Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0377/03774.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 40KB | 636 lines

$Unique_ID{COW03774}
$Pretitle{280}
$Title{Turkey
Chapter 4E.   Foreign Relations}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Jo Ann Browning Seeley}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{turkey
turkish
turkey's
relations
greece
united
soviet
states
countries
ec}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Country:     Turkey
Book:        Turkey, A Country Study
Author:      Jo Ann Browning Seeley
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1987

Chapter 4E.   Foreign Relations

     Since the days of the Ottoman Empire, geopolitical factors have largely
determined Turkey's foreign policy. A strategic position on the Black Sea
straits has projected the country into the arena of power politics. Its role
as bridge between the Middle East and the West has resulted in a flexible and
pragmatic approach to relations with most of its neighbors. While maintaining
a firm commitment to its Western allies, Turkey has demonstrated its
independence by improving relations with the Soviet Union and expanding and
strengthening ties with the Middle East.

     The 1982 Constitution defines foreign policy issues as within the purview
of the Foreign Ministry (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and matters concerning
the security of the country as the responsibility of the NSC, which advises
the Council of Ministers. According to informed sources, however, in the late
1980s Prime Minister Ozal and his closest advisers exercised decisive
influence over policy making. President Evren and members of his staff, as
well as senior military officers, also contributed to policy outcomes. The top
political and military leaders thus tended to eclipse the Foreign Ministry and
the NSC, which often met merely to ratify decisions taken elsewhere. While
Ozal's prominence in foreign as well as domestic decision making demonstrated
the revival of civilian power, the role of the senior military, including
Evren, was in keeping with the Turkish tradition of giving tacit approval for
the armed forces to act as ultimate arbiters in matters of national concern.

Turkey and the West

     Following the establishment of the republic in 1923, Ataturk's formula of
"peace at home, peace in the world" dominated foreign policy considerations.
The republic relinquished all claims to territories lost as a result of World
War I and adopted a cautious, realistic approach in its relations with
neighboring countries. Turkey's policy makers believed that, as long as no
great power threatened Turkey's vital interests, the primary goal of
maintaining national sovereignty called for a policy of nonalignment.

     This situation changed at the end of World War II, when Turkey was forced
to modify its position of neutrality in the face of Soviet aggression. The
attempts of the Russians since the time of Peter the Great (1672-1725) to
control the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits had made the Turks wary of their
northern neighbors. The Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe at the end of World
War II, coupled with Soviet demands for the surrender of two Turkish provinces
and joint naval control of the Black Sea straits caused Turkey to turn to the
West for support. In response to Turkey's request, the United States extended
economic and military assistance under the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall
Plan. As a result, Turkey's foreign policy became oriented toward the West
(see Postwar External Affairs, ch. 1). As area specialist George Harris
describes the situation, "The Soviets pushed Turkey into NATO's arms and the
Turks were glad for the embrace."

     Cooperation with the West continued throughout the 1950s. In July 1950,
Turkish troops were dispatched to support United Nations (UN) forces in Korea.
In February 1952, Turkey, which had joined the Council of Europe three years
earlier, became a member of NATO, a move that had bipartisan support in
Turkey. In addition, Turkey was a founding member of the Central Treaty
Organization (CENTO), established in 1955. As Turkey made substantial gains in
its economic and defense efforts, it came to play an appreciable role within
NATO. The mutuality of Turkish-American interests was further reinforced in
1957 by the Eisenhower Doctrine, which proclaimed the United States' resolve
to defend the integrity of any Middle Eastern state wishing to resist
communist aggression. NATO thus became the cornerstone of Turkey's foreign and
security policies during the height of the East-West confrontation in the
1950s and 1960s.

     Turkey began to re-evaluate its links with the West in 1962. Turkish
officials believed that the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated that NATO
membership alone would not guarantee protection against the Soviet Union. The
United States' removal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkish territory in
exchange for the withdrawal of Soviet intermediate-range missiles from Cuba
reduced Turkey's prominence in Western defense strategy. The subsequent
relaxation of cold war tensions was another factor in the loosening of
Turkey's western ties. The 1963-64 Cyprus crisis further strained the
relations between Turkey and the United States and led to anti-American
demonstrations in Ankara (see Conflict and Diplomacy, Cyprus and Beyond, ch.
1).

     Another source of contention was American pressure on Turkey to cease the
production of opium poppies, which the administration of United States
President Lyndon B. Johnson had concluded was a major source of the heroin
that was illegally entering the United States. When Ankara acceded to American
demands in 1971, there was strong public criticism of the "open intervention."
Cultivation was resumed in 1974, under new regulations designed to restrict
the illegal drug traffic (see Cropping Patterns and Production, ch. 3).

     United States-Turkish relations reached a low point in the mid-1970s,
when the United States placed an embargo on arms supplies to Turkey in
response to the country's military intervention on Cyprus. The Turkish
government retaliated by suspending operations at all American-occupied
installations in Turkey that were not clearly connected with NATO missions.
During negotiations over this issue, a new dynamic, which would continue to
affect United States-Turkish relations in later years, became apparent.
Whereas the executive branch of the United States government tended to have
some sympathy for Turkey's position during the 1974 Cyprus crisis, the
attitude of Congress became increasingly unfavorable. After major lobbying
efforts by Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, Congress agreed to lift
the arms embargo in 1978, and the Ecevit government then allowed resumption of
operations at the United States facilities in Turkey.

     Subsequent efforts to renegotiate defense cooperation arrangements
between Turkey and the United States continued to be hampered by clashes
between the legislative and executive branches in Washington. A five-year
Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) was eventually signed in
1980, restoring the formal relationship that had lapsed during the Cyprus
conflict.

     During the period of military rule after 1980, ties with the United
States were central to Turkey's foreign policy. Washington demonstrated a
sympathetic understanding of the reasons for the military takeover and played
a primary role in the program established by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF--see Glossary) to provide economic assistance to Turkey, which continued
to be heavily dependent on the United States for military aid as well. At the
same time, Turkey's relations with most West European countries were
undergoing a period of strain because of Turkey's sale of low-priced textiles
on the European market and its poor record on human rights.

     Close relations between Ankara and Washington were mutually beneficial.
Turkey's strategic importance as a NATO ally had acquired renewed significance
with the fall of the shah of Iran in 1979. Furthermore, the presence of a
socialist government in Greece critical of the United States' policies gave
additional importance to Turkish fr