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Subject: Computer Networking in the Ex USSR
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/** media.issues: 198.0 **/
** Topic: Computer Networking in the xUSSR **
** Written  5:50 pm  Jul 20, 1992 by hfrederick in cdp:media.issues **
[1275 lines in four responses]
Date:   Thu, 16 Jul 92 12:47:53 LCL
[from]  BTRAVICA@SUVM (Bob Travica)

Computer Networking in the xUSSR:  Technology, Uses and Social Effects

by Bob Travica (C) 1992 (btravica@suvm) & Matthew Hogan (m91hogan@suvm)
School of Information Studies, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA

Keywords: computer network, Soviet Union, electronic telecommunication,
network technology, electronic mail, social effects

                                 ABSTRACT

An exploratory study on the state-of-the-art of computer networks in the
countries of the former Soviet Union was conducted. Data were collected
mainly via computer networks.  The main finding is that computer networking
rapidly develops in the xUSSR. This paper presents findings of the study.
Four main computer networks are described in terms of their technology and
uses. Social effects of computer networks are analyzed on the case of the
failed 1991 coup.  Latent social effects of computer networks are
discussed.
** End of text from cdp:media.issues **

/** media.issues: 198.1 **/
** Written  5:51 pm  Jul 20, 1992 by hfrederick in cdp:media.issues **
I.      INTRODUCTION

In March of 1984, a network user from the Soviet Union announced via USENET
that he had joined the network.  This unprecedented event surprised the
international networking community.  The presence of a networker from
behind the Iron Curtain was a first in the history of both the Soviet Union
and the global networks.  Many USENET users expressed interest in the
Soviet user's action.  What a surprise when the posting turned out to be an
early April Fool's Day joke, the kind that traditionally rolled through
USENET.

In 1984, the USSR (hereafter xUSSR) was part of the information and
communication space controlled by the communist regimes.  National
networking was the exclusive privilege of the Soviet government and a
limited number of users from the scientific community. Soviet international
computer network links were reserved for the countries of the communist
'brotherhood.' Seven years after the April Fool's joke, networking in the
XUSSR shows a dramatically different picture.

Networking in the xUSSR is rapidly expanding.  It now includes new wide
area networks, gateways to global networks, new categories of network
users, and an increasing range of network services.  Initially, technical
(i.e., computer) and business interests were the protagonists of network
development.  Although the xUSSR is still in the early stage of social
andpolitical networking, if its contribution to global networking is to be
realized, the research community must be incorporated into the worldwide
networks.

This paper has four parts: Introduction; technical aspects of the xUSSR
computer networks; network uses (services); and, the discussion on the
social aspects of the networking in the xUSSR.  Our discussion of
networking is in terms of four major wide area networks, and their
information and communication uses.

1.  Research Questions and Theoretical Framework

This paper is based on our exploratory research conducted in late 1991 and
early 1992 on networking in the xUSSR. We are using a simple descriptive
model of the implementation of a new technology into the social context.
Consider the introduction and spread of the automobile as a new means of
transportation. The questions the researcher might ask are:  What do the
cars look like; Who are the drivers; What are the cars used for; What new
social phenomena are occurring and are likely to occur with the uses of
cars.  Similarly, we ask these questions about computer networking in the
xUSSR:

|What are the main networks and how are they designed?

|Who are the people making up the networks?

|What are the networks used for?

|What are the actual and latent social effects associated with the
networks?

Our main research question is:

|What is the overall trend of computer networking in the xUSSR?

The main finding of our research is that computer networking in the xUSSR
is increasing.  This finding is based on answers to the four specific
questions listed above.  Answers to the above questions are:

|There are four main wide area computer networks with growth potentials;

|The user communities are growing and divergent;

|The networks offer a variety of services; and

|Some significant social impacts of the networks on the social context have
occurred.

We argue here that the development of networking can effect social changes
in the political, economic, communication and scientific domains.
Specifically, that networking can support democratic tendencies, the
transition to a market economy, formation and support of telecommunication,
computer and information industries, the spreading of computer-mediated
interpersonal and mass communication, forging of invisible colleges among
scientists, and breaking-up of the closed information system eveloped in
the Soviet society.

2.  Conceptual Issues

In this paper, 'computer network' refers to two distinct but highly
associated realities - technical and human.  The former refers to computers
connected via telecommunications links.  The latter to webs of individuals
voluntarily using interlinked computers to share ideas, exchange written
texts, and gain access to online databases.  The technical dimension
belongs to the particular theory of networking that deals with special
hardware, software, and mathematical graph theory. (1) The human dimension
of networks borrows the sociological concept of group, but differs from it
by implying freedom of participation, a noninstitutional nature, permanence
of communication links, and duration determined by satisfaction of
networkers' interests.  (2) Our approach to computer networks is
'humanist.| (3) In other words, we recognize the necessity of the network
technical dimension, yet concentrate on the social/behavioral dimension.

The relationship between the technical and human dimension of a computer
network is that the former is a necessary condition for the latter.  A
computer network differs from other forms of human networks that rely on
media (telephone, fax, letter) or face-to-face communication.  In an
"invisible college," the technical dimension is not a sufficient condition
for people to "get connected." Being a computer network user, even a
frequent one, does not de facto lead to membership in a social group.  One
can just as easily remain intellectually and socially isolated in computer
network space.  The shift from isolation, to group membership, and finally
to participation occurs, as mentioned above, when the permanence of
communication among network users comes into play, together with mutual
feeding of their interests.  Studies on computerized conferencing provide
evidence on these structuring effects. (4) A 'computer network' as used
here designates the unity of the technical and human contexts discussed
above. 'Computer networking' is the forming of uman webs by communicating
via interlinked computers.  The 'networker' is an active participant in at
least one computer network.  In contrast, 'network user' is one who just
uses the technical infrastructure of a network, but is not involved in
social networking.  To simplify the language used in this paper, 'network'
will be used for 'computer network.'

Exploring networking in a macrosocietal context poses some challenges in
terms of the theoretical framework.  We found no satisfactory existing
theory.  We thus borrowed ideas from various information and communication
theories.  On the information side, our selection includes the technical
theory of networking, the database and information retrieval perspective,
the focus on information access and information transfer uses of networks,
the value-added process, and a model of the Soviet information system.  On
the communication theory side, we combine ideas from organizational-,
computer mediated-, and mass communication.

3.      Data Collection

This paper is networking-generated. Computer networks were the primary
source of data.  We monitored international distribution lists and news-
based networks devoted to networking and other develop-ments in the xUSSR.
We reviewed electronic archives associated with these services.  In
addition, we spent dozens of hours on-line communicating with key
networking people in the xUSSR.  We use on-line communication to gather new
information and to check what had been collected.  Therefore, our data
collection method comprised three techniques:  archival searching;
interviewing; and, surveying.  Each of these was done via computer
networking.  We also reviewed selected texts on the social and cultural
contexts of the xUSSR.

