$Unique_ID{COW03253} $Pretitle{241} $Title{South Korea Chapter 5A. National Security} $Subtitle{} $Author{Melinda W. Cooke} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{south korea forces military korean united north states armed defense} $Date{1981} $Log{Turtle Ship*0325301.scf Figure 17.*0325304.scf } Country: South Korea Book: South Korea, A Country Study Author: Melinda W. Cooke Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1981 Chapter 5A. National Security [See Turtle Ship: Iron-clad "turtle ship" designed and constructed by national hero, Admiral Yi Sun-sin] The major external threat to South Korea's national security in 1981 continued to be North Korea. Despite the 1953 truce agreements, charges and countercharges of espionage and hostile provocations had become a permanent feature of inter-Korean relations-by mid-1980 North Korea had claimed over 298,000 truce violations by South Korea; South Korea claimed over 56,000 by North Korea. Although both figures were doubtless inflated and reflected less about the actual incidence of truce violations than the zealousness of those doing the counting, it was clear that the truce had not signaled the end to all conflict. Whether or not the South Koreans had themselves fueled the fires of mutual hostility, it seemed clear that they faced real threats from North Korea-the possible outbreak of another war as well as infiltration, espionage, and sabotage. In the 1974-80 period South Korea had discovered three large tunnels built under the four-kilometer-wide Demilitarized Zone that separated it from North Korea, caught numerous infiltrators, and had broken up several spy rings. In addition, although the North Koreans claimed the opposite, intelligence data from domestic and foreign sources indicated that North Korean armed forces were deployed in an offensive posture. As a result of this atmosphere of mutual hostility South Korean security was distinguished by four distinct factors. First, the nation supported the world's sixth largest armed force, well equipped with modern weaponry. Only the Demilitarized Zone separated the country from its most feared opponent, and continued survival remained a critical issue to the nation. The offensive deployment of the North Korean armed forces and the seemingly unpredictable behavior of its leaders heightened apprehensions in South Korea about the nation's ability to defend itself and, more importantly, to deter war without the aid of its ally, the United States. Arms acquisition and modernization, training, and readiness were primary concerns as was vigilance against espionage, infiltration, and internal agitation by the enemy. A second feature of South Korean security was the highly professional military establishment, which wielded an effective force in the government. As ex-generals who achieved power through military coups, both presidents Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan were able to legitimize their rule through political processes, demonstrating the ability of their military power bases to mobilize support and to overcome opposition-by whatever means. From the standpoint of security, this meant that the military was able to promote successfully many or its own programs and to translate much of its own vision of South Korea into reality. Since the security situation was of overwhelming national concern, the North Korean threat factor provided the government with a ready-made justification for authoritarian action-a justification the public viewed with resignation, if not with favor. Though many of the more overt limits on the power of the opposition, the judiciary, and the legislature imposed under the yusin (revitalization) constitution had been eliminated by 1981, the 1980 Constitution put few limits on the power of the executive branch. The precedent of declaring martial law (thereby suspending regular due process) was well established, and the legal power to do so remained. The police ability to dispel assemblies had been strengthened, as had penalties for promoting vaguely defined antistate acts. Despite constitutional provisions of freedom from coerced confession and torture and guarantees of habeas corpus, reports persisted of political prisoners being held under house arrest without trial and in poor conditions. A final factor influencing South Korean security affairs was the strategic location of the Korean peninsula. Historically an area of competition among larger nations, subject to suzerainty, occupation, invasion, and division, the location of the peninsula made a solution to the division and hostility between north and south all the more difficult-constrained by the impact reunification would have not only on North Korea and South Korea, but also on the Soviet Union, the United States and its ally Japan, and China. No calculation of South Korean security could ignore the role played by outside actors, especially that played by its major ally, the United States. Significant though the interests of outside nations were, however, they were not the controlling determinant of security affairs on the peninsula. While in 1981 most observers agreed that none of the outside nations favored reunification by force, neither China nor the Soviet Union would or could apply pressure on North Korea to compromise its position. To what extent the United States was willing and able to do likewise for