The Best of the Bureau/The_Best_of_the_Bureau_Bureau_Development_Inc._1992.iso/dp/0102/01028.txt

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$Unique_ID{bob01028}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Chapter 6C   McFarlane-North Alteration Discussions}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Various}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{mcfarlane
north
documents
representative
barnes
contras
letter
military
congress
nsc}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Title:       Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Author:      Various
Date:        1987

Chapter 6C   McFarlane-North Alteration Discussions

     On August 28, McFarlane and North began a series of lengthy meetings to
fashion a response to the Congressional inquiries.  According to a chronology
prepared by McFarlane, they met six times and spoke by phone four times
between August 28 and September 12, the date of the response to Representative
Barnes.  Although both McFarlane and North acknowledged to the Committees that
they discussed altering the documents, the two dispute the purpose of the
meetings.

     McFarlane maintained that the meetings, together with the document
review, constituted his investigation into North's activities, an
investigation, he said, that turned up no proof of illegal activities.  For
example, he asked North about allegations relating to fundraising.  According
to McFarlane, North responded that he had not solicited or encouraged
donations, that he merely told potential donors, "if you want to be helpful to
the Contras, go to Miami, they're in the phone book they have an office, and
do it yourselves."

     The two reviewed the documents and, according to McFarlane, North
explained that his memos were being misinterpreted.  For example, in one memo
North wrote that the FDN "has responded well to guidance on how to build a
staff," and that "all FDN commanders have been schooled" in guerrilla warfare
tactics.  McFarlane said North told him, contrary to any implication in the
document, that the guidance came not from him but from retired military
officers hired by the Contras.  As McFarlane related the events, North offered
to alter the documents and McFarlane gave him a tentative go-ahead. McFarlane
testified:

Well, as we went through them, he pointed out where my own interpretation was
just not accurate . . . and he just said, you are misreading my intent, and I
can make it reflect what I have said if this is ambiguous to you, and I said
all right, do that.

North shortly returned with a sample alteration.  McFarlane's testimony
indicates that the document North had altered was "FDN Military Operations,"
dated April 11, 1985.  The recommendation in the document, "that the current
donors be approached to provide $15-20 M additional between now and June 1,
1985" was replaced with a recommendation that "an effort must be made to
persuade the Congress to support the Contras."  North had asserted, according
to McFarlane, that the problem with the documents was one of interpretation
and that the changes would be slight.  McFarlane acknowledged that this
alteration left the document "grossly at variance with the original text."

     McFarlane testified that he did not replace any original NSC documents
with altered documents and did not instruct North to do so.  He said he took
with him when he resigned the pages North had altered and eventually destroyed
them.

     North's version of events is substantially different.  McFarlane, North
testified, brought the selected documents to his attention, "indicated that
there were problems with them, and told me to fix them."  This meant, he
testified, that he was to "remove references to certain activities, certain
undertakings on my behalf or his, and basically clean up the record."  The
documents, North acknowledged, "clearly indicated that there was a covert
operation being conducted in support of the Nicaraguan Resistance."  That is
why, North testified, McFarlane instructed him to alter them:

The documents, after all, demonstrated his [McFarlane's] knowledge and
cognizance over what I was doing, and he didn't want that.  He was cleaning up
the historical record.  He was trying to preserve the President from political
damage.  I don't blame him for that.

North testified that he did not abide by McFarlane's instruction until shortly
before his dismissal:  "I saw towards the end of my tenure that this list
still had not been cleaned up, and so I went and got the documents out of the
system and started revising the documents."

     Although the record is inconclusive on what exactly McFarlane and North
discussed at their meetings, it is undisputed that both the National Security
Adviser and one of his principal staff members considered altering NSC
documents.  They discussed this course after receiving requests from several
Members of Congress for access to precisely those types of documents.

Responses to Congress:  The Denials

     Within days of his document review and discussions with North, McFarlane
sent the first of his responses to Congress.  In addition to the broad
assurance that the NSC staff was complying with the "letter and the spirit" of
the Boland Amendment, the responses contain specific denials of allegations
that the NSC staff had provided fundraising or military support to the
Nicaraguan resistance.

Fundraising

     McFarlane's September 11 response to Representative Barnes stated:  "None
of us has solicited funds, [or] facilitated contacts for prospective potential
donors . . .

     In his October 7 letter, McFarlane replied as follows to a written
question from Representative Hamilton:

     Mr. Hamilton:  The Nicaraguan freedom fighters, in the last two months,
are reported by the U.S. Embassy, Tegucigalpa, to have received a large influx
of funds and equipment with some estimates of their value reaching as high as
$10 million or more.  Do you know where they have obtained this assistance?

     Mr. McFarlane:  No.

     In fact, according to his own testimony, McFarlane not only knew how the
Contras obtained financial assistance, he personally facilitated the main
donation to the Contras:

     Q: . . .  I was referring to Country Two and the fact that the actual
donors had, as I understand it, Country Two was the actual donors -

     A:  Yes.

     Q:  And that you had not only facilitated contacts, but you had
facilitated the actual contribution.

     A:  I will accept that, yes.

     Furthermore, according to Assistant Secretary of State Gaston Sigur and
North, McFarlane was aware of Sigur's efforts to obtain a donation from a Far
Eastern country - efforts that took place while the responses to Congress were
being prepared.  North, of course, was aware of that approach.  Indeed, on
August 28, the day he and McFarlane had their first lengthy meeting to discuss
the Congressional inquiries, North reassured an official from that country
that the United States would be grateful if his country made a contribution to
the Contras.  The country responded with a $1 million gift.

     Also, in his letter of September 12, Representative Hamilton asked:

Has Colonel North been the focal point within the NSC staff for handling
contacts with private fundraising groups, such as the World Anti-Communist
League and the Council for World Freedom headed by retired Major General John
K. Singlaub?

     McFarlane replied, "No."  In fact, however, North had been dealing with
Singlaub on fundraising, as the December 4, 1984, North-to-McFarlane memo
showed.  As North told the Committees, he "certainly saw General Singlaub a
lot related to support for the Nicaraguan Resistance."

Military Assistance

In his September 5 letter, McFarlane stated:

At no time did we encourage military activities.  Our emphasis on a political
rather than a military solution to the situation was as close as we ever came
to influencing the military aspect of their struggle.

     North was heavily involved in the military aspect of the Contra struggle.
He testified that this statement was false.  In addition to helping arm the
Contras, and to providing intelligence and cash to Contra leaders, North also,
beginning in the summer of 1985, coordi