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FEDERALIST No. 62

The Senate
For the Independent Journal.

HAMILTON OR MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:
HAVING examined the constitution of the House of
 Representatives, and answered such of the objections against it as
 seemed to merit notice, I enter next on the examination of the
 Senate.
The heads into which this member of the government may be
 considered are: I. The qualification of senators; II. The
 appointment of them by the State legislatures; III. The equality of
 representation in the Senate; IV. The number of senators, and the
 term for which they are to be elected; V. The powers vested in the
 Senate.
I. The qualifications proposed for senators, as distinguished
 from those of representatives, consist in a more advanced age and a
 longer period of citizenship. A senator must be thirty years of age
 at least; as a representative must be twenty-five. And the former
 must have been a citizen nine years; as seven years are required
 for the latter. The propriety of these distinctions is explained by
 the nature of the senatorial trust, which, requiring greater extent
 of information and tability of character, requires at the same time
 that the senator should have reached a period of life most likely to
 supply these advantages; and which, participating immediately in
 transactions with foreign nations, ought to be exercised by none who
 are not thoroughly weaned from the prepossessions and habits
 incident to foreign birth and education. The term of nine years
 appears to be a prudent mediocrity between a total exclusion of
 adopted citizens, whose merits and talents may claim a share in the
 public confidence, and an indiscriminate and hasty admission of
 them, which might create a channel for foreign influence on the
 national councils.
II. It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of
 senators by the State legislatures. Among the various modes which
 might have been devised for constituting this branch of the
 government, that which has been proposed by the convention is
 probably the most congenial with the public opinion. It is
 recommended by the double advantage of favoring a select
 appointment, and of giving to the State governments such an agency
 in the formation of the federal government as must secure the
 authority of the former, and may form a convenient link between the
 two systems.
III. The equality of representation in the Senate is another
 point, which, being evidently the result of compromise between the
 opposite pretensions of the large and the small States, does not
 call for much discussion. If indeed it be right, that among a
 people thoroughly incorporated into one nation, every district ought
 to have a PROPORTIONAL share in the government, and that among
 independent and sovereign States, bound together by a simple league,
 the parties, however unequal in size, ought to have an EQUAL share
 in the common councils, it does not appear to be without some reason
 that in a compound republic, partaking both of the national and
 federal character, the government ought to be founded on a mixture
 of the principles of proportional and equal representation. But it
 is superfluous to try, by the standard of theory, a part of the
 Constitution which is allowed on all hands to be the result, not of
 theory, but ``of a spirit of amity, and that mutual deference and
 concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered
 indispensable.'' A common government, with powers equal to its
 objects, is called for by the voice, and still more loudly by the
 political situation, of America. A government founded on principles
 more consonant to the wishes of the larger States, is not likely to
 be obtained from the smaller States. The only option, then, for the
 former, lies between the proposed government and a government still
 more objectionable. Under this alternative, the advice of prudence
 must be to embrace the lesser evil; and, instead of indulging a
 fruitless anticipation of the possible mischiefs which may ensue, to
 contemplate rather the advantageous consequences which may qualify
 the sacrifice.
In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal vote allowed
 to each State is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion
 of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instrument
 for preserving that residuary sovereignty. So far the equality
 ought to be no less acceptable to the large than to the small
 States; since they are not less solicitous to guard, by every
 possible expedient, against an improper consolidation of the States
 into one simple republic.
Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the
 constitution of the Senate is, the additional impediment it must
 prove against improper acts of legislation. No law or resolution
 can now be passed without the concurrence, first, of a majority of
 the people, and then, of a majority of the States. It must be
 acknowledged that this complicated check on legislation may in some
 instances be injurious as well as beneficial; and that the peculiar
 defense which it involves in favor of the smaller States, would be
 more rational, if any interests common to them, and distinct from
 those of the other States, would otherwise be exposed to peculiar
 danger. But as the larger States will always be able, by their
 power over the supplies, to defeat unreasonable exertions of this
 prerogative of the lesser States, and as the faculty and excess of
 law-making seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most
 liable, it is not impossible that this part of the Constitution may
 be more convenient in practice than it appears to many in
 contemplation.
IV. The number of senators, and the duration of their
 appointment, come next to be considered. In order to form an
 accurate judgment on both of these points, it will be proper to
 inquire into the purposes which are to be answered by a senate; and
 in order to ascertain these, it will be necessary to review the
 inconveniences which a republic must suffer from the want of such an
 institution.
First. It is a misfortune incident to republican
 government, though in a less degree than to other governments, that
 those who administer it may forget their obligations to their
 constituents, and prove unfaithful to their important trust. In
 this point of view, a senate, as a second branch of the legislative
 assembly, distinct from, and dividing the power with, a first, must
 be in all cases a salutary check on the government. It doubles the
 security to the people, by requiring the concurrence of two distinct
 bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or
 corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient. This is a
 precaution founded on such clear principles, and now so well
 understood in the United States, that it would be more than
 superfluous to enlarge on it. I will barely remark, that as the
 improbability of sinister combinations will be in proportion to the
 dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies, it must be politic to
 distinguish them from each other by every circumstance which will
 consist with a due harmony in all proper measures, and with the
 genuine principles of republican government.