South Korea was also debatable. For although superpower rivalry had been largely responsible for the partitioning of Korea after World War II and continued to affect the peninsula, hostility between the two halves rapidly became an element in the situation as well. North Korea and South Korea quickly developed inimical economic and social arrangements, while at the same time each expressed a desire for reunification-on its own terms. The resulting tension made peaceful reunification unlikely, even if the great powers were to reach an agreement. Armed Forces The strategic doctrine of the armed forces was designed to counter the threat from North Korea. So great was the perceived threat that in 1981 the South Koreans supported the world's sixth largest armed force, totaling 600,600 active duty personnel. Even given the size of the armed forces, their high degree of readiness, and their modern weaponry, South Korean military analysts were not particularly sanguine regarding their nation's ability to deter or defend against an attack from North Korea. During the 1970-79 period the North Korean ground forces had nearly doubled in size to become the world's fifth largest. The country was self-sufficient in ground armaments and was considered capable of launching a surprise attack on South Korea that could be sustained for at least thirty days given the size of weapons stockpiles. The generally offensive deployment, training, and doctrine of North Korean forces worked to persuade South Koreans that their nation's security was seriously threatened. South Korea would not be helpless in any confrontation. Should North Korea attack, it would enjoy the benefit of initiative, but South Korea would be fighting on home ground from prepared defensive positions in terrain favorable to defense. South Korean troops were well trained and well led. South Korea was well equipped with modern weapons, and under the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and South Korea (ratified by the United States Senate in 1954), it would enjoy United States military assistance were the nation attacked (see Foreign Military Assistance, this ch.). Whether or not North Korea actually would once again attack South Korea was open to question. The opinions of foreign analysts varied. It could be argued that its steady barrage of hostile propaganda over three decades, offensive deployment, and regular attempts at infiltrating and subverting South Korea were for domestic consumption as much as anything else-actions necessary to legitimize the leadership. South Koreans, however, did not find such arguments persuasive. Thus in 1981 extensive experience in military and paramilitary service continued to form a common denominator for virtually the entire South Korean male population. Background Though Koreans honored past military heroes-such as General Ulchimundok, who defeated an invading Chinese army in A.D. 612, and Admiral Yi Sun-sin, a naval tactician famous both for his engagements of Japanese naval forces and for his ironclad boats called "turtle ships"-an enduring military tradition was lacking. Yi Dynasty (1392-1910) policy stressed civilian rule over the military, a policy so strongly enforced that by 1907, when the Korean military establishment was formally disbanded, it consisted of only 6,000 men. At the end of World War II and the Japanese occupation, the country had no armed forces. After the Japanese in Korea surrendered to United States troops, the need for indigenous police and military institutions quickly became apparent. The existing police force was revived, having as its core members of the formerly Japanese-run police force. In January 1946 the South Korean National Constabulary was established and manned with returning war veterans. In the same year a weak and poorly equipped coast guard was formed to fight flourishing smuggling and piracy. Upon the founding of the independent Republic of Korea in 1948 and the departure of United States troops the following year, the constabulary was reformed into the Army of the Republic of Korea; the coast guard became the navy. Shortly thereafter an air force and reserve forces were also founded. When the Korean War (1950-53) began, the low quality of the armed forces immediately became apparent. Although the South Koreans had 94,000 troops when North Korea invaded, one week later only 20,000 could be accounted for. By early September 1950 the invading forces held all of South Korea except for the Pusan-Taegu corridor in the southeast. In the absence of the Soviet Union the United Nations Security Council, upon request of the United States, condemned the move in June 1950 and asked members of the United Nations (UN) to furnish assistance to South Korea. Fifteen nations besides the United States and South Korea eventually provided troops; all forces fought under the UN flag and under the unified command of General Douglas A. MacArthur, designated the commander-in-chief of UN forces. These combined forces successfully broke North Korea's extended supply lines by landing at Inch'on and thereafter pushed the invading forces back to near the Chinese border. Only the massive intervention of Chinese "volunteers" in October 1950 averted the defeat of the North Korean forces. Subsequently the UN and communist forces fought to a standstill, and an armistice was finally signed in 1953. By 1954 South Korean