for a war to victory and its occasional calls
- for diplomacy.
-
- McNamara and Taylor were encouraged by what they found. On
- October 2, they informed the President that "The military
- campaign has made great progress and continues to progress." They
- presented a series of recommendations, three of which were later
- authorized (watered down a bit) in NSAM 263: (1) "An increase in
- the military tempo" throughout the country so that the military
- campaign in the Northern and Central areas will be over by the
- end of 1964, and in the South (the Delta) by the end of 1965; (2)
- Vietnamese should be trained to take over "essential functions
- now performed by U.S. military personnel" by the end of 1965, so
- that "It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S.
- personnel by that time"; (3) "the Defense Department should
- announce in the very near future presently prepared plans to
- withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963" as "an
- initial step in a long-term program to replace U.S. personnel
- with trained Vietnamese without impairment of the war effort."
-
- Their report stressed again that the "overriding objective" is
- victory, a matter "vital to United States security," but that
- withdrawal could not be too long delayed: "any significant
- slowing in the rate of progress would surely have a serious
- effect on U.S. popular support for the U.S. effort." They
- anticipated victory by the end of 1965. The withdrawal plans
- were crucially qualified in the usual way: "No further reductions
- should be made until the requirements of the 1964 campaign become
- firm," that is, until battlefield success is assured.
-
- Note that lack of popular support for the war was not perceived
- by JFK and his advisers as providing an opportunity for
- withdrawal, but rather as a threat to victory.
-
- The NSC met the same day to consider these proposals. The
- President's role was, as usual, marginal. He repeated that "the
- major problem was with U.S. public opinion" and, as he had before,
- balked at the time scale. He opposed a commitment to withdraw
- some forces in 1963 because "if we were not able to take this
- action by the end of this year, we would be accused of being over
- optimistic." McNamara, in contrast, "saw great value in this
- sentence in order to meet the view of Senator Fulbright and
- others that we are bogged down forever in Vietnam." The phrase
- was left as "a part of the McNamara-Taylor report rather than as
- predictions of the President," who thus remained uncommitted to
- withdrawal, at his insistence.
-
- A public statement was released to the press, and prominently
- published, presenting the essence of the McNamara-Taylor
- recommendations. The statement repeated the standard position
- that the US will work with the GVN "to deny this country to
- Communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported
- insurgency of the Viet Cong as promptly as possible," continuing
- with "Major U.S. assistance in support of this military
- effort," which is needed only until the insurgency has been
- suppressed or until the national security forces of the
- Government of South Viet-Nam are capable of suppressing it."
-
- These decisions were encapsulated in NSAM 263 (Oct. 11), a brief
- statement in which "The President approved the military
- recommendations" 1-3 cited above, weakened by one change: that
- "no formal announcement be made of the implementation of plans to
- withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963." The
- final provision of NSAM 263 is JFK's personal instruction to
- Ambassador Lodge to step up the military effort along with
- training and arming of new forces, so as to enhance the prospects
- for victory, on which withdrawal was conditioned.
-
- Note that read literally, NSAM 263 says very little. It approves
- the McNamara-Taylor recommendations to intensify the war and
- military training so that "It should be possible to withdraw the
- bulk of U.S. personnel" by the end of 1965, and includes JFK's
- personal instructions to Lodge to intensify military action. It
- does not call for implementing a 1,000 man withdrawal, but rather
- endorses the third point of the McNamara-Taylor proposal
- concerning plans for such withdrawal "as an initial step in a
- long-term program" to be conducted "without impairment of the war
- effort," deleting their call for formal announcement of these
- plans.
-
- Presumably, the intent was to implement the withdrawal plans if
- military conditions allow, but that intent is unstated. The fact
- might be borne in mind in the light of elaborate later efforts to
- read great significance into nuances of phrasing so as to
- demonstrate a dramatic change in policy with the Kennedy-Johnson
- transition. Adopting these interpretive techniques, we would
- conclude that NSAM 263 is almost vacuous. I stress that that is
- not my interpretation; I assume the obvious unstated intention,
- only suggesting that other documents be treated in the same
- reasonable manner -- in which case, widely-held beliefs will
- quickly evaporate.
-
- The picture presented in public at the time requires no
- significant modification in the light of the huge mass of
- documents now available, though these make much more clear the
- President's unwillingness to commit himself to the withdrawal
- advocated by his war managers for fear that the victory might not
- be achieved in time, his concerns that domestic opinion might not
- stay the course, his insistence that withdrawal be conditioned on
- military victory, and his orders to step up the military effort
- and to replace the Diem regime by one that will "focus on
- winning" and not entertain thoughts of US withdrawal and peaceful
- settlement.
-
- Through October 1963, problems with the GVN continued to mount.
