$Unique_ID{COW03251} $Pretitle{241} $Title{South Korea Chapter 4C. The Power Structure} $Subtitle{} $Author{Rinn-Sup Shinn} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{party political korea power military parties south democratic foreign national} $Date{1981} $Log{} Country: South Korea Book: South Korea, A Country Study Author: Rinn-Sup Shinn Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1981 Chapter 4C. The Power Structure South Korea is a constitutional republic with an elected president and an elaborate system of checks and balances. The president represents the ruling Democratic Justice Party. In theory the authority and power of the state, emanating from the people, are legitimized through constitutional processes. Most government posts are filled by dedicated civilians with years of experience in general administration and in specialized fields as well. The principle of civilian rule was not, in 1981 at least, blatantly breached. The military appeared to be concerned less with political than strictly professional matters. Appearance is not reality, however. The power structure still bears an unmistakable imprint of the military, considered by many to be inevitable, if not desirable, in light of the inter-Korean confrontation and to a degree because of the continuing weakness and fragmentation of nonmilitary political forces. From all indications political power and the military were inseparable in 1981, as in the past. On balance the extent of military influence was perhaps more pervasive in 1981 than it had ever been, except for the 1961-63 period during which the country was under military rule. In fact, among South Koreans no one would likely challenge the presumption that the role of the military as ultimate guardian of order and stability would remain unchanged as long as their country felt threatened by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), and a number subscribed to the notion that real political power grew out of the barrel of a gun, not out of the ballot boxes. The "power strata" (kwolyok ch'ung) as well as the "special privileged strata" (t'ukkwon ch'ung) are influenced by Chun and his military cohorts, some still on active duty and others in retirement, serving in presidentially appointed or elective positions of trust. The power strata is a term used mainly to describe the power hierarchy connected with bureaucratic (civil and military) and political positions, whereas the special privilege strata covers the economic elites. Without question loyalty and individual competence are important criteria for membership in the broadly defined power structure but, as of mid-1981, to be considered as really influential, one must have played a significant instrumental role in Chun's systematic ascendancy to the top since December 1979 (see Political Developments since October 1979, this ch.). Military influence is neither absolute nor self-perpetuating, but it is nevertheless pervasive. That influence can be defined in terms of formal positions held by military officers or in terms of the network of personnel, civilians or otherwise, who are placed in strategic posts in government ministries. Almost always the civilian bureaucrats in sensitive positions are those who are acceptable to the military-controlled inner sanctum of power. In addition the military has a variety of options in bringing its influence to bear on the political process. Among these options are a threat of a "coup" and a warning of "stern actions" against those elements perceived to be threatening the favored status of the military in the society or endangering domestic tranquility and external security. Negative sanctions may have the desired effect of temporary relief but certainly are not likely to boost an upturn in the economy nor likely to endear the military to those segments of the population whose empathy would contribute significantly to the cause of domestic cohesion through reconciliation. The logic of political survival may well thus dictate the broadening of a power base that as of mid-1981 was popularly perceived to be primarily controlled by the military. The need to shed such an image, and above all for Chun to demonstrate that he is not a "military" leader and that he can command respect and support from a broad strata of the population, would likely pose a political challenge to the president in the years ahead. South Korea is not markedly different from other societies where power is highly centralized, and the way in which power is dispensed or withheld has profound consequences. Competition for access to the bureaucratic and economic levers of power has always been fierce and unrelenting. As a result the power structure is essentially performance oriented with a fairly rapid turnover. Merit, innovation, new skills, and hard work will continue as determinants of social mobility. Under Chun's presidency "a new way of doing things" is strongly encouraged, the rationale being that the power structure should reflect new, reformist outlook rather than perpetuate "premodern vestiges." Nevertheless many observers shared the view that other things being equal, an informal, personal access to the president and his close military associates was critically important as a real measure of political power. In 1981 the power elite, by reputation and by formal functions, included those who held positions dealing with presidential affairs, national security, and intelligence. These were the Presidential Secretariat, the Defense Security Command (DSC), the Capital Garrison Command, the Special Forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP), the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Home Affairs that controlled the national police. Cabinet members, members of the National Assembly, and executives of the Democratic Justice Party could be also considered influential were they connected personally or through professional association with Chun and his chief lieutenants. Not to be overlooked was a group of fifty to eighty generals and colonels commanding regimental, divisional, and corps units. This nameless group was believed to have been exerting considerable influence on the inner council of power through informal communications. Many of these front-line commanders were dedicated professionals, but some of them were popularly perceived to have been "politicized." It is axiomatic that the top echelon of power-and by extension the regime itself-can be stable only so long as its responsiveness to popular needs is credibly demonstrated. This is certainly true in South Korea where the levels of