NetNews Usenet Archive 1993 #3/NN_1993_3.iso/spool/bit/listserv/seasial/4664

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Date:         Sat, 23 Jan 1993 17:28:25 PST
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From:         Coban Tun <[e-mail]>
Subject:      THAILANG - NATION VIEWS ECONOMIC TIES WITH JAPAN (LONG)
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01/19 2133  THAILANG - NATION VIEWS ECONOMIC TIES WITH JAPAN

(JAN. 19) PAC RIM INTELLIGENCE REPORT - When Japanese militarists coined the
term "East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" some fifty years ago, the prosperity
they had in mind was in all likelihood their own. Today, the pervasiveness of
Japanese goods, department stores, and even cultural phenomena like the karaoke,
have led some to wonder if the  "Sphere" has not already been achieved by
economic means.
   This is a very real ambivalence in East Asia over the regional role of Japan
in the coming decades. Negative attitudes towards Japan tend to stem from
historical and geopolitical factors. In Northeast Asia, in particular, where
proximity to Japan exacted a heavy toll in the past, resentment towards Japan
remains strong. China and Korea remember their wartime suffering at the hands
of Japan and view any political move by Tokyo on the international scene with
suspicion.
   In Southeast Asia, attitudes are more mixed. During World War II, open,
protracted guerrilla warfare against the Japanese occupation was conducted in
the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore. A generally more positive Japanese
role, however, was played in Burma and Indonesia, where the nationalist
independence movement leaderships were trained and equipped by the Japanese.
In Thailand, common bonds of the monarchy, Buddhism, and independence from
Western colonial rule contributed to a positive relationship with the Japanese
military during the war.
   Though wartime memories continue to colour the perceptions of East Asian
nations, more recent developments suggest that acceptance of Japan's role in
regional affairs will increase. A new generation born after the war have no
personal recollection of the cruelties inflicted on their parents and
grandparents. For their part, the Japanese have been developing ever closer
economic ties with Southeast Asia. Since 1985, Japanese investment in Southeast
Asia has expanded rapidly, eclipsing traditional Western investment, including
the United States. Following the end of the Cold War, Japan has been playing a
constructive role in resolving the Cambodian issue, notably by holding the Tokyo
conference last year and committing non-combatant forces to participate in
peacekeeping operations in Cambodia.
   But every now and then controversy flares up over some issue such as the
revision of history textbooks (to portray Japan's role in the Second World War
in a proper perspective), and the lingering dualism in regional perceptions
towards Japan resurfaces.
   The priorities that Japan needs to address in Southeast Asia are two- fold:
to reassure regional states that Japan will not aspire to establish
political-military dominance over the region, and to ensure more equitable
distribution of benefits in her economic relations.
   In the past few days we have been reassured that Japan will "bear in mind the
lessons of history and never walk the path of a military power again." Japan,
according to Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, will continue to rely on the
United States to provide its security umbrella.
   During the Cold War, such a reaffirmation of an ongoing policy position
would be sufficiently reassuring. The end of the Cold War, however, has caused
enough changes in the regional security equation to compel a rethink of
Japan's role in it.
   Following are few areas where Japan's role will be welcome in the months
ahead:
   Conflict prevention: In the wake of the US military withdrawal from Southeast
Asia, some alternative arrangement will eventually have to be found. It is
unlikely that another major power can assume the role played by the United
States, as possible candidates (such as China and Russia) also have their
share of historical baggage. For the time being, then, the most acceptable
alternative is multilateral and regional cooperation. For example, Japan may
demonstrate her willingness to work with her partners in Southeast Asia by
participating in UN-led and Asean-initiated efforts to foster conditions
conducive to conflict prevention.