- Nhu called openly for the Americans to get out completely, only
- providing aid. Another problem was the lack of "effectiveness of
- GVN in its relation to its own people." Asked about this,
- Ambassador Lodge responded in an "Eyes only for the President"
- communication that "Viet-Nam is not a thoroughly strong police
- state...because, unlike Hitler's Germany, it is not efficient"
- and is thus unable to suppress the "large and well-organized
- underground opponent strongly and ever-freshly motivated by
- vigorous hatred." The Vietnamese "appear to be more than ever
- anxious to be left alone," and though they "are said to be
- capable of great violence on occasion," "there is no sight of it
- at the present time," another impediment to US efforts.
-
- Small wonder that JFK was unwilling to commit himself to the
- McNamara-Taylor withdrawal proposal. Note that the same defects
- of the US clients underlie the critique of the strategic hamlet
- program by Kennedy doves.
-
- Washington's coup plans continued, with Ambassador Lodge in
- operational command. The only hesitation was fear of failure.
- When the coup finally took place on November 1, replacing Diem
- and Nhu (who were killed) by a military regime, the President
- praised Lodge effusively for his "fine job" and "leadership," an
- "achievement...of the greatest importance." With the generals now
- in power, "our primary emphasis should be on effectiveness rather
- than upon external appearances," the President added. We must
- help the coup regime to confront "the real problems of winning
- the contest against the Communists and holding the confidence of
- its own people." The "ineffectiveness, loss of popular
- confidence, and the prospect of defeat that were decisive in
- shaping our relations to the Diem regime" are now a thing of the
- past, the President hoped, thanks to Lodge's inspired leadership
- and coup-management, with its gratifying outcome (Nov. 6).
-
- Two weeks before Kennedy's assassination, there is not a phrase
- in the voluminous internal record that even hints at withdrawal
- without victory. JFK urges that everyone "focus on winning the
- war"; withdrawal is conditioned on victory, and motivated by
- domestic discontent with Kennedy's war. The stakes are
- considered enormous. Nothing substantial changes as the mantle
- passes to LBJ.
-
- The post-coup situation had positive and negative aspects from
- the point of view of the President and his advisers. On the
- positive side, they hoped that the ruling generals would now at
- last focus on victory as the President had demanded, gain popular
- support, and end the irritating calls for US withdrawal and moves
- towards a peaceful settlement. On the other hand, there was
- disarray at all levels, while at home, advocacy of diplomacy was
- not stilled. Furthermore, evidence that undermined the
- optimistic assessments was becoming harder to ignore. The new
- government confirmed that the GVN "had been losing the war
- against the VC in the Delta for some time because it had been
- losing the population." A top-level meeting was planned for
- Honolulu on November 20 to consider the next steps. The US
- mission in Vietnam recommended that the withdrawal plans be
- maintained, the new government being "warmly disposed toward the
- U.S." and offering "opportunities to exploit that we never had
- before." Kennedy's plans to escalate the assault against the
- southern resistance could now be implemented, with a stable
- regime finally in place. McNamara, ever cautious, was concerned
- by a sharp increase in VC incidents and urged that "We must be
- prepared to devote enough resources to this job of winning the
- war."
-
- At the Honolulu meeting, a draft was written by McGeorge Bundy
- for what became NSAM 273, adopted after the assassination but
- prepared for JFK with the expectation that he would approve it in
- essentials, as was the norm. Top advisers agreed; Hilsman made
- only "minor changes." The State Department history states
- correctly that the draft "was almost identical to the final
- paper," differing only in paragraph 7.
-
- Both documents reiterate the basic wording of the early October
- documents. On withdrawal, the version approved by Johnson is
- identical with the draft prepared for Kennedy. It reads: "The
- objectives of the United States with respect to the withdrawal of
- U.S. military personnel remain as stated in the White House
- statement of October 2, 1963," referring to the statement of US
- policy formalized without essential change as NSAM 263. As for
- paragraph 7, the draft and final version are, respectively, as
- follows:
-
- "_Draft_: With respect to action against North Vietnam,
- there should be a detailed plan for the development of
- additional Government of Vietnam resources, especially
- for sea-going activity, and such planning should indicate
- the time and investment necessary to achieve a wholly new
- level of effectiveness in this field of action."
-
- "_NSAM 273_: Planning should include different levels of
- possible increased activity, and in each instance there
- should be estimates of such factors as: A. Resulting
- damage to North Vietnam; B. The plausibility of denial;
- C. Possible North Vietnamese retaliation; D. Other
- international reaction.
-
- Plans should be submitted promptly for approval by higher
- authority."
-
- There is no relevant difference between the two documents, except
- that the LBJ version is weaker and more evasive, dropping the
- call for "a wholly new level of effectiveness in this field of
- action"; further actions are reduced to "possible." The reason
- why paragraph 7 refers to "additional" or "possible increased"
- activity we have already seen: such operations had been underway
- since the Kennedy offensive of 1962, apparently with direct
- participation of US personnel and foreign mercenaries.