II.  TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF COMPUTER NETWORKS

In this section we describe four major wide area networks in the xUSSR:
IASNET; RELCOM; GlasNet; and SUEARN.  Each network is described in terms of
its objectives, geographical range and user distribution, design,
architecture, host hardware and software, communication links,
interconnections, and financial arrangements. The networking environment in
the xUSSR is comprised of wide area networks, multiple local area networks,
and numerous bulletin board systems.  The complexity of the Soviet
networking environment is rapidly increasing.  The networks are spreading
over a wide geographic area.  This expansion imposes limitations in
presenting up-to-date technical or political inform-ation.  Some of what we
present here is already historical.  Our intention is to take a snap-shot
of the early phase of net-working in a country that will soon grow out its
'infantile' stage.  Having this record of 'childhood' may contribute to our
under-standing of political, social and technical network relations.

Wide area networks (WANs) conventionally re found in large cities, usually
administrative and economic centers.  In the xUSSR, Moscow is the hub and
at the forefront of networking developments.  Two out of the four networks
explored in this paper are primarily Moscow-based.  However, these two
networks are expanding to remote locations.  An example is Krasnodar the
city at the heart of the region that Gorbachev selected for experimentation
with market principles and implementation of modern technology.

Local area networks (LANs) are mostly found in towns. LANs conventionally
spread over an area of up to 32 miles (50 km) in diameter.  Examples in the
xUSSR include those linking schools and hospitals.  LANs in the xUSSR
constitute a separate topic in need of research.  We will not discuss them
further in this paper.

There are numerous bulletin boards systems (BBSs) in the xUSSR.  Users must
cope with noisy voice telephone lines, and the lack of powerful servers
(e.g., the RISC technology super microcomputers on the COCOM list of
prohibited exports to the xUSSR).  An important use of BBSs is PC software
exchange.  It is striking that the BBSs are mushrooming in spite of bad
telephone lines.  Almost every xUSSR-related discussion group on BITNET and
USENET posts lists of BBSs on a regular basis.  We will not discuss the
BBSs further in this paper.

1.  IASNET

IASNET stands for 'Institute for Automated Systems Network.| It was the
first public switched data network in the USSR, installed some-time after
1982 by the Institute for Automated Systems (IAS) whose name in Russian is
VNIIPAS - Vsesoyuzniy Nauchno - Issledovatelskiy Institut Prikladnih
Avtomatizovannih Sistem.  IAS was established under the auspices of the
national Academy of Science.  The Institute is the National Center for
Automatic Data Exchange (NCADE).  The main IASNET host is in Moscow on the
IAS premises.

Initially, IASNET was de facto and de jure a star-like internetwork with
IAS at the hub.  Quarterman (1990) reported briefly on two of the most
important IASNET networks - AkademNet and ADONIS.  The former linked
academic organizations and the latter computer centers to IAS.  In
addition, IAS was the hub of the international network linking the former
Council of Mutual Economic Assistance's (CMEA) countries to the USSR.  At
first, IASNET provided access to scientific databases.

With the political changes in the xUSSR and the break up of CMEA, the
IASNET design is changing its star-like configuration.  Romanov (1992)
points out that AkademNet is still under development, constrained by a
diverse set of problems --particularly political ones.  In 1987, IAS
obtained the status of Recognized Private Operating Agency, which meant a
partial loss of the budget. Since then, IAS has been more entrepreneurial
in its networking undertakings.  For example, it is involved in two
telecommunication joint ventures supported, in part, by foreign capital:
The Soviet-American SovAm Teleport; and Soviet-Finish INFOCOM.

The main objective of IASNET is to provide a wide range of network services
to the scientific community in the xUSSR.  It is a mix of network
architectures.  Its core is OSI- based, resting on the following suites of
protocols: X.3, X.25/X.75, X.28 and X.400. (5) Being on these protocols
allows IASNET to connect with European PTT data networks, which rely on
these open standard protocols.  In contrast, ADONIS rests on NJE protocols.
(6) The IASNET main host was a Soviet-made Zilog 80 running the Unix
operating system and in-house communication software.
(7)  In the Spring of 1991, a new host was setup -- Alcatels's DPS-2500.
(8) IASNET uses both dial-up and leased lines.  The speed of transmission
via the former carrier was 2400 baud per second with Kermit support.
Today, the leased lines transmit data at 9600 baud/sec. (9) IASNET national
and international links are implemented via X.25 and X.75 lines.  The
former is used between Moscow and Novosibirsk, Odessa, Yerevan, Tbilisi,
Rostov-On-Don, Dubna, Samara, St.  Petersburg, Kiev and other nodes within
xUSSR.  Before the CMEA abolishment the X.25 lines reached the main
research institutions in Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Cuba,
Mongolia, and North Korea.  The only link remaining is to Cuba (the
satellite channel), the other lines have been dismantled.  A X.25 satellite
link to the U.S. exists.  Plans are underway to switch it to X.75. (10) IAS
connects public data networks in Austria, Finland and Bulgaria -- Radio
Austria, Datapak and Bulpak respectively -- by X.75 lines.  Finally, IASNET
has gateways to other domestic networks, such as RELCOM and Sovpak (a
Marine Ministry network launched in 1991).

2.  RELCOM

RELCOM stands for 'Russian Electronic Communications.' Established in
Spring of 1990, by the cooperative DEMOS and Kurchatov Institute of Atomic
Energy (KIAE).  The main host facilities are at the premises of DEMOS and
KIAE in Moscow.  The primary objective of RELCOM is to provide a wide range
of users with e-mail, other network services, as well as a gateway to
Internet.

In the beginning of 1992, RELCOM had regional nodes in 25 cities if the
xUSSR connecting over 1,000 organizations or 30,000 users.  These nodes
included the following types of organizations: small private businesses,
joint ventures, securities and brokerage firms, various other private
ventures, banks, large firms with public property, scientific and
educational organizations (about 200), health institutions, domestic and
foreign news agencies, some government institu-tions, and computer and
informatics focused organizations and clubs.  There are also a number of
national and foreign individual users.  Most RELCOM user groups are from
the private economy sector.  (11)  The RELCOM main host is the de facto
backbone of RELCOM.  (12)  mprised of five VAXes and two twinhead-600 486
microcomputers, the equipment is linked by two Ethernets and a SLIP link.
The backbone is located at the DEMOS and KIAE premises.  RELCOM
architecture rests on the UUCP protocol.  This protocol links computers
running some version of the Unix operating system, and predominately used
with dial-up lines and for batch transfers.  RELCOM uses the XENIX version
of Unix, and dial-up lines.

RELCOM has a gateway to IASNET.  Its UUCP architecture allows RELCOM to
connect with EUnet, one of the largest European Unix-protocol networks.
The dial-up UUCP link is in Finland. RELCOM was assigned the ".su" Internet
DNS in September of 1991. The .su DNS made possible access to Internet
through the EUnet-Internet interbackbone link.  This step linked Russia to
Internet, the largest world's internetwork.

Financially, RELCOM is on its own.  The network was established with no
government support.  It continues to support commercial economic
principles.