armed forces had been built up to a sixteen-division force of 600,000 that manned three-quarters of the front. But the catastrophic results of the initial invasion had convinced the South Koreans that they could neither have forced a standoff nor held the armistice line of 1953 without the presence of the UN forces-primarily United States troops. Continued dependence on the United States for military, economic, and technical aid reinforced the South Korean perception that the security of their nation depended on the presence of the United States troops. South Korea's first president, Syngman Rhee (1948-60) had placed the country's entire armed forces under the operational control of the UN at the beginning of the war. Since the United States was the executive agent for the UN in the conflict, this meant that South Korean troops were under United States operational command. The continued presence of United States troops in South Korea was further guaranteed under the Mutual Defense Treaty, which provided that should an armed attack occur against territory in the Pacific area under control of either party, the other would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. United States troops could not be committed except by direct order of that nation's president. The deficiencies underlying the 1950 defeat of the South Korean army were addressed in the postwar decade. Training, which had been singled out as the most serious weakness, was vastly broadened and improved at all levels. Tanks and artillery pieces were provided in significant quantity for the first time. More rigorous training and discipline and the incorporation of the first officer graduates of the Korean Military Academy (KMA) supported the development of institutional loyalty and professionalism. A new turning point in general development trends was reached in 1964 when South Korea, responding to a request from South Vietnam, dispatched the first contingent of its own forces to offer support in the Vietnam conflict. Between 1965 and 1972 some 300,000 South Korean troops were sent to Vietnam. The impressive showing by the army's Tiger and White Horse divisions (the 29th regiment of the latter was commanded by Chun in 1970) lent added prestige to the military. The conflict gave the armed forces valuable combat experience and increased pay for participants. Modernization and improvement of the South Korean defense establishment was speeded up in the early 1970s after the institution of a five-year military development plan envisioning the expenditure of US $5 billion on the armed forces. The plan, jointly funded by the United States and South Korea, was intended to compensate the nation for the fact that one of the two infantry divisions formerly maintained by the United States in South Korea had been withdrawn. Both countries saw themselves increasingly committed to the development of a self-sufficient South Korean defense establishment. After the fall of Saigon in 1975 Seoul began an ambitious Force Improvement Plan for the years 1976-80, which was designed to further enhance its independent defense capability. This plan, later extended to include a sixth year, emphasized increasing modern fighter aircraft and antitank capability; improving the tank force, air defense, and logistics; and promoting a domestic defense industry. Planning in the early 1980s for a second Force Improvement Plan suggested that South Korea would continue its high level of defense spending and its improvement of the quality of its defense establishment. The prospect of further United States ground forces withdrawals from South Korea became likely in the 1976-78 period. In early 1977, reiterating his 1976 campaign promises, President Jimmy Carter announced a program for withdrawal according to a schedule to be worked out with South Korean and Japanese officials. The administration based its decision on several assumptions. It held that first, South Korea, given its impressive economic record, was increasingly able to repel an attack on its own; second, the superpowers were opposed to renewed conflict; and third, an improved United States Air Force presence on the peninsula, combined with the ability to reinforce South Korean efforts from Pacific-based forces, was sufficient to deter attack. Finally, the administration argued that the prospective withdrawal could be paced to the increasing ability of South Korea to defend itself. This ability was to be enhanced by a compensatory aid package equal to US $1.9 billion over four years. Strong opposition to the withdrawal plan emerged immediately in South Korea and the United States. Critics claimed that although the South Korean armed forces were improving, they were not capable of repelling an attack without assistance. It was pointed out that the presence of United States ground troops provided to allies and enemies alike a visible and tangible guarantee of United States commitments in Asia, which a general presence in the Pacific would not provide. From a South Korean perspective the forces represented a valuable bargaining chip in negotiations with North Korea that they were not eager to relinquish. In the 1978-79 period the position of the opponents of withdrawal was reinforced by new intelligence reports. According to United States intelligence reports and contrary to the estimates upon which withdrawal had been predicated, North