-
- No direct US government involvement is proposed in NSAM 273
- beyond what was already underway under JFK. The plans later
- developed by the DOD and CIA called for "Intensified sabotage
- operations in North Vietnam by Vietnamese personnel," with the US
- involved only in intelligence collection (U-2, electronics) and
- "psychological operations" (leaflet drops, "phantom covert
- operations," "black and white radio broadcasts").
-
- These two NSAMs (263 in October, 273 on Nov. 26 with a Nov. 20
- draft written for Kennedy) are the centerpiece of the thesis that
- Kennedy planned to withdraw without victory, a decision at once
- reversed by LBJ (and perhaps the cause of the assassination).
- They have been the subject of many claims and charges. Typical
- is Oliver Stone's Address to the National Press Club alleging
- that a "ten-year study" by John Newman (_JFK and Vietnam_)
- "makes it very clear President Kennedy signaled his intention to
- withdraw from Vietnam in a variety of ways and put that intention
- firmly on the record with National Security Action Memorandum 263
- in October of 1963," while LBJ "reverse[d] the NSAM" with NSAM
- 273; Kennedy was assassinated for that reason, Stone suggests.
- Zachary Sklar, the co-author (with Stone) of the screenplay
- _JFK_, also citing Newman's book, claims further that the draft
- prepared for Kennedy "says that the U.S. will _train South
- Vietnamese_ to carry out covert military operations against North
- Vietnam" while "In the final document, signed by Johnson, it
- states that _U.S. forces_ themselves will carry out these
- covert military operations," leading to the Tonkin Gulf incident,
- which "was an example of precisely that kind of covert operation
- carried out by U.S. forces" (his emphasis). Arthur Schlesinger
- claims that after the assassination, "President Johnson,
- listening to President Kennedy's more hawkish advisers..., issued
- National Security Action Memorandum 273 calling for the
- maintenance of American military programs in Vietnam `at levels
- as high' as before -- reversing the Kennedy withdrawal policy."
- As further proof he cites a paragraph from NSAM 273: "It
- _remains_ the _central objective_ of the United States in
- South Vietnam to _win_ their contest against the _externally
- directed_ and supported communist conspiracy." He highlights
- these words to show that LBJ was undertaking "both the total
- commitment Kennedy had always refused and the diagnosis of the
- conflict" that Kennedy had "never quite accepted."
-
- These alleged facts are held to establish the historic change at
- the assassination.
-
- The claims, however, have no known basis in fact, indeed are
- refuted by the internal record, which gives no hint of any
- intention by JFK to withdraw without victory -- quite the
- contrary -- and reveals no "reversal" in NSAM 273. Newman's book
- adds nothing relevant. The call for maintenance of aid is in the
- draft of NSAM 273 prepared for Kennedy, and was also at the core
- of his tentative withdrawal plans, conditioned on victory and
- "Major U.S. assistance" to assure it. Furthermore, Kennedy's
- more dovish advisers approved and continued to urge LBJ to follow
- what they understood to be JFK's policy, rejecting any thought of
- withdrawal without victory. The final version of NSAM 273 does
- not state that US forces would carry out covert operations in any
- new way; nor did they, in the following months. There were
- covert attacks on North Vietnamese installations just prior to
- the Tonkin Gulf incident, but they were carried out by South
- Vietnamese forces, according to the internal record.
- Schlesinger's highlighted words appear regularly in both the
- public and private Kennedy record, as does the diagnosis, along
- with JFK's insistent demand that everyone must "focus on winning
- the war." The hidden meanings are in the eye of the beholder.
-
- The two versions of NSAM 273 differ in no relevant way, apart
- from the weakening of paragraph 7 in the final version.
- Furthermore, the departure from NSAM 263 is slight, and readily
- explained in terms of changing assessments. Efforts to detect
- nuances and devious implications have no basis in fact, and if
- pursued, could easily be turned into a (meaningless) "proof" that
- LBJ toned down Kennedy aggressiveness.
-
- The call in NSAM 273 (both the draft and the weakened LBJ
- version) for consideration of further ARVN operations against the
- North is readily explained in terms of the two basic features of
- the post-coup situation: the feeling among Kennedy's war planners
- that with the Diem regime gone, the US at last had a stable base
- for Kennedy's war in the South, with new "opportunities to
- exploit"; and the increasing concern about the military situation
- in the South, undermining earlier optimism. The former factor
- made it possible to consider extension of ARVN operations; the
- latter made it more important to extend them. In subsequent
- months, Kennedy's planners (now directing Johnson's war)
- increasingly inclined towards operations against the North as a
- way to overcome their inability to win the war in the South,
- leading finally to the escalation of 1965, undertaken largely to
- "drive the DRV out of its reinforcing role and obtain its
- cooperation in bringing an end to the Viet Cong insurgency,"
- using "its directive powers to make the Viet Cong desist"
- (Taylor, Nov. 27, 1964).
-
-
-
-
-