Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0302/03025.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 19KB | 294 lines

$Unique_ID{COW03025}
$Pretitle{360}
$Title{Romania
Romanian-Soviet Meetings in 1924}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Mihai Opritescu}
$Affiliation{Embassy of Romania, Washington DC}
$Subject{soviet
german
bukovina
germany
question
baltic
august
states
europe
state}
$Date{1990}
$Log{}
Country:     Romania
Book:        Romanian Military History
Author:      Mihai Opritescu
Affiliation: Embassy of Romania, Washington DC
Date:        1990

Romanian-Soviet Meetings in 1924

     On June 23, 1940, von Schulenburg, the German ambassador to Moscow
informed the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the Soviet determination
to settle the territorial problems with Romania. The German diplomat informed
that the USSR's territorial claims versus Romania extended, too, to Bukovina,
besides Bessarabia, a province inhabited, as it was explained, by
Ukraineans.

     The information took the German officials by surprise as they did not
expect at that time that the Soviets would rise the question of solving the
third point in the additional secret protocol dated August 23, 1939; "As far
as the south-eastern Europe is concerned the Soviet side stresses its
interest to Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political
disinterestedness vis-a-vis these territories". Moreover, the Soviets did
increase their territorial claims over Bukovina too, a territory which had not
been the subject to the Moscow "agreement", what made Hitler declare in a
highly violent temper: "I do not want to be taken by the Russians for an
imbecile". Germany, discontented that Russia had seized upon the Baltic
countries, firmly reacted; the note sent by the Ministry in Wilhelmstrasse to
Kremlin specified that the Soviet claims over Bukovina did represent a novelty
as in the past it belonged to the Austrian crown (then never to Russia - o.n.)
and it was "densely populated with German citizens".

     The Soviets, aware of their going beyond all limits, on June 26, 1940,
would confine their claims to northern Bukovina only, the town of Cernauti
(Czernowitz) included; that day at 12 o'clock p.m. the Soviet ultimatum was
handed to the Romanian minister to Moscow, Davidescu. The Romanian
authorities' surprise was even bigger than of the Germans' but Romania,
isolated herself, lacked of the German support, would eventually cede to the
pressures exerted upon her and would consent to the ultimatum. Then, besides a
predictable revendication, a novelty emerged: Bukovina. A natural question
arises: It was Bukovina an ultimatum at the last moment correlated to the
territorial changes of September 1939 or it was a long-run target?

     While researching the documents of the Vienna Romanian-Soviet conference
in March-April 1924 a sentence arrested our attention; it belonged to
Krestinski, the Soviet ambasador in his interpellation of April 2, 1924.
Reffering to the question of a plebiscite in Bessarabia the Soviet diplomat
made the following assertion: "It is only in this way that the Romanian
government could free from its finding fault with holding Bessarabia forcedly
as it equally holds Bukovina against the will of the Ukrainean peasants, in
their majority, living in this province". The same assertion could be also
found in the memorialistic notes of Gherman Pantea, a member of the Romanian
delegation to the conference held in Austria's capital city. The above quoted
statement is highly telling from two viewpoints at least: first, that in 1924
the Soviet side contested Romania's rights over Bukovina; secondly, that the
question of Bukovina is put in correlation with Bessarabia's appurtenance to
the Romanian State. Then the following question might be put: the assertion
about the majoritary presence of the Ukrainean peasants vis-a-vis the Romanian
population could be presented as a viable argument? Obviously the answer is
negative, although the argument was advanced, too, in the ultimative note of
June 1940. Then, which were the aims that determined the Soviet side make that
statement in 1924? An answer could be offered by the Brest-Litovsk
negotiations in 1917 when Austro-Hungary "completely exhausted... threatened
by famine pursuing to conclude peace" to give her "bread for the next day" did
make numerous concessions, among which the one stipulated in the secret
Austro-Ukrainean agreement envisaging that until July 15, 1918 Austro-Hungary
should unite the "territories of eastern Galicia whose population is Ukrainean
in majority from so far Galicia and joined Bukovine in a country of the
crown". In 1924 Moscow could not refer directly to the question of Bukovina
because the Brest-Litovsk peace had been contested by the Soviets, labelled as
"imperialist" and a direct contest of Bukovina's appurtenance to Romania would
have been equivalent to an action aimed at the revision of treaties at a time
when USSR was normalizing her relations with the Western countries.

     It is possible that the Soviet delegation to have used the Bukovine
argument in order to underline that Romania was also holding other territories
able to be contested through "ethnical" arguments, but their raising the
question of Bukovina, 16 years later, besides the question of Bessarabia makes
us believe that the Soviet diplomacy pursued the possible revendication of
Bukovina from a "multinational considered-State at a favourable time. Beyond
any doubts the favourable moment was June 1940 when Germany, while directing
her efforts westwards with a view of a decisive confrontation with Britain
after Frances's defeat, could not oppose the expansionist Soviet tendencies in
South-East Europe of course, as decisive argument in Bukovina's claiming was
the occupation, in September 1939, of the limitroph Polish territories. The
German guarantees granted to Romania in August 1940 showed a visible change
in the outlook of German diplomacy towards the Balkans, a change to arouse the
deep irritation of Kremlin which would be pointed out by Molotov during his
visit to Berlin in summer 1940; on that occasion he informed his German
collocutors, among others, about the Soviet intentions to get the rest of
Bukovina too. The Soviet hopes would not take shape entirely, but the
territorial modifications, north Bukovina included, of June 1940 would be
accomplished and sanctioned internationally through the Paris Treaty in 1947.

DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE BETWEEN AUGUST 1939 AND APRIL 1940

MIHAI RETEGAN

     On the 23rd of August 1944 the whole world was amazed to see the coup de
theatre of the Soviet-German pact. Shortly afterwards, some diplomatic
circles, which were generally well informed, discreetly commented on a new
joint coup of the two states that seemed to support irreconciliable
ideologies: the division of eastern Europe, from the Arctic Ocean to the Black
Sea, into spheres of influence according to a typically imperialist procedure.
The short, but intense Soviet-German negotiations, which developed at a speed
that alarmed the European diplomatic chancelleries, resulted in four items of
the agreement: "1. In case of a territorial and political change of the
territories belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania), Lithuania's northern border will be the border of the spheres of
interest both of Germany and of the U.S.S.R. In connection with this point
both sides admit Lithuania's interest in the Vilno territory. 2. In case of a
territorial and political change of the territories belonging to the Polish
State, the spheres of interest, both of Germany and the U.S.S.R., will be
delimited approximately by the Narev, Vistula and San rivers. The question
whether the interests of both sides make the maintenance of an independent
Polish State desirable and the way the borders of this state will be traced
can only be determined definitely during the subsequent political events.
Anyway, both governments will solve this question by friendly understanding.
3. As for south-eastern Europe, the Soviet side emphasizes its own interest in
Bessarabia. The German side states its total political