3.  GlasNet

GlasNet stands for 'Glasnost Network,' and thus bears the stamp of the
glasnost and peristroika era.  It is a joint venture of the Institute of
Global Communications (IGC), San Francisco, and the International
Foundation, which has offices in Moscow, Washington D.C., Stockholm,
Sweden, Sofia, and Bulgaria.  GlasNet is a member of the Association for
Progressive Communications (APC).  It began operating on May 30, 1991.  The
network headquarters is in Moscow.  The main objective of GlasNet is to
offer easy and inexpensive communication to diverse user groups.
GlasNetintends to support non-profit and non-government organizations.
(13)

GlasNet covers Moscow and some remote users.  Plans for expansion are
underway (see the information below).  The types of users linked by GlasNet
include scientists, educators, cultural groups, journalists,
environmentalists, and computer enthusiasts.

The network's IGC/APC background is determined by the GlasNet architecture.
GlasNet is a UUCP dial-up network implementing the MNP protocol.  The main
host is a 386 computer running a Unix operating system.  GlasNet rests on
Unix communications software, and APC e-mail and computer conferencing
software. Communication links use voice lines for domestic traffic.  The
1200 and 2400 baud modems are used for establishing terminal-network
connections.  The Moscow and other APC hosts link via international direct
dial lines and Telebit modems.

There are many GlasNet interconnections owing to the IGC/APC involvement in
global networking.  There is some concern in the international user
community about GlasNet's interconnections.  For instance, some SUEARN
users have associated SFMT (San FranciscoMoscow Teleport) and SovAm
Teleport to GlasNet.  However, Caulkins (1992) reports that no
institutional or business relationships exist between GlasNet and these
telecommunication institutions. GlasNet is nonprofit.  It started with
grant funding from several U.S.  charitable foundations.  User fees cover
operational costs of the network.  All charges are in rubles.

4.  SUEARN

SUEARN is the last wide area network we explored.  Two acronyms make up the
network name -- SU for Soviet Union, and EARN for European Academic and
Research Network.  SUEARN is a part of the European research network with
links to the Middle East and Africa.

The network is based at the Institute of Organic Chemistry (the acronym in
use is IOH after the institute name in Russian). IOH operates under the
auspices of the Russian Academy of Science.  The implementation of SUEARN
began in 1990.  On October 21 of 1991, IOH opened the SUEARN international
link.  The main host is located at IOH in Moscow.  The primary objective of
SUEARN is promotion of information exchange between academic and research
institutions. (14) So far 117 research and educational institutions and
scientific associations have joined the SUEARN project. (15)

Given that SUEARN is part of EARN/BITNET, the two must use compatible
network architecture.  In early 1992, the SUEARN network architecture
rested on NJE protocols.  However, the SUEARN designers intend to use NJE
over IP.  The network backbone will be supported by 68 institutions in the
former Soviet republics, except Estonia, Georgia, and Moldova. In early
1992, SUEARN linked the Moscow environments, as well as individuals
throughout the xUSSR. (16) Within the xUSSR, SUEARN provides a gateway
network called FREEnet (the acronym stands for Research Engineering and
Education).  This is a TCP/IP network linking social and humanities
research and educational institutions to the SUEARN backbone. (17) All
FREEnet resources are free and any non- profit organization may join.  The
SUEARN budget comes from mixed domestic and foreign sources.

The main host is an IBM 370 compatible computer ES1066 manufactured in a
Minsk computer plant.  The system software is MVS.  Communication software
has been designed in-house.  SUEARN leases its intersite lines.  Speed of
data transfer via international lines 9600 bps.  It is noteworthy that the
youngest WAN has significant support from the U.S.  networkers.  Months
before the SUEARN gateway opened, networkers gathered around BITNET's
SUEARN listserv were discussing various issues related to setting up SUEARN
in the xUSSR.  This activity illustrates the intense interest of the
international community in integrating the xUSSR into the global
information and communication flows.

In summary, IASNET, RELCOM, GlasNet and SUEARN are main networks in the
xUSSR. They vary in terms of objectives, geographical and demographic
spread, architectures, and financing.  All the networks have growth
potential.

END OF PART 1 OF 3 PARTS
** End of text from cdp:media.issues **

/** media.issues: 198.2 **/
** Written  5:51 pm  Jul 20, 1992 by hfrederick in cdp:media.issues **
--Computer Networking in xUSSR (Part 2) (Bob Travica and Matthew Hogan)

PART 2 OF 3 PARTS
+++++++++++++++++

III.  NETWORK USES

In this section we discuss information transfer and communication in terms
of the four networks described above.  What do we mean by "networking
uses?| Computer networks have several basic functions.  One is to get and
send "inform- ation." This is accomplished in two ways: by providing a
medium for communication between individuals; and by enabling access to
databases and electronic archives.  By information transfer we mean
distribution lists, file transfer, news-type software systems, electronic
journals, access to bulletin boards, and so on.  Communication uses are
electronic mail (e-mail) and computerized conferencing.  This classific-
ation scheme parallels communication software types.  From a system
designers' perspective.

>From a social/behavioral perspective, the above classification of software
uses rarely meet that of the user's information needs.  For example, a
system based on distribution lists, such as BITNET, may well serve as a
conferencing system, if 'conference' is a discussion characterized by unity
of topic, discourse development, moderating roles, and some resume of the
activity. A listserv providing such functionality, in discrete time limits,
serves as a conference.  This is so regardless of the retrieval
capabilities, which may not rest on a hierarchical organization of postings
-- the defining characteristic of conferencing software in eyes of system
designers.  In contrast, news-type systems, such as USENET, have interfaces
with powerful retrieval capabilities.  Yet this function-ality is not a
sufficient condition to make some of the USENET newsgroups more than one-
stop, in-out information shops.  An e-mail system may well serve
information access purposes, when a human being is the source of
information.

The ambiguities above suggest the need to blend technological and social
perspectives when investigating "network uses." We view the use of
technology as dependent on human needs and actions. This approach generally
reflects how computer networks are used.  Such a perspective may help us
understand a computer network-scarce space like xUSSR, where users exploit
software for their own purposes regardless of the system designer's stated
intentions.


1.  Network Services

The first two services offered by IASNET were access to on- line databases
and e-mail.  The latter was offered on such a limited basis that it was
almost unknown to IASNET users.  (18)  Today, IASNET offers worldwide
database access, two e- mail systems (regular and Mini-Mail), a
computerized conferencing system (on ADONIS), electronic data interchange
based on the EDIFACT standard, currency conversion system, telecommu-
nication and information management consulting, and various information
services, such as a CUADRA-type catalog of foreign databases, PTT tariffs
and codes, and more. (19)

RELCOM

RELCOM services include e-mail, USENET news and the access to USENET
archives.  In addition, computer conferencing services are being developed.
Several news agencies, such as Interfax, Post factum and Moscow News use
RELCOM to deliver information to their customers.  (20) In its early stage
of its development, RELCOM is both a traditional communication system
(point-to-point), and a broadcasting medium.  The latter confirmed during
the 1991 coup d'etat discussed below. The first phase of the RELCOM
implementation intended to be a full network integration into Internet.
The provision of the Internet DNS (.su) was the initial step in this
process.

