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- From: jaske@abacus.bates.edu (Jon Aske)
- Subject: Chomsky (Z-9/92): Vain hopes, part 2/7
- Message-ID: <1992Sep3.213414.23900@mont.cs.missouri.edu>
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- Date: Thu, 3 Sep 1992 21:34:14 GMT
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-
- ------------------------------------------------------
- The following article by Noam Chomsky appeared in:
- Z Magazine, September 1992
- and is reprinted here with the magazine's permission.
- ------------------------------------------------------
-
- Vain Hopes, False Dreams (Part 2 of 7, 9.5KB)
- ========================
-
- 2. JFK and Withdrawal: the Early Plans
- --------------------------------------
-
- The optimistic mid-1962 assessment led Secretary of Defense
- Robert McNamara, the primary war manager for Kennedy and Johnson,
- to initiate planning for the withdrawal of US forces from
- Vietnam, leaving to the client regime the dirty work of cleaning
- up the remnants. Kennedy and McNamara recognized that domestic
- support for the war was thin, and that problems might arise if it
- were to persist too long. Similarly, in November 1967, General
- Westmoreland announced that with victory imminent, US troops
- could begin to withdraw in 1969 (as happened, though under
- circumstances that he did not anticipate); that recommendation
- does not show that he was a secret dove. Advocacy of withdrawal
- after assurance of victory was not a controversial stand.
-
- In contrast, withdrawal _without victory_ would have been
- highly controversial. That position received scant support until
- well after the Tet offensive of January 1968, when corporate and
- political elites determined that the operation should be
- liquidated, in large part because of the social costs of protest.
-
- The question to be considered, then, is whether JFK, despite his
- 1961-2 escalation and his militant public stand, planned to
- withdraw _without_ victory, a plan aborted by the
- assassination, which cleared the way for Lyndon Johnson and his
- fellow-warmongers to bring on a major war. If so, one may
- inquire further into whether this was a factor in the
- assassination.
-
- The withdrawal decisions were reported at once in the press with
- fair accuracy, and the basic facts about the internal
- deliberations lying behind them became known 20 years ago when
- the _Pentagon Papers_ appeared. In July 1962, the analyst
- writes, "At the behest of the President, the Secretary of Defense
- undertook to reexamine the situation [in Vietnam] and address
- himself to its future -- with a view to assuring that it be
- brought to a successful conclusion within a reasonable time."
- McNamara declared himself impressed with the "tremendous
- progress" that had been made, and called for "phasing out major
- U.S. advisory and logistic support activities." General Paul
- Harkins (commander of the US military mission) estimated that the
- VC should be "eliminated as a significant force" about a year
- after the Vietnamese forces then being trained and equipped
- "became fully operational." McNamara, however, insisted upon "a
- conservative view": planning should be based on the assumption
- that "it would take three years instead of one, that is, by the
- latter part of 1965." He also "observed that it might be
- difficult to retain public support for U.S. operations in Vietnam
- indefinitely," a constant concern. Therefore, it was necessary
- "to phase out U.S. military involvement." The Joint Chiefs
- ordered preparation of a plan to implement these decisions. The
- operative assumption was that "The insurgency will be under
- control" by the end of 1965.
-
- On January 25, 1963, General Harkins' plan was presented to the
- Joint Chiefs, stating that "the phase-out of the US special
- military assistance is envisioned as generally occurring during
- the period July 1965-June 1966," earlier where feasible. A few
- days later, the Chiefs were reassured that this was the right
- course by a report by a JCS investigative team headed by Army
- Chief of Staff Earle Wheeler that included leading military
- hawks. Its report was generally upbeat and optimistic. The
- anticipated success of current plans to intensify military
- operations would allow a "concurrent phase-out of United States
- support personnel, leaving a Military Assistance Advisory Group
- of about 1,600 personnel" by 1965. All of this was considered
- feasible and appropriate by the top military command.