Korea's military strength was seen as greater than that of South Korea. The new data suggested that North Korea had been engaged in troop buildups and weapons augmentation since 1970 and now held a clear superiority. Whereas old estimates had credited South Korea with an advantage of 100,000-150,000 ground troops, the new reports gave North Korea a 25,000-50,000 edge. Whether troop strength had actually risen or the new reports simply reflected different counting methods was not clear. Nonetheless in 1979 the administration bowed to congressional pressure and suspended reductions until a reappraisal could be made in 1981. In early 1981, up to which time approximately 3,600 troops had been withdrawn, the administration of President Ronald Reagan announced that further withdrawal were not under consideration. Important ramifications had already resulted from the proposed withdrawal plan. In response to the probability that South Korea would have to shoulder an ever-increasing portion of self-defense, defense expenditures rose from 4 percent of the gross national product (GNP-see Glossary) in 1974 to over 6 percent in 1980. This increase permitted substantial upgrading of the armed forces, especially in the areas of antitank warfare, air defense capabilities, and weapons stockpiling. Confidence in their self-defense capability, however, continued to elude military planners. North Korean spending had increased also, and the long lead-time required in weapons procurement made it difficult to translate money into weapons quickly. Moreover what constituted adequate self-defense from the South Korean side was itself a disputed matter, and where security was involved there was no wish to err on the side of over-confidence. No matter how the military balance lay in mid-1981-and opinions varied widely-South Korea had clearly augmented its weapons stockpiles and improved its weapons production capabilities over 1975 levels. The prospective withdrawal of United States troops and the concomitant rise in defense spending by South Korea led some critics to charge that the United States was contributing to an arms race on the peninsula. Close examination of relative defense spending suggested that both North Korea and South Korea were engaged in a steady military buildup (see fig. 16). Washington, however, discounted this factor in its 1981 decision to allow the sale of thirty-six F-16 fighter aircraft to South Korea, stating that the aircraft represented only a defensive response to the military buildup of North Korea. Some viewed the decision as a step raise in an arms race-a qualitative improvement of South Korea's capabilities that might convince the Soviet Union to provide North Korea with MiG-23 aircraft that had long been requested. Further augmentation of South Korean forces promised to continue to spark future debate. Having an ambitious nuclear development program under way, an indigenous supply of low-grade uranium, and a missile-building capacity, South Korean capabilities and intentions regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons promised to be a critical part of any arms race. While he was president, Park had indicated an interest in nuclear weapons research and refused to preclude any contingency were his country's security sufficiently threatened. But his ambitions had been thwarted by serious constraints-chiefly the difficulty of obtaining enriched, weapons-grade uranium. Under United States pressure South Korea canceled plans to obtain a French reprocessing plant in 1975. In that same year pressure was also exerted on Seoul to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968 and to submit to strict controls regarding the use of its Westinghouse and Candu (Canadian-built) reactors. (The latter type was used by India to produce fissionable material for its nuclear program.) Although in mid-1981 it was probably impossible to hide a nuclear weapons program from detection, technical breakthroughs in reprocessing seemed likely to lessen the complexity and expense of reprocessing, making such a program increasingly easier to engage in secretly. Even without such breakthroughs several analysts believed in 1980 that the South Koreans could develop nuclear weapons within four to six years, were they to decide to do so. A decision to "go nuclear" (as the South Korean government had threatened to do in the mid-1970s), however, seemed certain to result in a disruption of United States-South Korean defense ties. Moreover the adverse reaction of such nations as Japan, the Soviet Union, and China made it likely that such a decision would endanger rather than enhance the nation's security. Given the cordial relations between Seoul and Washington in mid-1981, the advantages from the continued presence of the United States in South Korea appeared to outweigh heavily the questionable benefits of nuclear weapons. Place in National Life With no historical example of a proper role for the armed forces in national life, the military moved to forge its own. Upon its 1961 seizure of power the military assumed authority for national development, rejecting the model of a civilian-controlled military. While not consciously playing the leading role in modernization (civilians ran most of the economy), the military contributed key supporting ingredients in order to ensure the stability and economic viability it saw as necessary