Secondly. The necessity of a senate is not less indicated
 by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to
 the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by
 factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions.
 Examples on this subject might be cited without number; and from
 proceedings within the United States, as well as from the history of
 other nations. But a position that will not be contradicted, need
 not be proved. All that need be remarked is, that a body which is
 to correct this infirmity ought itself to be free from it, and
 consequently ought to be less numerous. It ought, moreover, to
 possess great firmness, and consequently ought to hold its authority
 by a tenure of considerable duration.
Thirdly. Another defect to be supplied by a senate lies in
 a want of due acquaintance with the objects and principles of
 legislation. It is not possible that an assembly of men called for
 the most part from pursuits of a private nature, continued in
 appointment for a short time, and led by no permanent motive to
 devote the intervals of public occupation to a study of the laws,
 the affairs, and the comprehensive interests of their country,
 should, if left wholly to themselves, escape a variety of important
 errors in the exercise of their legislative trust. It may be
 affirmed, on the best grounds, that no small share of the present
 embarrassments of America is to be charged on the blunders of our
 governments; and that these have proceeded from the heads rather
 than the hearts of most of the authors of them. What indeed are all
 the repealing, explaining, and amending laws, which fill and
 disgrace our voluminous codes, but so many monuments of deficient
 wisdom; so many impeachments exhibited by each succeeding against
 each preceding session; so many admonitions to the people, of the
 value of those aids which may be expected from a well-constituted
 senate?
A good government implies two things: first, fidelity to the
 object of government, which is the happiness of the people;
 secondly, a knowledge of the means by which that object can be best
 attained. Some governments are deficient in both these qualities;
 most governments are deficient in the first. I scruple not to
 assert, that in American governments too little attention has been
 paid to the last. The federal Constitution avoids this error; and
 what merits particular notice, it provides for the last in a mode
 which increases the security for the first.
Fourthly. The mutability in the public councils arising
 from a rapid succession of new members, however qualified they may
 be, points out, in the strongest manner, the necessity of some
 stable institution in the government. Every new election in the
 States is found to change one half of the representatives. From
 this change of men must proceed a change of opinions; and from a
 change of opinions, a change of measures. But a continual change
 even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule of prudence
 and every prospect of success. The remark is verified in private
 life, and becomes more just, as well as more important, in national
 transactions.
To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government would
 fill a volume. I will hint a few only, each of which will be
 perceived to be a source of innumerable others.
In the first place, it forfeits the respect and confidence of
 other nations, and all the advantages connected with national
 character. An individual who is observed to be inconstant to his
 plans, or perhaps to carry on his affairs without any plan at all,
 is marked at once, by all prudent people, as a speedy victim to his
 own unsteadiness and folly. His more friendly neighbors may pity
 him, but all will decline to connect their fortunes with his; and
 not a few will seize the opportunity of making their fortunes out of
 his. One nation is to another what one individual is to another;
 with this melancholy distinction perhaps, that the former, with
 fewer of the benevolent emotions than the latter, are under fewer
 restraints also from taking undue advantage from the indiscretions
 of each other. Every nation, consequently, whose affairs betray a
 want of wisdom and stability, may calculate on every loss which can
 be sustained from the more systematic policy of their wiser
 neighbors. But the best instruction on this subject is unhappily
 conveyed to America by the example of her own situation. She finds
 that she is held in no respect by her friends; that she is the
 derision of her enemies; and that she is a prey to every nation
 which has an interest in speculating on her fluctuating councils and
 embarrassed affairs.
The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more
 calamitous. It poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It will be
 of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of
 their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be
 read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be
 repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such
 incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is to-day, can
 guess what it will be to-morrow. Law is defined to be a rule of
 action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less
 fixed?
Another effect of public instability is the unreasonable
 advantage it gives to the sagacious, the enterprising, and the
 moneyed few over the industrious and uniformed mass of the people.
 Every new regulation concerning commerce or revenue, or in any way
 affecting the value of the different species of property, presents a
 new harvest to those who watch the change, and can trace its
 consequences; a harvest, reared not by themselves, but by the toils
 and cares of the great body of their fellow-citizens. This is a
 state of things in which it may be said with some truth that laws
 are made for the FEW, not for the MANY.
In another point of view, great injury results from an unstable
 government. The want of confidence in the public councils damps
 every useful undertaking, the success and profit of which may depend
 on a continuance of existing arrangements. What prudent merchant
 will hazard his fortunes in any new branch of commerce when he knows
 not but that his plans may be rendered unlawful before they can be
 executed? What farmer or manufacturer will lay himself out for the
 encouragement given to any particular cultivation or establishment,
 when he can have no assurance that his preparatory labors and
 advances will not render him a victim to an inconstant government?
 In a word, no great improvement or laudable enterprise can go
 forward which requires the auspices of a steady system of national
 policy.
But the most deplorable effect of all is that diminution of
 attachment and reverence which steals into the hearts of the people,
 towards a political system which betrays so many marks of infirmity,
 and disappoints so many of their flattering hopes. No government,
 any more than an individual, will long be respected without being
 truly respectable; nor be truly respectable, without possessing a
 certain portion of order and stability.
PUBLIUS.