-
- Wheeler then reported directly to the President, informing him
- "that things were going well in Vietnam militarily, but that `Ho
- Chi Minh was fighting the war for peanuts and if we ever expected
- to win that affair out there, we had to make him bleed a little
- bit'." The President "was quite interested in this," General
- Wheeler recalled in oral history (July 1964). His dovish
- advisers were also impressed. In April 1963, Hilsman proposed to
- "continue the covert, or at least deniable, operations along the
- general lines we have been following for some months" against
- North Vietnam with the objective of "keeping the threat of
- eventual destruction alive in Hanoi's mind." But "significant
- action against North Vietnam" is unwise on tactical grounds: it
- should be delayed until "we have demonstrated success in our
- counter-insurgency program." Such "premature action" might also
- "so alarm our friends and allies and a significant segment of
- domestic opinion that the pressures for neutralization will
- become formidable"; as always, the dread threat of diplomacy must
- be deflected. With judicious planning, Hilsman said, "I believe
- we can win in Viet-Nam."
-
- Hilsman was not quite as optimistic as the military command. A
- few days before the President heard Wheeler's upbeat report, he
- received a memorandum from Hilsman and Forrestal (Jan. 25) that
- was more qualified. They condemned the press for undue pessimism
- and underplaying US success, and agreed that "The war in South
- Vietnam is clearly going better than it was a year ago," praising
- ARVN's "increased aggressiveness" resulting from the US military
- escalation, and reporting that GVN control now extended to over
- half the rural population (the VC controlling 8%), a considerable
- gain through late 1962. But "the negative side of the ledger is
- still awesome." The VC had increased their regular forces,
- recruiting locally and supplied locally, and are "extremely
- effective." "Thus the conclusion seems inescapable that the Viet
- Cong could continue the war effort at the present level, or
- perhaps increase it, even if the infiltration routes were
- completely closed." "Our overall judgment, in sum, is that we are
- probably winning, but certainly more slowly than we had hoped."
- They made a variety of technical recommendations to implement the
- counterinsurgency program more efficiently, with more direct US
- involvement; and to improve the efficiency of the US mission to
- accelerate the "Progress toward winning the war."
-
- We thus learn that in early 1963, in an atmosphere of
- considerable to great optimism, the military initiatives for
- withdrawal went hand-in-hand with plans for escalation of the war
- within South Vietnam and possibly intensified actions against
- North Vietnam. We learn further that such "intelligence and
- sabotage forays" into North Vietnam were already underway --
- since mid-1962 according to McGeorge Bundy. On December 11,
- 1963, as the new Administration took over, Michael Forrestal
- (another leading Kennedy dove) confirmed that "For some time the
- Central Intelligence Agency has been engaged in joint clandestine
- operations with ARVN against North Vietnam." Journalist William
- Pfaff reports that in the summer of 1962, at a Special Forces
- encampment north of Saigon he observed a CIA "patrol loading up
- in an unmarked C-46 with a Chinese pilot in civilian clothes,"
- taking off for a mission in North Vietnam ("possibly into China
- itself"), with some "Asians, some Americans or Europeans."
-
- The connection between withdrawal and escalation is readily
- understandable: successful military actions would enable the GVN
- to take over the task from the Americans, who could then withdraw
- with victory secured, satisfying the common intent of the extreme
- hawks, war manager McNamara, and JFK.
-
- In the following months, the withdrawal plans were carried
- forward under the same optimistic assumptions, with the agreement
- of the military, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and General
- Maxwell Taylor, JFK's most trusted military adviser. The
- "fundamental objective" remained unchanged, Michael Forrestal
- advised the President on August 27: the US must "give
- wholehearted support to the prosecution of the war against the
- Viet Cong terrorists," and "continue assistance to any government
- in South Vietnam which shows itself capable of sustaining this
- effort."
-
- The reference to "any government" relates to increasing
- Administration concerns over the Diem regime. One factor was
- that its repression was evoking internal resistance, which was
- interfering with the war effort. Another was that Diem and his
- brother Nhu were pressing their demands for US withdrawal with
- increasing urgency, sometimes in public, including a front-page
- interview in the _Washington Post_ in May in which Nhu called
- for withdrawal of half the American military. Administration
- planners feared that GVN pressures for withdrawal of US forces
- would become difficult to resist, a danger enhanced by
- exploratory GVN efforts to reach a diplomatic settlement with the
- North. The skimpy political base for Kennedy's war would then
- erode, and the US would be compelled to withdraw without victory.
- That option being unacceptable, the Saigon regime had to get on
- board, or be dismissed.
-
-
-
-
-