popular expectations have been gradually rising as a function of remarkable economic development in recent years and, importantly, because of political promises made by incumbent leaders. This points to the importance to the political leadership of a second layer of influential persons in the power hierarchy. These include several hundred executives with technocratic and military backgrounds placed in key government-run enterprises. They form essential links in the government strategy of economic production and growth. No less critical are hundreds of generalist-oriented senior civil servants who have provided a measure of stability and continuity in various politically troubled circumstances. A very small number of returnees with advanced degrees from foreign educational institutions can also be considered influential. These academic returnees play a role as consultants and formulators of policies concerning a wide range of complex governmental endeavors. Political Parties Among the pronounced features of Chun's "new politics" was the frequently enunciated commitment to the creation of a new political consciousness and a new political pattern. The pledge was premised on the view that political modernization was not possible as long as the country was strapped by what Chun called "the rut of the old era." The politics of modernization was therefore seen as the removal of such negatives as the perpetuation of one-man rule, corruption, demagoguery, election fraud, excesses in adversary politics, and the lack of dialogue among competing political actors. The development of an orderly, yet vigorous, multiparty system, promoted by the Chun leadership in earnest, was designed to fulfill the needs of new politics. In 1981 there were eight political parties legally recognized under the new Political Party Law of November 1980. These parties, having won one or more parliamentary seats in the elections held in March 1981, were represented in the National Assembly. Preparations for the formation of these parties had begun in December 1980, and officially their formal inauguration took place after mid-January 1981, in time to contest the elections for the presidential electoral college and the presidency-both in February-and for the National Assembly in March 1981. The existence of various political parties appeared to lend an air of credence to Chun's avowedly democratic regime, but beyond that it was still to early to tell whether the multiparty system could indeed play a functional role as a vehicle of mass political participation. None of the parties including the ruling Democratic Justice Party had any institutional or leadership link to the parties of the pre-1980 years. All parties were new, having had to start from scratch, so to speak; all former parties were automatically dissolved in October 1980 with the promulgation of the Constitution. The dissolution was justified as an effort to remove "unqualified politicians" and corruption from the political arena and to create "a sound political climate." The Political Party Law of 1980, according to its drafters, was designed to encourage multiparty politics. Thus some of the former restrictions were removed from the law, making it relatively easier to establish a political party. Parties could then be formed by a minimum of twenty persons (thirty previously), and the required number of local chapters was reduced from one-third to one-fourth of the total electoral districts. In an effort to forestall the emergence of a regionally biased political party, however, the law required that a party must have branches in at least four provinces (previously three), plus Seoul and Pusan. The law widened the door of participation by making it possible for "intellectuals," including university professors, to join a party (previously the intellectuals were barred). At the same time, however, the statute excluded from party membership government officials, journalists, and the teachers of elementary, middle, and high schools. This exclusion was designed to shield these categories from undesirable partisan influences. A viable party system was also attempted in another way. Given the official concern about order and discipline in the society, the law stipulated that failure by a party to field candidates for parliamentary elections or to return at least one parliamentary seat or to garner at least 2 percent of the total valid votes in an election would be grounds for disbanding a substandard party. Party finance was another target of party reform, this one under the revised Political Fund Law of December 1980. According to its drafters the revised law has taken into account the experiences of some fifteen countries including the United States, Japan, Britain, and France. The purpose of the law was to reform the structure of party finance. Previously all parties depended on membership dues and contributions from private individuals and enterprises, but these contributions were more often than not considered to be a major source of political corruption. The revised law sought a tighter control of these contributions and permitted the formation of "financial supporters' associations" by political parties. In actuality, however, the idea of support associations may prove unworkable. In April the Korea Times observed that opposition parties would find it difficult to form "such groups because businessmen might worry about being watched if they should help opposition parties." The Democratic Justice Party, which was supposed to epitomize the political virtues of a new era, is the fourth ruling political organization South Korea has had since independence. The previous incumbent parties were Syngman Rhee's Liberal Party (1951-60), Chang Myon's Democratic Party (1960-61), and Park Chung Hee's Democratic Republican Party (1963-80). The ruling party was essentially a coalition of civilians and ex-military officers, the latter in commanding position (active duty military personnel are barred from joining political parties). Its elected members to the National Assembly and key officeholders in the party headquarters were fairly representative of all functional groups and geographical regions as well. Predictably the ruling organization supported Chun and his various policies relating to political reforms, the economy, national defense, popular welfare, and foreign relations. The principal opposition to the ruling party came from the Democratic Korea Party, organized by the remnants of the defunct New Democratic Party and led by Yu Ch'i-song. The party stressed the need for "liberal democracy" based on a two-party, not