GlasNet

GlasNet offers e-mail, computer conferencing, a selection of USENET
newsgroups, and send-only fax. (21) E-mail is emphasized.  Two
characteristics of their e-mail worth noting are specific usage, and
geographical reach of the system.  In GlasNet, e-mail is used in
conjunction with other communication media.  There is a system called
GlasMail for this purpose.  It accepts e-mail or written letters from the
United States, then transfers them as e- mail to Moscow, and finally routs
the message by the most convenient form for the addressee, be it telephone,
telegram, fax or letter.  This is a situation appropriate response for the
selling of the e-mail concept to potential user base, rather than to mature
e-mail user community.

The GlasNet users have access to many international and national networks.
They may send mail to AlterNex, Applelink, ARPANET, AT&T LandMail, AT&T
Mail, BITNET, BOLNET, CARINET, CGNET, CIGnet, COMLINK, COMPUSERVE, CONNECT,
CSnet, DASNET, DELPHI, DIALCOM, EasyLink, EcoNet, ECUANEX, EIES, ENVOY 100,
FIDONET, GALAXY, GeoNet, GreentNet, GTE, HandsNet, HURACAN, IMC, INET,
Internet, JANET, MCI MAIL, MicroLink, NASA, PsychNet, ScienceNet, SOURCE,
TCN, Telecom Gold, Telemeil, THE META-NETWORK, TWICS, Tymnet/Ontyme, UNDP,
UNDRO, UNINET, UNISON, UUCPMail Net, USENET, Web, WELL, WORKNET, and OMNET.

According to Caulkins (1992), GlasNet is planning new information services,
such as computerized conferencing, access to databases maintained on
IGC/APC hosts, and telex.  GlasNet is also planning to expand service to
new geographic areas.  It may locate new hosts in St.  Petersburg, Kiev and
Dnetropetrovsk.

SUEARN

The main service provided by SUEARN in the first phase of its
implementation is e-mail.  This has been impeded by the high costs of
intercity leased lines, and the absence of high quality modems.(22) The
focus is on the Vladivostok - Irkutsk - Novosibirsk - Sverdlovsk - Moscow
lines, and the lines from main nodes in Moscow to the former republics.
Further implement-ation of SUEARN should allow its users to have the same
services available on EARN / BITNET.  The development of FREENet is
constrained by the lack of hard currency needed for purchasing high
performance hardware.


2.  Databases and Online Services

An ever increasing number of value-added information services and products
are available in the xUSSR.  These are primarily on-line public access
catalogs (OPACS) and research databases (bibliographic and numeric).  Until
recently, scientific and academic institutions were the major database
producers in xUSSR.  The first online databases were installed by the
Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences (INION) in 1980.
More recently, other types of value added services are available such as,
information brokering, current awareness publications, teleconferencing,
and e-mail.  The improvements in network communications combined with
improved access to information technology has increased the Russian user-
base for on-line services which now include scientists, academics and
researchers.  There is also a small, but active group of independent
citizens interested in on-line services.  This last group may be the BBS
users, which we hope to learn more about them in the future.

The factors limiting the development of on-line databases in the xUSSR
parallel those facing their telecommunication industry in general.  They
are: the information infrastructure; economic realities; and ideological
constraints. We discussed the information infrastructure in the previous
section.  The most telling economic issue in this context is the disparity
between personal income and the cost of using on-line services.  At this
time, it is more cost effective to conduct a manual search, then an on-
line information service. (23) Ideological constraints are easing.  The
opportunities for foreign enterprise are improving.  Peristroika and
glasnost have eased some constraints on free speech and privacy, but the
paranoia of the Cold War years has yet to disappear.  Notable exceptions to
the isolation of the Soviet society are the joint ventures like SFMT, SovAm
and GlasNet.  Even with the opening of the xUSSR to international
networking community, the restricted flow of information both into and out
of xUSSR continues.

There are three major database producers in the xUSSR.  They are the
Institute for Scientific and Technical Information (VINITI), the USSR
National Public Library for Science and Technology (GPNTB), and the
Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences (INION).  Other
database producers include government agencies and smaller academic
institutions.  The data-bases mounted by the three agencies are intended
for Russian users.  All are in the Russian language. Mayorov and Polyakov
estimated that in 1990, nearly 1500 in-house databases existed.  Their
subject coverage is narrow, focusing on local research.  The databases are
both numeric and bibliographic.  While most on-line databases are available
only to their producers via inhouse networks (LANS), the increasing demand
for information is changing this situation.

In 1982, IAS sought to integrate the computer networks of the USSR Academy
of Sciences and the "republican" Academy of Sciences.  This was realized by
IASNET with a gateway to AkademNet, the major value added service linking
the majority of Soviet on-line services.  IASNET provides access to on-line
databanks, VINITI databases index and abstracts of Soviet and foreign
scientific and technical literature.  By 1990, there were over fifty
databases, covering from one to eight years of various scientific
literatures.  There are a reported 5.4 million documents in the VINITI
databank, with 1.3 million annual additions.  IASNET also provides access
to foreign and domestic on-line data-bases, and provides links with the
Internet, GlasNet, EARN, and TELENET.  In 1990, access to international on-
line services was further expanded by the joint SovietAmerican venture
between SFMT and IAS called "SovAm Teleport." This joint venture suppots
the INTELSAT satellite which links users in nonxUSSR countries with Russian
databases.  Accord-ing to Mayorov and Polyakov, IAS plans to mount
databases and become an on-line service itself as the result of a joint
Soviet French venture.

The GPNTB is the largest library of its kind in the xUSSR.  It has
cataloged foreign monographs and periodicals, serial publications and
computer programs from all the CMEA countries.  Remote access to these
databases is limited.  In contrast, INION serves the scholarly community in
xUSSR.  The first databases were mounted in 1980.  By mid-1990, the system
supported fourteen bibliographic databases reflecting the subjects and
geographic regions of its members.  It also produces numeric databases and
directories.  The contents of these databases are Soviet and foreign
monographs, journal articles, dissertations, working papers, and so forth.
Coverage is from two to eleven years.  The total volume was of mid-1990 was
one million, with about 200,000 annual additions.  All the databases are in
Russian.

On-line vendors of commercial databases are scarce in xUSSR.  This
situation is changing.  In 1990, the International Centre for Scientific
and Technical Information (ICSTI) was perhaps the only commercial-like on-
line service in xUSSR serving the CMEA countries. (24) ICSTI intends to
eventually automate data exchange between the CMEA countries.  The
databases at ICSTI were created by CMEA countries including the xUSSR.
These reference resources (e.g., VINITI data-bases), industry directories,
trade and economic databases, databases related to specific industries, and
interdisciplinary research such as environmental protection.  As xUSSR
computer networks acquire more nodes, greater number of inhouse databases
are being opened to remote users.  Now that CMEA has dissolved and a new
political landscape emerged, we will have to wait and see what comes of
this ambitious project. (25)

What will happen regarding the use of on-line databases in the xUSSR?
Within the xUSSR, on-line information will continue to be found in
distributed databases provided by public and "private" sources.  The need
for research information will lead to a dramatic increase in the use of
established on-line services based in Western Europe, England, and the
United States.  With the expansion of the international research community
in include xUSSR, greater demands on system operators and software
designers will follow.  This demand will bring with it issues specific to
the xUSSR.  Three of the most pressing are the pricing of services, and use
of the cyrillic alphabet, and serving a foreign user community. The pricing
issues are: systems that are not set for hard currency; the cost of
searching and retrieving information that is often greater then the value-
added by the system; and, the cost of technology severely constrains the
user base.  The problems associated with the use of cyrillic seriously
hampers foreign access to Russian language databases.  The cyrillic
alphabet also constrains the exchange of information.  It is difficult to
integrate information from non-cyrillic with existing cyrillic texts.
(Some progress is being made in this area) Finally, the xUSSR information
profession has little, if any, experience serving a foreign user community.
The only foreign users, with one or two exceptions, have been members of
the CMEA countries.

