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- Xref: sparky comp.ai.philosophy:7424 sci.philosophy.tech:4997 sci.logic:2647
- Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech,sci.logic
- Path: sparky!uunet!think.com!rpi!utcsri!psych.toronto.edu!christo
- From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
- Subject: Re: Searle on syntax mirroring semantics
- Message-ID: <1993Jan26.203819.8931@psych.toronto.edu>
- Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
- References: <1993Jan26.121155.24448@sophia.smith.edu>
- Date: Tue, 26 Jan 1993 20:38:19 GMT
- Lines: 24
-
- In article <1993Jan26.121155.24448@sophia.smith.edu> orourke@sophia.smith.edu (Joseph O'Rourke) writes:
- >Can anyone explain this sentence to me? It is on p.203 of "The
- >Rediscovery of the Mind" by John Searle.
- >
- > The development of proof theory showed that within certain
- > well-known limits the semantic relations between propositions
- > can be entirely mirrored by the syntactic relations between
- > the sentences that express those propositions.
-
- Logic. The rules that drive a logical derivation are forward are syntactic
- (e.g. "if a formula look like such-and such, then you're allowed to write
- one down that looks so-and so), but upon interpretation, you'll discover that
- certain semantic feature (viz. truth) have been preserved. This is the sense
- in which syntax mirrors semantics. It is also the driving force behind the
- plausibility of computational cognitive science (See Pylyshyn _Computation and
- cognition_ or Fodor _Psychsemantics_.). Only if a (syntactic) computer program
- can mirror the semantic features of cognition is there any hope that a computer
- might be made into a mind.
-
- --
- Christopher D. Green christo@psych.toronto.edu
- Psychology Department cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
- University of Toronto
- Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1
-