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FEDERALIST No. 4

The Same Subject Continued
(Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
For the Independent Journal.

JAY

To the People of the State of New York:
MY LAST paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the
 people would be best secured by union against the danger it may be
 exposed to by JUST causes of war given to other nations; and those
 reasons show that such causes would not only be more rarely given,
 but would also be more easily accommodated, by a national government
 than either by the State governments or the proposed little
 confederacies.
But the safety of the people of America against dangers from
 FOREIGN force depends not only on their forbearing to give JUST
 causes of war to other nations, but also on their placing and
 continuing themselves in such a situation as not to INVITE hostility
 or insult; for it need not be observed that there are PRETENDED as
 well as just causes of war.
It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature,
 that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect
 of getting anything by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make
 war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for the
 purposes and objects merely personal, such as thirst for military
 glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts
 to aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans.
 These and a variety of other motives, which affect only the mind of
 the sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by
 justice or the voice and interests of his people. But, independent
 of these inducements to war, which are more prevalent in absolute
 monarchies, but which well deserve our attention, there are others
 which affect nations as often as kings; and some of them will on
 examination be found to grow out of our relative situation and
 circumstances.
With France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheries, and
 can supply their markets cheaper than they can themselves,
 notwithstanding any efforts to prevent it by bounties on their own
 or duties on foreign fish.
With them and with most other European nations we are rivals in
 navigation and the carrying trade; and we shall deceive ourselves
 if we suppose that any of them will rejoice to see it flourish;
 for, as our carrying trade cannot increase without in some degree
 diminishing theirs, it is more their interest, and will be more
 their policy, to restrain than to promote it.
In the trade to China and India, we interfere with more than one
 nation, inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages which
 they had in a manner monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves
 with commodities which we used to purchase from them.
The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give
 pleasure to any nations who possess territories on or near this
 continent, because the cheapness and excellence of our productions,
 added to the circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and
 address of our merchants and navigators, will give us a greater
 share in the advantages which those territories afford, than
 consists with the wishes or policy of their respective sovereigns.
Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on
 the one side, and Britain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the
 other; nor will either of them permit the other waters which are
 between them and us to become the means of mutual intercourse and
 traffic.
From these and such like considerations, which might, if
 consistent with prudence, be more amplified and detailed, it is easy
 to see that jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the
 minds and cabinets of other nations, and that we are not to expect
 that they should regard our advancement in union, in power and
 consequence by land and by sea, with an eye of indifference and
 composure.
The people of America are aware that inducements to war may
 arise out of these circumstances, as well as from others not so
 obvious at present, and that whenever such inducements may find fit
 time and opportunity for operation, pretenses to color and justify
 them will not be wanting. Wisely, therefore, do they consider union
 and a good national government as necessary to put and keep them in
 SUCH A SITUATION as, instead of INVITING war, will tend to repress
 and discourage it. That situation consists in the best possible
 state of defense, and necessarily depends on the government, the
 arms, and the resources of the country.
As the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and
 cannot be provided for without government, either one or more or
 many, let us inquire whether one good government is not, relative to
 the object in question, more competent than any other given number
 whatever.
One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and
 experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may
 be found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can
 harmonize, assimilate, and protect the several parts and members,
 and extend the benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. In
 the formation of treaties, it will regard the interest of the whole,
 and the particular interests of the parts as connected with that of
 the whole. It can apply the resources and power of the whole to the
 defense of any particular part, and that more easily and
 expeditiously than State governments or separate confederacies can
 possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system. It can place
 the militia under one plan of discipline, and, by putting their
 officers in a proper line of subordination to the Chief Magistrate,
 will, as it were, consolidate them into one corps, and thereby
 render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen or into
 three or four distinct independent companies.
What would the militia of Britain be if the English militia
 obeyed the government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the
 government of Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the
 government of Wales? Suppose an invasion; would those three
 governments (if they agreed at all) be able, with all their
 respective forces, to operate against the enemy so effectually as
 the single government of Great Britain would?
We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the time may
 come, if we are wise, when the fleets of America may engage
 attention. But if one national government, had not so regulated the
 navigation of Britain as to make it a nursery for seamen--if one
 national government had not called forth all the national means and
 materials for forming fleets, their prowess and their thunder would
 never have been celebrated. Let England have its navigation and
 fleet--let Scotland have its navigation and fleet--let Wales have its
 navigation and fleet--let Ireland have its navigation and fleet--let
 those four of the constituent parts of the British empire be be
 under four independent governments, and it is easy to perceive how
 soon they would each dwindle into comparative insignificance.
Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America divided into
 thirteen or, if you please, into three or four independent
 governments--what armies could they raise and pay--what fleets could
 they ever hope to have? If one was attacked, would the others fly
 to its succor, and spend their blood and money in its defense?
 Would there be no danger of their being flattered into neutrality
 by its specious promises, or seduced by a too great fondness for
 peace to decline hazarding their tranquillity and present safety for
 the sake of neighbors, of whom perhaps they have been jealous, and
 whose importance they are content to see diminished? Although such
 conduct would not be wise, it would, nevertheless, be natural. The
 history of the states of Greece, and of other countries, abounds
 with such instances, and it is not improbable that what has so often
 happened would, under similar circumstances, happen again.
But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded State
 or confederacy. How, and when, and in what proportion shall aids of
 men and money be afforded? Who shall command the allied armies, and
 from which of them shall he receive his orders? Who shall settle
 the terms of peace, and in case of disputes what umpire shall decide
 between them and compel acquiescence? Various difficulties and
 inconveniences would be inseparable from such a situation; whereas
 one government, watching over the general and common interests, and
 combining and directing the powers and resources of the whole, would
 be free from all these embarrassments, and conduce far more to the
 safety of the people.
But whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under
 one national government, or split into a number of confederacies,
 certain it is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as
 it is; and they will act toward us accordingly. If they see that
 our national government is efficient and well administered, our
 trade prudently regulated, our militia properly organized and
 disciplined, our resources and finances discreetly managed, our
 credit re-established, our people free, contented, and united, they
 will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke
 our resentment. If, on the other hand, they find us either
 destitute of an effectual government (each State doing right or
 wrong, as to its rulers may seem convenient), or split into three or
 four independent and probably discordant republics or confederacies,
 one inclining to Britain, another to France, and a third to Spain,
 and perhaps played off against each other by the three, what a poor,
 pitiful figure will America make in their eyes! How liable would
 she become not only to their contempt but to their outrage, and how
 soon would dear-bought experience proclaim that when a people or
 family so divide, it never fails to be against themselves.
PUBLIUS.