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- From: Hank Roth <odin@world.std.com>
- Subject: Israel's War on Lebanon (II)
- Message-ID: <1992Dec20.060806.25750@mont.cs.missouri.edu>
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- Date: Sun, 20 Dec 1992 06:08:06 GMT
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- {From ISRAEL'S WAR IN LEBANON: Eyewitness Chronicles of the
- Invasion and Occupation, Edited by Franklin P. Lamb (Spokesman
- for the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation) Russell Press Ltd,
- Nottingham, England (1984)}
-
- Part 2--INTRODUCTION
-
- REQUIREMENT OF ACTUAL NECESSITY
-
- The principle of necessity refers to the imminence of the threat
- of attack and the absence of effective peaceful alternatives for
- averting it. The purpose of the requirement of actual necessity
- is to prevent states from using self-defense as an excuse for
- aggression. As Professor Myles McDougal of Yale University Law
- School has written:
-
- "The structure of traditional prescription [in international
- law] has established a standard of justifying necessity commonly
- referred to in exacting terms. A high degree of necessity--a
- "great and immediate" necessity, "directly and immediate,"
- "compelling and instant" --was prerequisite to a characterization
- of coercion as "legitimate self-defense." Necessity that assumed
- the shape of an actual and current application of violence
- presented little difficulty, contain and restrict the assertion
- of claims to apply preemptive violence, that is, when the
- necessity pleaded consisted of alleged expectations of an attack
- which had yet actually to erupt...There is a whole continuum of
- degrees of imminence or remoteness in future time, from the most
- imminent to the more remote, which, in the expectations of the
- claimant of self-defense, may characterize an expected attack.
- Decision-makers sought to limit lawful anticipatory defense by
- projecting a customary requirement that the expected attack
- exhibit so high a degree of imminence as to preclude effective
- resort by the intended victim to non-violent modalities of
- response."
-
- The legal principles of self-defense, and particularly the
- requirement of "actual necessity," were raised early in the
- United States in an 1837 incident known as the CAROLINE case. The
- case involved the capture and destruction of a small U.S. vessel,
- the CAROLINE, and the killing of two Americans in U.S. territory
- by Canadian troops. The CAROLINE had been used to transport men
- and supplies to Canadian insurgents. Apparently the British
- government had previously brought the matter to the attention of
- U.S. authorities, but the United States failed to stop the use of
- the ship, in apparent violation of customary neutrality
- requirements. In the diplomatic controversy that followed, Great
- Britain justified its action on the basis that imperative need
- for self-defense required immediate action. The United States
- did not challenge the facts of the ship's involvement in the
- transport activities, but effectively claimed that the
- circumstances did not make a case of reasonable necessity for
- anticipatory self-defense. While the British tendered a formal
- apology, they did not accept legal responsibility for the
- destruction of the vessel and the death of the two crewmen.
-
- The CAROLINE case is often cited to illustrate then Secretary of
- State Webster's statement that the necessity fo self-defense in
- such cases should be "instant, overwhelming, having no choice of
- means and no moment for deliberation." While relevant, Webster's
- dictum should not be taken literally in the international
- community today. Nuclear weapons stockpiles and the capability of
- instantaneous delivery raise the likelihood that the initial
- attack may leave few defenders or little to be defended. Thus,
- the definition of the "moment for deliberation" must be
- reconsidered.
-
- As noted above, although opinions differ regarding the requirement
- of an "armed attack" for the lawful exercise of the right under
- Article 51 of the UN Charter, the weight of opinion and practice
- is that the right may be claimed and used only when there is
- reasonable cause to believe that the national existence is
- imperiled. In other words, international law permits the exercise
- of self-defense not only when there is reasonable cause to
- believe that the very survival of the state is endangered in the
- face of actual attack, but also against a threatened aggression
- when the danger is imminent and threatens national existence.
-
- The actual necessity of self-defense must be shown to be
- overwhelming in order to preserve the existence of the state.
- This was not the case with respect to the Israeli invasion of
- Lebanon. Israel's argument that it met the requirement of actual
- necessity is based on its claim that it had been attacked by the
- PLO through terrorist attacks against individuals and that, in
- any event, there existed the threat of an imminent PLO armed
- attack. But the evidentiary record discloses no evidence of an
- armed attack by the PLO of a degree of gravity to meet the actual
- necessity test for Israel's use of force. Indeed, UNIFIL
- headquarters in Lebanon has stated that the PLO's only use of
- military force against Israel between the July 1981 ceasefire and
- the June 1982 Israeli invasion was on May 9, 1982, in response to
- intense Israeli bombing, which itself violated the July 1981
- ceasefire.
-
- Israel argued in the Security Council on June 6: "Even in a
- relatively short period of time which has elapsed since the July
- 1981 agreement on cessation of hostiles, the total of dead and
- wounded at the hands of the PLO has steadily mounted to a point
- where it has now reached 17 dead and 241 wounded in a total of
- 141 terrorist acts, all of them originating from terrorist bases
- inside Lebanaon." Middle East specialist John Reddaway, commenting
- on this point, declared:
-
- "Concerning the 17 stated to have been killed, Israel provided 15
- specific examples which included eight Israeli Jews, seven of
- whom were apparently killed in Israel, and an Israeli diplomat
- killed in France. He also referred to seven Jews killed in
- foreign countries including Austria, Belgium and West Berlin,
- none of whom were stated to be Israeli citizens. Concerning the
- seven Israeli Jews stated to be killed in Israel, he said that
- four were killed on April 22, 1979, and three on April 6, 1980
- (both occasions prior to the 1981 ceasefire). He assumed that the
- PLO was responsible in all instances, but furnished no proof. In
- the case of the Jews killed outside Israel, he did not say
- whether the local police authorities agreed that the PLO were
- responsible."