multiparty, system. Other major political themes stressed were the protection of civil and political rights of the people, a greater legislative power for the National Assembly, an expanded program of social welfare, and the institutionalization of provincial self-rule. Another opposition group was the Korean National Party, headed by Kim Chong-ch'ol, a veteran lawmaker formerly associated with Park's Democratic Republican Party. Most of the founding members were those who had held second echelon positions within Park's now-defunct organization. The party called for a greater freedom for private entrepreneurship, "true free democracy," and a peaceful transfer of power. The Civil Rights Party, under seventy-one-year-old Kim Ui-t'aek, claimed that it alone was the "legitimate" opposition party, one that was not to be confused with "the government-manufactured opposition parties." Most of the party stalwarts were those who had been active in opposition politics for decades. The party's platform differed little from the programs and slogans espoused by other opposition groups. In addition there were the Democratic Socialist Party led by Ko Chong-hun, the Democratic Farmers Party, and the Human Welfare Party (also known as Anmin Dang). The impact of these minor parties was negligible. In 1981 efforts were under way to pool the political resources of the minor parties. It was a common practice to label the Democratic Justice Party, the Democratic Korea Party, and the Korean National Party as the three major parties. Foreign Affairs Foreign Policy Setting In mid-1981 South Korea's foreign relations were still affected by the legacy of its historical interaction with foreigners and its geopolitically sensitive location. Traditionally Korea's proximity to China, the Soviet Union, and Japan and the rivalry among these powers for influence in Korea have conditioned the people to look on foreign countries with fear and suspicion but at the same time to seek the protection of one power against another (see The Yi Dynasty, ch. 1). The Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 and the division of the peninsula in 1945-seen from Korea as equally tragic events-reinforced long-standing Korean mistrust of foreign powers. The traditional self-image of Korea as a shrimp among warring whales is still very much a factor in the South Korean perception of its foreign policy milieu. The people continue to believe that because of the country's strategic position they could never again opt for the hermit-like seclusion of the earlier centuries. Rather it is generally believed that the peninsula will remain a focus of power rivalry among the four major powers-the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan. Relationships among these powers, not to mention their attitudes and policies toward the two Koreas, are matters of special concern to the South Korean government. Two of the powers, the Soviet Union and China, are not only allied with North Korea but also share common borders with North Korea. This contiguity is a source of apprehension so far as South Korea is concerned, being perceived as giving a distinct tactical advantage to North Korea in the event of renewed hostilities on the peninsula. It is asserted that North Korea could count on military and economic assistance from its communist neighbors within a matter of hours, whereas South Korea's only dependable ally-the United States-may not be able to respond to its need quickly enough, being separated by an ocean and furthermore having to satisfy first the internal process of constitutional consultation before troops are committed overseas. Such views, coupled with the ingrained South Korean distrust of North Korean intentions, are the root of South Korean insecurity. From Seoul's perspective the most effective way to guarantee its safety is to have the United States continue its military presence in the South and to faithfully honor its mutual defense treaty commitments. What the government calls "security diplomacy" continues to command top priority in the scheme of foreign relations. Foreign policy perceptions also are influenced strongly by economic factors, which in turn are seen as critically important for South Korea's security posture, let alone its political stability. Not endowed with adequate natural resources essential to industrialization, South Korea must depend heavily on external resources and overseas markets. The development of friendly relations with other countries has become an imperative. Economic diplomacy enjoys a priority no less important than that accorded to security diplomacy. Pragmatism, diversity, and the shedding of ideological can't have become evident in the 1970s as South Korea has stepped up its efforts to cultivate contacts with as many countries as circumstances would allow. Almost totally dependent on the Middle East for crude oil, the country has assiduously courted the goodwill of many Islamic nations. And for political reasons having to do with North Korea, it has also sought to develop ties with nonaligned nations whereas North Korea has attempted to have South Korea isolated as an unworthy member (allegedly because of Seoul's status as a United States colony). South Korea's practical diplomacy is evident in its posture toward the communist countries. Through the 1960s, to be sure, it had rejected diplomatic suppleness toward the communist nations as a sign of appeasement, but does so no longer. Rigidity has come to be viewed as self-defeating at a time when North Korea was actively seeking friends and contacts among noncommunist nations. In the South Korean perception of its external environment, North Korea remains a major determinant. Although neither side regards the other as a sovereign, foreign state and both sides continue to consider their relationship as internal rather than foreign, the existence of the two Koreas has a significant bearing on the conduct of foreign relations for both sides. In 1981 each country continued to depict the other as an aggressive and unpredictable entity. Seoul and P'yongyang each staked out their mutually exclusive claims as being the only lawful government of all the Korean people and thus the sole conscience and voice of the nation. Competition for foreign recognition and influence in the community of nations was intense and unrelenting. Fueled by enormous and continuing arms buildups on both sides, tensions only served to complicate the already strained inter-Korean relations. Long-standing distrust and enmity were at once the cause and effect of the seemingly insoluble Korean dilemma.