Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0377/03775.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 32KB | 502 lines

$Unique_ID{COW03775}
$Pretitle{280}
$Title{Turkey
Chapter 5A.   National Security}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Jean R. Tartter}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{military
turkish
soviet
turkey
forces
political
army
ch
nato
new}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Country:     Turkey
Book:        Turkey, A Country Study
Author:      Jean R. Tartter
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1987

Chapter 5A.   National Security

     The armed forces have been a conspicuous presence in Turkish national
life for many hundreds of years. Under Ottoman rule, the government and the
military establishment were virtually indistinguishable. After World War I,
the army commander, Mustafa Kemal, later called Ataturk, threw the occupying
powers out of Anatolia and formulated the principles underlying the modern
Turkish state. On three occasions since that time, the military leadership has
intervened to protect the nation's democratic framework. The third interlude
of military rule, which lasted from 1980 to 1983, was welcomed by the vast
majority of Turkish citizens as an alternative to the anarchy and terrorism of
the 1970s. Although many regarded the stern measures imposed to restore
internal order as excessive, the intervention reaffirmed the reputation of the
military as guardians of Turkish democracy.

     In spite of increasing debate over the value of Turkey's relationship
with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), continuing problems in
obtaining needed military assistance, and the desire for better relations with
the Soviet Union, the country's senior military leaders have continued to
support the Atlantic Alliance. A staunch participant in NATO activities for
thirty-five years, Turkey has undertaken the vital mission of anchoring the
alliance's southeastern flank. It controls the strategic Turkish straits that
provide the Soviet Union access to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea. The
Soviet Black Sea fleet, if available as unimpeded reinforcement, could tip the
balance in a confrontation between the Soviet naval squadron and the United
States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. In the late 1980s, Turkish forces
defending the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits were outnumbered by Warsaw Pact
forces by more than two to one on the ground and five to one in the air.
Military coordination of Greek and Turkish forces would reduce these
disparities, but unremitting animosities between the two NATO members have
frustrated such cooperation.

     On its northeastern border, Turkey's armed forces were also outnumbered
by 20 Soviet divisions that could be rapidly deployed in the Transcaucasus
region and by over 350 Soviet combat aircraft. To meet the multifront threat,
Turkey maintained the second largest standing military contingent in NATO. In
terms of the relative prosperity of its members, Turkey made the greatest
defense-spending effort in the alliance. Turkish personnel were highly trained
and well disciplined. Nonetheless, the country's military effectiveness was
limited by a shortage of resources needed to modernize and even to keep
existing equipment operational.

     Turkey's deficiencies in firepower, communications, and mobility would
present serious handicaps in defending against a Soviet armored thrust
supported by air cover. In late 1987, most of Turkey's fleet units and
submarines were nearing the end of their operational usefulness, and the bulk
of its combat planes were outmoded models discarded by other NATO countries.
Some progress had been made in overcoming these insufficiencies, however. With
help from the United States, Turkish industry was beginning to assemble--and
would ultimately coproduce-- modern fighter aircraft. In addition, naval
vessels were being constructed and tank inventory upgraded with support from
the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). Modern
antitank and antiaircraft weapons systems and short-range missiles were being
supplied as military aid. In spite of these programs, Turkey's modernization
needs would not be met in the foreseeable future, diminishing the alliance's
strategic credibility in the eastern Mediterranean area.

     Turkey and the United States developed many bonds and shared goals after
United States military and economic assistance began in 1947 in response to
the threat of Soviet expansionism. Turkey allowed the United States to use
important bases and intelligence installations on Turkish territory, which
contributed to the common effort to contain Soviet influence. This close
relationship had been strained for many years as a result of a complex of
issues arising from the Cyprus problem. The Turkish military intervention in
Cyprus in 1974, for example, induced the United States Congress to impose a
partial arms embargo between 1975 and 1978. In the late 1985, events related
to the Cyprus issue continued to affect congressional attitudes toward the
level and types of arms delivered under the military assistance program.

     The internal security problems that preoccupied Turkey during the latter
part of the 1970s moderated after the disorder of that period was subdued by
the military government set up in 1980. Martial law, at first general in the
cities and restless provinces, was gradually reduced until it applied only in
the remote southeastern provinces troubled by the Kurdish insurgency; it was
rescinded in mid-1987. Although the police, gendarmerie, and military did not
appear to be notably effective in coping with Kurdish unrest, it presented no
immediate threat to internal security.

     Turkish military power in the volatile Middle East was a factor for
stability, discouraging the introduction of Soviet armed might into the
region. In spite of the proximity of the fighting between two of its
neighbors, Iran and Iraq, the risk of Turkish involvement was minimized by its
policy of strict neutrality, and as of mid-1987 major redeployments of troops
to the border area had not been found necessary.

Historical Role of the Armed Forces

     The professional armed forces of Turkey trace their origins back for more
than five centuries, when a permanent body of men was recruited to form the
nucleus of the much larger armies mobilized to conduct annual campaigns
against selected objectives (see Ottoman Military Establishment, ch. 1). A
unique feature of the Ottoman military organization was the janissary army,
whose members were conscripted as youths from non-Muslim subjects in the
Balkans, converted to Islam, and given military training. Gradually acquiring
high status, prominence, and privilege, the janissaries ultimately constituted
a reactionary palace guard, resistant to reforms and of little military value
to the reigning sultan.

     Military conquest permitted the spread of the Ottoman Empire through the
Middle East, North Africa, the Balkans, and most of Eastern Europe. The
sequence of Ottoman victories was finally halted and a gradual military
eclipse ensued after the failure of the siege of Vienna in 1683 (see Decline
of the Ottoman Empire, ch. 1). Vast territories were relinquished as a result
of a century of setbacks in battles with the European powers.

     The need for modernizing a military system engaged in a losing struggle
to maintain Ottoman control over the Mediterranean littoral and the Middle
East was recognized by the first of the reformist sultans, Selim III (reigned
1789-1807). Selim introduced French instructors to train the soldiers of a new
volunteer army organized in the style of contemporary European armed forces.
His efforts were successfully resisted by the janissaries, who concluded that
the new approach foreshadowed an end to their traditional privileges. Rising
up in 1807, the janissaries precipitated the sultan's abdication and the
dismantling of the new army. Selim's successor, Mahmud II (reigned 1808-39),
was eventually strong enough to challenge the power of the traditional
military caste, reinstituting the new army and, in 1826, crushing the
janissaries by a massive