   Japan's regional people: Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe's suggestion last
week that Japan's constitution should be amended to allow more active roles
for her peacekeepers abroad raised understandable controversy. Prime Minister
Miyazawa's attempt to smooth ruffled feathers may have done the job for the time
being. But these conflicting signals have again raised the question of Japan's
real intentions towards the region. Japan's partners might feel more confident
if a definitive policy towards Southeast Asia where to be enunciated, along
with some indication of Japan's perception of her role in the region.
   One way of lending greater transparency and predictability to her foreign
policy is to engage in regular dialogue with her partners in the region, now
only through formal arrangements such as the Asean Ministerial
Meetings/Post-Ministerial Conference, but also in informal bilateral
consultations. Regional Development: Since the mid-1980s, Japanese investment,
attracted to Southeast Asia's low wages and industrious work force, has been a
significant factor in the region's export boom. While Japanese investment is
certainly welcome, greater focus on areas such as human resources development
and technology transfer would contribute to an even more solid sense of
partnership. Official development assistance on issues of international
concern, such as the environment, narcotics suppression, and AIDS, should also
reinforce the goodwill and yield results beneficial to the region as a whole.
   Apart from Asean, Japan has lately been turning her attention to the
embryonic economies of Indochina, an encouraging sign that Japan is further
deepening her commitment to economic development in the region. Given Thailand's
central location and expertise in regional affairs, a tripartite developmental
framework, involving Thailand, Japan and Indochina, would consolidate not only
the economic relationship among these partners, but enhance the climate for
political cooperation in the region as well.
   With such a wide-ranging role for Japan in the region, will Southeast Asia
indeed become,a Co-Prosperity Sphere?. More to the point, will Southeast Asia
become Japan's Co-Prosperity Sphere? From available indications, such will not
necessarily be the case. To begin with, while Japan is the major investor in
the region, traditional Western investors still maintain a considerable, if
relatively declining. presence. Moreover, other non-American countries are also
aggressively pursuing investment opportunities in this part of the world. As
the Asian NIEs (newly industrialized economies) move up the ladder of
industrialization, they are increasingly attracted to Southeast Asia not only
as a market but also as a location for offshore production facilities.
   The perceptual dualism mentioned earlier also serves as a powerful
self-correcting mechanism. There is great sensitivity in the East Asian
countriesindeed, in Japan itselfabout the acceptable limits of Japanese
international political and military activity. The slightest suggestion that
Japan might break out of her constitutionally stipulated behavioural mould is
enough to ship up a noisy debate in Japan and her Northeast Asian neighbours.
While opposition to a heightened role for Japan will be more marked in Northeast
Asia, the verdict is still out in Southeast Asia, due to the different wartime
experiences of countries in the region.
   If Japan, by tradition a closed society, can remedy foreign perceptions, such
as by further opening up her market and society to outsiders, their detractors
will have much less to be distrustful of. Until Japan clarifies her stance and
intentions towards the region to the satisfaction of her partners, some
lingering doubt about the desirability of a more active Japanese political role
is likely to remain. Building trust will take time but it will be time well
spent.
   Another point worth mentioning is the dampening effect Japanese political
pluralism may have on any expansionist design, should such a design be indeed
possible. In the his 1989 book, The Enigma of Japanese Power, Karel van Wolfeten
observed that, contrary to Westerr perceptions of a unified "Japan, Inc.,"
decisionmaking in Japan is more often characterized by fragmentation, frigidity
and indecisiveness. The democratic Japan of today, it seems, will be hard put
to muster the ambitious purposefulness of Imperial Japan's wartime plans.
   In light of these considerations fears of a coerced, Japan-dominated
Co-Prosperity Sphere seem unwarranted. Whether Japan dominates or not will be
primanly due to market forces and up to each country to determine.
   Japan's regional role cannot be denied its expansion. We must channel these
energies into constructive cooperation so that the region as a whole may
benefit. Now is an ideal opportunity for Japan to prove that she is up to the
challenges of international responsibillty. Bearing in mind the lessons of
history, Japan can now take further concrete steps to ensure that her partners
will never again have cause to question their foreign policy motivations.