Soviet generated database designed for foreign use is the Soviet Press
Digest, produced by Dialog in a Soviet-American joint venture. It is
mounted on Mead Data Central as an information service.  Another database
is offered by TASS, the Soviet news agency.  It is available full-text on
Datasolve's World Reporter service.(26)

What do we know about the on-line user community in the xUSSR?  Like their
counterparts elsewhere, little information is available on users beyond
general demographics, gross categories defined by system operators, and the
number of passwords formally assigned.  Basede on our sources, we know that
the types of users include managers, scientists and researchers, and
information professionals.  Given the limited number of passwords issued it
is reasonable to say that there are very few users (or a lot of sharing of
account passwords).  Mayorov and Polyakov write that there are 145 on-line
(remote) users of the INION database and 32 foreign users.  We think that
the user community will continue to grow, if or when, the information
infrastructure and the economic situation improve, and as the ideological
constraints loosen.  A sign of change is noted: IAS has begun to sponsor
educational sessions, demonstrations and general information about on- line
services to its actual and potential users.

Network users who are not affiliated with research or academic institutions
can be divided into two basic groups:  private individuals and business
users. Individual networkers use the BBSs. Many are able to link to
international networks.  The amount of interest this group has in the on-
line services is not clear.  Access to numeric databases, bibliographic
databases, and research resources may be of less interest then information
services like news bureaus, and USENET services.  Independent user groups
are increasing, but they are severely hampered by economic constraints and
access to technology.  The business community on the other hand, is
actively exploiting the networks as a means to establish contacts and
secure investments.  This group is faced with a different set of economic
constraints.  Unlike the individual, the business community have three
avenues of communication -- public telephone lines, private leased lines
and satellite links.  They share the same gateways, satellites and
landlines of IASNET, RELCOM, and GlasNet.  Therefore the relations between
the business community and the research and academic community are
complicated by technological entanglements.  In the long-run xUSSR will
need all three of these user groups to build an information infrastructure
and to open xUSSR to the international community.

In summary, main networks in the xUSSR provide a variety of services,
including e-mail, teleconferencing, and access to BBSs and databases. The
development of on-line services is slowed down by economic, ideological,
and technical factors.

IV.  SOCIAL EFFECTS

In this section we consider a set of realized and latent social effects of
networking in the xUSSR.  They are:  political democratization, the
telecommunications and computer industry developments, forging of invisible
colleges among scientists, spreading of computer-mediated interpersonal and
mass communication, and negating the old information model that generated
the distorted picture of social reality.

What structural changes to the xUSSR society has been introduced by
information technology?  What are some of these changes?  To examine this
question have considered the following trends: democratization (the failed
1991 coup); the structuring of society; the development of a computer and
telecommunications industry; and dissolution of the Soviet society's
unrealistic self-image.  Taken together these represent potential social
reform for the xUSSR and an opening to the international community.

1.      Democratization: The Failed 1991 Coup

The failed coup of 1991 hailed significant political changes for the xUSSR.
The Communist Party's tight grip on the government was released.  While the
long term changes are unclear, there is no doubt that life has changed in
the xUSSR.  The Russian government now supports a more demo- cratic system.
Our focus here is on access to and control of information during the coup
and the role networkers played in the failure of the 1991 Soviet coup.  If
they sought to close down telecommunication links they were ineffective.

Did coup leaders (|The Committee|) fail to grasp the powerful broadcasting
potential and informing abilities of telecommunications systems and
computer networks?  Where they too distracted by the events taking place in
the streets of Moscow and elsewhere?  The answers to these questions are
not yet known, but it is clear that coup leaders failed to sever electronic
communication links, and access to the networks. Land lines and satellite
links remained operational throughout the four-day coup.

We briefly discuss computer networking during the coup to illustrate the
democratic characteristics of this networking.  The following account is
based on information gathered from e-mail postings, articles and personal
networking by the authors.

While the world looked on in amazement, a group of stalwart Communist Party
members sought to snatch power from the elected Russian leaders and from
the Russian people.  Americans sitting in hotels around Moscow learned of
Gorbachev's internment at 9am Monday, August 19th, from a CNN broadcast.
(27) People resting at the International Hotel, just blocks from the White
House, watched CNN broadcast events outside the White House on August 19th
and 20th.  These events were never broadcast on Soviet television. (28)
Foreigner's visiting Moscow for an IFLA conference learned of the coup
events from worried relatives during phone calls from the United States.
(29)

Boris Yeltsin's first statement defying the coup leaders and calling for
support against The Committee was distributed across Russia using a
combination of photocopy, facsimile, electronic mail and verbal
communications. (30) All of his speeches were distributed in this manner.
(31) At one point Yeltsin may have contacted the "outside world" from the
besieged White House over a cellular phone obtained from a visiting
American executive.  Communication into and out of the White House was
never seriously threatened. (32) While the coup leaders initially closed
down independent television and radio stations, they ignored dedicated and
public telephone lines, packet-switches and satellite links.

They also overlooked access to photocopy machines and telefax equipment.
As the official television and radio stations broadcast opera, telephones
lines and computer networks were clogged with messages about the events
unfolding in Moscow, Leningrad, and elsewhere.  Hours before the release of
any official "news," information about the coup had spread via computer
networks throughout Russia and to the outside world.  At the height of the
confrontation at the White House, one could make a phone call from a public
phone booth just blocks away. (33)

At 5:01 am on August 19th, Vadim Antonov, a senior computer programmer at
the DEMOS cooperative posted early news of the coup on RELCOM:

Oh, do not say.  I've seen the tanks with my own eyes.  I hope we'll be
able to communicate during the next few days.  Communists cannot rape the
Mother Russia once again!  (34)

Within hours messages like this were copied and distributed through out
xUSSR.  Messages were also sent worldwide via an Internet link in Finland.
Once on the Internet, news about the coup rapidly spread around the world.
Individuals around the world joined the revolutionary spirit by relaying
the messages posted from Russia.  By midday August 19th, information
collected by Interfax, the independent Soviet news agency, Radio Moscow
World Service, the Russian Information Agency, Northwest Information
Agency, and Baltfax were being disseminated by RELCOM. (35) In the middle
of the second day of the coup an independent radio station, Echo Moskey,
was back on the air broadcasting from a roving van. (36)

RELCOM was the principle network used to distribute information about the
coup.  From the DEMOS headquarters, information was sent to all 70 network
nodes where it printed and distributed.  Networkers relaying messages,
stripped off names and network address to protect the senders who feared
persecution if the coup succeeded.  (37) There was suspicion that the KGB
knew about the network activity, but either chose not to interfere or was
unable to jam the network.  GlasNet was used to send and receive messages
through the San Francisco Moscow Teleport (SFMT) to the United States,
Northern and Western Europe, and United Kingdom.  GlasNet provided
information on events in Leningrad and Moscow via news feeds from CNN and
the BBC.