-
- "The inclusion of attacks on non-Israeli Jews outside the State
- of Israel reflects claims advanced by the Israeli Government that
- "the Jewish people" throughout the world share a common
- nationality with the citizens of Israel. But, in fact, the
- Government of Israel has no legal authority to intervene
- diplomatically or militarily on behalf of Jews who are not
- Israeli nationals. Even supposing the Jews killed in foreign
- countries are Israeli nationals, the responsibility for their
- protection lies primarily with the host countries, and
- intervention by Israel could be justified only if that protection
- fell below the standard commonly accepted by the international
- community. To try to make out that a number of isolated attacks
- on Jews, by unidentidified assailants in Europe, presented such a
- danger to the State of Israel as to justify its invasion of a
- neighboring state in the Middle East is making a mockery of the
- concept of self-defense."
-
- Israel has not offered any evidence whatsoever that a PLO armed
- attack was imminent. Indeed, Prime Minister Begin admitted that
- the invasion of Lebanon was not necessary to ensure the exitence
- of the State of Israel. In his August 8 appearance at the
- National Defense College in Israel, Begin specifically stated
- that the invasion "does not really belong to the category of wars
- of no alternative," thus acknowledging that Israel's invasion was
- not a legitimate act of self-defense and did not meed the
- requirment of actual necessity.
-
- Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Israeli lobby in
- the United States and elsewhere, in close coordination with the
- Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, attempted to justify the
- invasion retrospectively by arguing that Israel captured large
- quantities of PLO arms, proving an armed attack was imminent. The
- posession of arms does not establish that an armed attack is
- imminent or that an actual necessity existed. Moreover, inasmuch
- as the arms were "discovered" after the invasion, they could not
- have constituted justification for an invasion that had already
- been launched. By mid-June, the Israel lobby began circulating
- revelations of the seizure by the Israeli Army of massive depots
- of PLO arms. According to Defense Minister Sharon, the quantities
- were "incredible."
-
- As Michael Jansen, author of the BATTLE OF BEIRUT, has noted, one
- of the purposes of the PLO arsenal stories was to achieve the
- propaganda goal of furnishing "proof" not only that the
- Palestinians were planning to launch a full-scale attack on
- Israel, but that they were actually going to do it with foreign
- forces, including Russian forces (and for whom these weapons were
- being prepositioned.) At one fund-raising event, senior Israeli
- Army officers stated that they had seized enough arms to equip
- "one million terrorists" and that it would "require 500 large
- trucks working for months to transport the massive material,
- valued at $5 billion." The Israeli lobby continued its claims:
-
- * In a July 2 letter to THE TIMES of London, Shabtar Rossene
- stated that it would take 80 trucks at least a month to transport
- 4,000 tons of ammunition and in addition 140 tanks and other
- military vehicles, 12,500 light weapons, 520 heavy weapons, and
- so on.
-
- * Israel Ambassador to the United States Moshe Arens claimed that
- 500 to 600 heavy artillery pieces were captured.
-
- * Prime Minister Begin claimed that the captured weapons would
- equip five divisions, or 60,000 troops.
-
- * On June 28, at an exhibition of captured arms, a logistic corps
- brigadier stated that the weapons were sufficient not for five
- divisions, but for five brigades, or 20,000 men and that it would
- take 1,000 men and 150 trucks a month to complete their removal.
- Vistors to the exhibition were advised that the Russian T-162
- tanks on display were a selection of the 500 tanks captured from
- the Syrians and the PLO.
-
- These wildly inflated claims were reduced to reality by military
- correspondents of Israeli newspapers as they began to investigate
- the figures. For example, the Israeli newspaper HA'ARETZ
- concluded that the weapons found were enough for one lightly
- armed infantry division, that is, for 12,000 men, and that only
- 38 T-34 tanks were captured. The HA'ARETZ article continued:
-
- "It is likely that some of the 46 T-55's captured belonged to
- the terrorists, but there is another view that they all belonged
- to the Syrians. So it is not true that 400 or 500 tanks were
- captured in terrorist territory. The only weapons found in large
- quantities were different types of rifles: some 10,000
- Kalachnikov assault rifles..while the number of artillery pieces
- seized were also large, it was not as great as some political
- leaders claimed earlier in the war."
-
- "Fifty-one heavy guns were captured, including two old French
- 155mm guns and 32 Russian 130mm guns, and 240 other types of
- artillery, some of which could have belonged to the Syrians. The
- booty was also poor in the latest-type Katushyas; of the 26
- captured only 15 were the latest type. Did these arms threaten
- Israel's exitence? They did constitute a danger of raids,
- shelling and terror, but in no sense a danger to our existence.
- The strength of an infantry division with partial support is no
- danger to Israel's existence, unless we suddenly desire to ignore
- the strength of the Israel Defense Force."
-
- Following this and other reports documenting the discrepancy
- between reality and the claims made earlier by government
- officials, there was a demand in the Knesset for an inquiry into
- the origin of the inflated claims. TO-DATE, NOTHING DEFINITIVE
- HAS BEEN REPORTED ON THE RESULTS.
- ----------------------------------------------
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