to national security. During the eighteen-year Park era former military officers held numerous posts in the cabinet and government enterprises (though in lessening degrees as time wore on). In 1981 under Chun, active duty and retired military officers continued to exercise substantial influence within the government. The military functioned as a channel of upward mobility, allowing talented individuals to rise regardless of social and economic backgrounds. It also provided technical training to many young men, subjecting them to rigid military discipline in the process and contributing to the establishment of a well-educated, well-ordered labor pool used by the country in its progress toward economic development. The military also played a large role in introducing Western management techniques, especially before 1970. Military officers in the 1950-60s were the major beneficiaries of educational programs in the United States, learning a scientific approach to problem-solving and efficient organizational theory. As these officers moved into top positions in ministries and government-run enterprises, the way was opened in turn for younger civilian technocrats whose access to decisionmaking positions had earlier been blocked by more conservative Japanese-trained businessmen and bureaucrats (see New Social Elites, ch. 2). Mission The two primary missions of the armed forces were to defend the country from outside aggression and to maintain domestic security. The armed forces also had a lesser mission to aid in national development through participation in civic action programs. Since 1953 defense against outside aggression has been perceived almost entirely in terms of countering a threat from North Korea-to deter attack or should deterrence fail, to successfully defend the country from an invasion. Most forces were deployed to the north of Seoul along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and in positions three-to-eight kilometers to the rear along a heavily fortified defense line. Because South Korea's mountains form two corridors through which any sizable offensive would have to move, major troop concentrations were in two heavily guarded areas: to the east, through the Ch'olwon Valley and Uijongbu to Seoul and to the west from Kaesong to Munsan to Seoul (see fig. 17). Defense strategy also stressed readiness against amphibious attacks along the coastline, airborne offensives, or offensives using tunnels as a main avenue of approach. The proximity of Seoul to the DMZ-approximately forty kilometers-was a major concern to defense planners and national leaders. As the largest urban area, the country's psychological and political nerve center, and a center of industry and commerce, the city provided a ready target. Recognizing its great vulnerability, Park once considered moving the capital southward. Instead a concrete defense wall with anti-air and antitank missile emplacements north of the city was completed in 1979. A forward defense strategy adopted in 1975, however, put Seoul behind the first line of defense. South Korea was particularly concerned about the possibility of a surprise attack. Success of the forward defense strategy depended on ample warning time to call air strikes and perhaps to reinforce local forces with United States air power. A telephone hotline between Seoul and P'yongyang, open for only seven months from February to September of 1980 after being shut down in August 1976, was intended to guard against the possibility of accidental attack. The armed forces were also responsible for prevention of espionage, sabotage, and infiltration. The special Counter-Espionage Operation Command coordinated the activities of military and civilian agencies in combating subversion. The armed forces and police periodically captured infiltrators near the DMZ or in the coastal waters. On the question of the armed forces' responsibility for internal security Chun stated in January 1981: "When civilians are unable, on their own, to cope with the extreme dangers to national security stemming from political, economic, and social chaos, the armed forces must carry out their duty of preserving national security." When political stability is considered restored, he concluded, the military forces should return to their original duties. Performance of this mission was often controversial. In 1974 and during the 1979-80 period the military, under orders from the president, enforced martial law throughout the nation-a situation critics charged was designed less to secure stability than to maintain unpopular governments. When it was not performing such overt activities the military functioned as behind-the-scenes "insurance," recognized by the government's opposition as willing enforcers of the official position that stability was a prerequisite for economic, social, and political development. [See Figure 17.: Deployment of South Korean and United States Forces in South Korea] To complete its civic action mission, a minor duty, the military engaged in a wide variety of projects including flood control, rice planting, road building, and community development. Some undertakings proved beneficial for military purposes as well. Flood dikes made efficient tank barriers. Highways were necessary for conventional transportation, for movement of wartime supplies, and in specially widened stretches, for emergency wartime runways.