The volume of traffic on the phone lines became so heavy on August 19th
that a call went out to all networkers worldwide to stay off the net unless
they were posting vital information.

Please stop flooding the only narrow channel with bogus messages (and) with
silly questions.  Note that it's neither a toy nor a means to reach your
relatives or friends.  We need the bandwidth to help organize the
resistance. Please, do not (even unintentionally) help those fascists.
(38)

Phone line traffic was 100 times normal.  An additional 24 circuits on the
Soviet Intersputnik satellite were activated to accommodate the heavy
demand.  Land and satellites links operated without disruption for voice,
facsimile and electronic mail. (39)

Amid the events at the White House it was life as usual for many people and
business in the xUSSR.  During the coup, foreign companies with access to
dedicated lines, packet- switched networks, or cellular phones communicated
both within xUSSR and across international boarders.  Two package delivery
services, DHL and United Parcel Service, continued to operate uninterrupted
throughout the coup.  For Control Data Corp. and Borland Inter-national
business went on uninterrupted in their Soviet offices.  Some businesses
did feel threatened and sent employees home.  (40) Many people in Moscow
and else-where in xUSSR were unaware of coup events until late Tuesday.
Many accounts of day-to-day life in Moscow suggest that the disruption was
limited to the White House, Red Square, Gorbachev's dacha in the Crimea,
and to a few other hot spots in Leningrad.  Darrell P.  Hammer wrote about
his experiences on Monday:

I decided to go to the center and see for myself.  But first I took a walk
of several blocks.  I was living in Otradnoe on the north edge of Moscow.
Here there was no evidence of any emergency.  At the Kirov market the Azeri
farmers were in their usual place, selling fresh fruit and defending their
high prices.. to outraged housewives.(41)

During the coup, the computer network became a broadcasting operation.
Net-workers acting as unofficial correspondents posted information and
political commentary.  Bob Clough, a business manager for Nantucket Corp.,
based in Moscow, provided CompuServe users with on-the-scene reports of
events via a telephone link through Finland. (42) Telecommunication network
systems and information technology became a distributed publishing service
-- a freedom press.

While there is still much to be learned about the coup, clearly information
techno-logy played a significant role in this historic event. While CNN
televised images of the coup, it was not these images, but words of men
like Yeltsin that held sway for Russian citizens.  The "desk-top
publishing" metaphor is applicable for the way Yeltsin communicated with
the Russian people.  Within hours of Yeltsin's statement in defiance of
coup leaders, handbills reproducing his statement papered the walls of the
Moscow metro.  These same statements were sent to Leningrad, and the United
States.  The speed with which information about the coup spread helped the
constitutional government and their supporters mount a timely defense of
their newly won civil rights.

The Russian networker, Antonov, writing about nets and the coup said that
"computer communications are more democratic by nature then mass media like
TV or news-papers . . . ."(43)  He further asserted that there is no central
authority in a computer network.  This naive yet enthusiastic ideal- ism
aboutthe promise of electronic net-works has a ring of truth for the Soviet
society.  However, several questions regarding access and control of
information technology persist.  Some of these are of a technical nature:
Who will regulate the telephone or telecommunication lines and the
electrical power needed to operate the computer networks?  Who will
maintain the lines themselves?  Some questions are political: Who has
access to the network?  How will does the cost of networking effect network
access use? The evidence we have gathered support the notion that
networkers did play a role in the failed coup.  They distributed
information throughout xUSSR and to networkers worldwide in a timely and
effective manner.  The networkers distributed information to others who did
not have direct access to RELCOM or GlasNet.  Networkers also distributed
information generated by non- Soviet sources like the BBC and CNN.  The
majority of citizens may have had no knowledge of the electronic networks,
but the information the they received was vital to their ability to take
action angainst the coup. For many politicians and business people, the
networks had the direct benefit of enabling communications during the coup.

The excitement of playing a role in such a historical event is undeniable.
George Tereshko wrote:

When the dark night fell upon Moscow, RELCOM was one source of light for
us.  Thanks to these brave people we could get information and hope. (44)

The use of RELCOM news services and GlasNet during the coup illustrates the
broadcasting potential of computer net- works.  Computer networks may
become a mass information media in the xUSSR by linking the rich tradition
of underground publishing in the USSR (samizdat) with networking.  The
networker's contribution to the resistance was due, in part, to the novel
situation and their unexpected exploitation of the network.  These
activities exemplify the social and political aspects of networking.

The coup supports the following observations:

|The structure of networks supported the communication activities of the
networkers.  It enabled them to create, reproduce, and gather information;

|The networks were transformed into a broadcasting medium.

|It facilitates collaboration of geographically decentralized networkers.

|The networks provided a means for collaboration by a diverse group of
individuals.  No one paid attention to disciplinary or social distinctions.

End of Part 2 of 3 parts


** End of text from cdp:media.issues **

/** media.issues: 198.3 **/
** Written  5:51 pm  Jul 20, 1992 by hfrederick in cdp:media.issues **
--  Computer Networking in xUSSR (Part 3) (Bob Travica and Matthew Hogan)

Part 3 of 3 parts
+++++++++++++++++

2.  Invisible Colleges

It may seem remarkable to us how little individual Soviet scholars and
scientists know about each other and their work.  The general lack of
communication within the USSR is apparent.  Computer networking seems to be
shifting academic collaboration to more open exchange of personal and
professional information.  Postings on the xUSSR networks are typical of
what we see on the Internet: sharing biographical data; research interests
and project information; asking and answering questions; discussing and
debating issues.  The introduction of computer networking is educating
xUSSR researchers about what is going on in their electronic backyard. (45)
What we see being posted on these networks is typical of the ways people
build a common ground and become part of or establish a group with like
interests.

According to Hiltz and Turoff, among others, formation of particular social
groups is facilitated via interlinked computers or computer mediated
communications (CMC).  Two such groups are invisible colleges and hackers.
The former is of a particular interest in our research.  The invisible
college is a social and poliical group of scholars, scientists and
researchers.  Traditional documentation of invisible colleges is through
citation analysis and other formal indicators.  While the academic
community has yet to incorporate computer networking into their evaluation
policies, there is much evidence that networking, including the publication
of electronic texts, is increasing.  It seems probable that computer
networking will become a standard practice for scholars, scientists, and
researchers.  The invisible college is transforming computer networking
from formal discipline oriented groups, to groups bound by political and
topical concerns.  We posit that computer networking will enable discourse
between the business, academic and general population and thereby undermine
the discipline orientation of the invisible college.  A new form of social
grouping will merge.  Signs of this trend are evident in the xUSSR.

Scientific institutions holding elitist status in the xUSSR, may hold on to
distinguished roles in the era of networking.  These institutions are
likely to form the core of future computer networks.  The IAS and IOH are
central to two of the main computer networks is evidence of this trend.
These institutions are the movers and shakers of networking, rather than
mere network nodes.  This is so, in part, because they already have
computing resources appropriate for networking.  By having the
qualifications needed to become a networking agency IAS, IOH and other
scientific institutions, satisfy conditions to facilitate invisible
colleges. Networks will continue to have government support even in the
somewhat changed economic conditions, which include the principle of
economic self reliance.  These institutions are competent in technical
networking theory and engineering.

Invisible colleges may come into existence and live through electronic
links, such as e-mail and computer conferencing.  The electronic invisible
college phenomenon seen in other countries should develop in the xUSSR.  In
the case of xUSSR, it may well take on new characteristics and forms.  The
electronically configured invisible colleges are as hidden to the public
eye as were those in the time of Sir Francis Bacon, the 18th century
creator of the idea of an invisible college.  What differentiates today's
invisible colleges from their ancestors are the type of network links.

3.  Development of the Computer and Telecommunications Industry

The Soviet government has failed to develop two essential technologies for
computer networking: the building and maintaining of computer hardware and
telecommunications facilities.  What they have managed to do is manufacture
clones of IBM and DEC mainframes, and IBM microcomputers.  Telephone
communications are in poor shape. Without a computer industry, the USSR
relied on importing and cloning computer hardware.  Government restrictions
caused import problems.  The Coordination Committee (COCOM) rigorously
controlled exports of computer technology to the USSR and CMEA.  The
effects of COCOM restrictions were to some extent balanced by some national
markets that served as a Trojan horse for computers entering the USSR.

The Soviet telephone system has been chronically in poor shape.  The Soviet
leadership's desire to restrict privacy, combined with failing to grasp the
importance of basic telecommunications, can be blamed for the bad condition
of telephone networks in the xUSSR.  The Soviet government used all means
to limit personal privacy.  Limiting access to telephone and computer
networks was part of this policy.  In contrast, significant investments
were made in telecommunications facilities linking Communist Party's
officials.

Improvement of both the computing and telecommunications industry may be
expected in the xUSSR.  In 1991, COCOM lifted a substantial portion of the
export prohibitions.  The list of the state-of-the-art computer technology
approved for export to the xUSSR continues to grow.  This may stimulate the
existing cloning industry.  The integration of xUSSR into Western markets
will impose keener intellectual property regulations on the xUSSR.

The telecommunications infrastructure of the xUSSR is being transformed
from a relatively primitive system, by current standards, to one able to
handle major value added information services.  It is not likely that the
xUSSR governments will undertake a major rebuilding of the telephone
network.  The vast geographic distances between user groups (cities, e.g.)
is a major concern.  The problem is partially alleviated by satellite
links, which have always been in better shape in Russia than their land
phone lines.  Foreign capital investments are being sought to rebuild
telecommunications networks.  MCI, Sprint, and AT&T are examples of foreign
interests pushing hard in the xUSSR market.  These companies are developing
commercial networks that will provide various value added services
including e- mail and data transfer.  From a policy perspective, we see an
interesting trend.  In addition to the presence of foreign
telecommunication's providers presence, joint ventures have formed to
establish telecommunications facilities.  In this paper we have noted two
-- SFMT and SovAm teleport.  If this trend continues, perhaps the countries
of the xUSSR will be among the first European countries divesting
telecommunications from government monopolies.

The development of networking is favorable now that both computer and
telecommunications technology are recognized as key elements of the xUSSR
information infrastructure.  Once part of the technology development cycle,
building and maintaining computer networks will influence the development
of national computer and telecommunications industries.  Here is one
possible scenario.  Since networking requires special computer hardware and
software, imports of these to the xUSSR will probably continue.  However,
they will probably stay within moderate limits because of hard currency
shortage.  To compensate the domestic computer industry will try to fill
the void.  GlasNet is an example.  Attempting to cope with the problem of
noisy telephone lines, the GlasNet management discarded the idea of
importing high quality modems.  Instead, they helped initiate the domestic
computing industry to produce equivalent modems.  This may happen with
multiplexers, concentrators, repeaters, routers, and switches
(communication computers) and other network hardware.

To summarize, the telecommunications industry can be supported by
networking developments.  The negligence of Soviet leadership in not
developing and maintaining public telecommunications might be overturned by
the demand for reliable and fast intercomputer links.  Foreign capital will
play a key role in forging the new information infrastructure. Despite the
current financial problems in Russia, it is a large market which is capable
of supporting a lucrative telecommunications industry.

4.  A Soviet Information Model

The Soviet society's self image was idealized not realistic.  The image did
not reflect political and economic conditions.  The image was based on a
specific information model outlined in this section.  We hold that computer
networking can be one of the factors influencing dissolution of theSoviet
information model.  The changes that are taking place in the countries of
the former xUSSR are still not structural ones.  An important structural
change would be the break of the old information model and emergence of
less constrained and open system-like forms of communication.

Voluntaristic Commands and Distorted Feedbacks

The Soviet information model is a closed system.  Its core is the "master
unit" which embodies the top leadership of the Communist Party and the
national and state governments.  Under the master unit are complex tree-
like "slave structures" or transmission mechanisms.  In the economic
subsystem, these slave structures relay information from the master unit to
state-owned enterprise managers, and down through to individual workers.
The same happens in the cultural and other sub-systems.  Thus, all downward
flows carry command information, such as what and how to manufacture goods,
or what themes and how to present them in movies.  The upward flows are
feedbacks that parallel the hierarchical structures layer by layer up to
the master unit.  These feedbacks are actually just responses to the
senior-level command inputs.

Both downward and upward information is decoupled from factual reality.
Commands are voluntaristic, i.e., made up of ideals and wishes rather than
based on real capacities and conditions. The evidence on this is most
striking in economic domain (for examples see Winiecki, 1991).  If the
aviation ministry makes the decision on a new type of plane, the plane must
be produced regardless the price.  Similarly, the responses to commands do
not reflect reality.  One reason is that there are too many levels that
upward information has to jump over; every jump increases the probability
of information distortion.  Another is due to vested interests of the
feedbacks creators.  Here is an illustration based on the relationship
between managers and the party officials.  The officials pass the senior
level party directives to managers.  The managers try to match production
indicators to the directives regardless the real outcomes.  The local party
officials know that information is incorrect. However, they comply with it
because they share responsibility for production outcomes The whole process
distorts the image of reality, so that possibly no single person really
knows what is going on in any social domain.

The Political Aura of Information

Next characteristic of the Soviet information model is that all information
has an political aura.  This applies both to public and the most of non-
public information.  The latter has, in general, very little room to exist
because the domain of privacy is restrained by many means.  One of which is
an individuals participation in pervasive networks called 'collectives'
(see Shlapentokh, 1989).  Collectives cover all the domains of an
individual|s life -- from neighborhood to work place -- and deal with all
aspects of the individual's life -- from political attitudes to drinking
habits.

Another way of looking at the political aura of Soviet information is to
acknowledge the lack of clear content- based distinctions between
information kinds, such as economic, technological, organizational,
artistic and interpersonal information. All the distinctions are blurred by
the dominant political dimension of information. This phenomenon is also
called the 'dominance of ideology' (e.g., Shlapentokh, 1986).  The
political aura is imposed by the overall command function of the
information system.  Also by the self-perpetuation of the social rulers.
In other words, information is instrumentalized for ruling purposes.
Examples from arts, mass media and public speech follow.

Politically instrumentalized artistic information is typical to the USSR.
The USSR has a history of applying social realism as the way of art and
artistic conduct. (See for example, Graffy, and Hosking, 1989).  Artistic
information is channeled by various para-political institutions, such as
associations of writers and composers.  These associations help reify and
extol artistic expression conforming to the rules of social realism.  The
main purpose of politically instrumentalize artistic information is to
glorify the Soviet system.  By portraying the system in a rosy color, this
information generates unrealistic images.  Mass media have been
instrumentalized by the top party leadership and by bureaucracy.  Direct
links between mass media, like broadcasters and the Communist Party were
institutionalized (46).  Mass media was an apologist for the Soviet rulers
-- the party-government officials.  The unrealistic content of the mass
media information was indicated by its non- communicative language.  For
example, Soviet surveys suggest that a majority of the audience did not
understand the media language (47)

The third generator and disseminator of politically instrumentalized
information has been non-mediated networks generated by Communist Party
members and sympathizers.  These face-to-face networks transmitted the
party's world view to the masses.  The networks used to be generated
through political campaigning, a particular form of public speech.  The
party members and sympathizers campaigned on a regular basis and in a
variety of forms.  (48) Some researchers hold that these nonmediated
networks were the primary source of the party's power by providing the
party with 'inviolable' contact with the masses. (49)

The Soviet information model is characterized by information comprised of
voluntaristic commands, distorted feedback, and the dominant political
dimension.  All the information is decoupled from factual reality. Channels
for the information are various non-mediated networks like those generated
through political campaigning.  The overall outcome of the information
system is that the whole society sustain a distorted image about itself.
Can computer networks help subvert such a system?  We believe they can.  In
particular:

| networks may undermine the political aura of information, because they
encourage individual free speech, the expression of personal interests, and
the taking of actions;

| networks are loose associations of independent individuals, and they
undermine political instrumentalization of information;

| networking is a private act -- the more one is engaged, the greater one's
sphere of privacy.  Consequently, networks in xUSSR may reduce the
collectives space;

| networks enable people with similar political interests and opinions to
find each other and generate action; and

| networks may become independent broadcasting media, in contrast to the
traditional electronic media which are less likely to be released from the
government control.

SUMMARY

In this paper we described the technical infrastructure of four main
computer networks in the xUSSR.  Then we discussed the main services
provided by the networks, and databases and online services.  Finally,
several social effects of the networks that either actually occurred or
could occur in the long-run were analyzed.

We believe that conditions are in favor of developing networking in the
xUSSR at an increasing pace.  In addition, networks already have had social
effects and more effects are to be expected.  The 1991 coup case shows that
networks were channels of information otherwise inaccessible, and
generators of anti-coup action.  In addition to supporting the social
democratization, networks can also facilitate emergence of invisible
colleges, the development of telecommunications and computer industry, and
dissolution of the information system that has been decoupled from factual
reality.


NOTES
(1) Andrew Tanenbaum, Computer Networks, 2nd ed. Englewood
     Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1988.

(2)Robert K. Mueller,  Corporate  Networking: Building
     Channels for Information and  Influence,  New York: The
     Free Press, 1986.

(3)Lee Sproull, and Sarah Kiesler, Connections: New Ways of
     Working in  the Networked Organization,  Cambridge: The
     MIT Press, 1991.

(4)Starr Roxanne Hiltz, and Murray Turoff, The Network
     Nation:  Human  Communication via Computer, Reading:
     Addison-Wesley, 1978.

E.B. Kerr, and S.R. Hiltz, Computer-Mediated Communication
     Systems: Status and Evaluation, New York: Academic
     Press, 1982.

Starr R. Hiltz, Online Communities: A Case Study of the
     Office of the Future, Norwood: Ablex Publishing, 1984.

(5)Genady Romanov, the IASNET administrator, On-line Survey,
     December 1991.

(6) John Quarterman, The Matrix: Computer Networks and
     Conferencing Systems Worldwide,  Digital Press, 1990.

(7)IAS Information gathered from IASNET administrators
     through email, 1991.

(8)Romanov.

(9)IAS Information.

(10)Romanov.

(11)RELCOM Information gathered from RELCOM administrators
     through e-mail, 1991.

(12)Ibid.

(13)David Caulkins, Director of GlasNet, On-line Survey,
     December, 1991.

(14)Evgeny Mironov,  the SUEARN administrator, On-line
     Survey, December 1991.

(15)Andrej Mendkovich, SUEARN Developments, Network
     Coordination Center document NCC-I008.91, 6/17/1991,
     1991.

(16) Mironov.

(17) Mendkovich.

(18) Werner Klotzbuecher, "Online  Behind the Old Iron
     Curtain:  Computer-Assisted Information and
     Communication with CMEA Countries," Online 15:2(March
     1991).

(19)Romanov.

(20)RELCOM information.

(21) Caulkins.

(22)  Mendkovich.

(23)  Sergei Mayorov, and Leonid Polyakov, "Online in the
     Soviet Union,"  Online 15:4(July 1991), 105.

(24)Ibid.

(25)Ibid.

(26)Ibid.

(27)David Buckle, "57th IFLA Conference and Exhibition,
     Moscow -- a Russian Adventure,"  OCLC Newsletter No
     193(Sept/Oct), 1991.

(28)Darrell P. Hammer, "The Coup - a Memoir,"  Distributed
     on Russia- L,1 and 3 of September 1991.

(29)Edward Valauskas, and Monica Ertel, "Moscow Diary: IFLA
     & the Coup, August 19-21, 1991,"  Apple Library User
     Group Newsletter 9:4(Oct 1991): 2.

(30)Tom Masland, |How the Resistance Spread the
     Word,| Newsweek 118:10(Sept 2, 1991):39.

(31)Joshua Quittner, |||Tales of the Net that Said Nyet,||
     New York Newsday, August 28, 1991.

(32) Hammer.

(33)  Ibid.

(34)Larry Press, |A Soviet Computer Network During the
     Coup,|  A posting on SUEARN, Sept. 7, 1991.

(35)Ibid, 8.

(36)Hammer.

(37)Press, 8.

(38)Quittner.

(39)SUEARN Digest, 1991.

(40)Ibid.

(41)Hammer

(42)SUEARN Digest.

(43)Quittner, 42.

(44)Press, 10.

(45)  Igor Yastrzhemsky, SUEARN Digest, 1991.

(46)Thomas F. Remington, "Words and Deeds: CPSU Ideological
     Work," in Michael P. Sacks and Jerry G.  Pankhurst,
     eds., Understanding Soviet Society.  Boston: Unwin
     Hyman, 1988.

(47)Thomas F. Remington, Thomas F., The Truth of Authority:
     Ideology and  Communication in the Soviet Union,
     Pittsburgh:  University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988.

(48)Remington, |Words and Deeds:  CPSU Ideological Work,"
     154-155.

(49)Mueller, 2.
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