$Unique_ID{bob01028} $Pretitle{} $Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report Chapter 6C McFarlane-North Alteration Discussions} $Subtitle{} $Author{Various} $Affiliation{} $Subject{mcfarlane north documents representative barnes contras letter military congress nsc} $Date{1987} $Log{} Title: Iran-Contra Affair: The Report Author: Various Date: 1987 Chapter 6C McFarlane-North Alteration Discussions On August 28, McFarlane and North began a series of lengthy meetings to fashion a response to the Congressional inquiries. According to a chronology prepared by McFarlane, they met six times and spoke by phone four times between August 28 and September 12, the date of the response to Representative Barnes. Although both McFarlane and North acknowledged to the Committees that they discussed altering the documents, the two dispute the purpose of the meetings. McFarlane maintained that the meetings, together with the document review, constituted his investigation into North's activities, an investigation, he said, that turned up no proof of illegal activities. For example, he asked North about allegations relating to fundraising. According to McFarlane, North responded that he had not solicited or encouraged donations, that he merely told potential donors, "if you want to be helpful to the Contras, go to Miami, they're in the phone book they have an office, and do it yourselves." The two reviewed the documents and, according to McFarlane, North explained that his memos were being misinterpreted. For example, in one memo North wrote that the FDN "has responded well to guidance on how to build a staff," and that "all FDN commanders have been schooled" in guerrilla warfare tactics. McFarlane said North told him, contrary to any implication in the document, that the guidance came not from him but from retired military officers hired by the Contras. As McFarlane related the events, North offered to alter the documents and McFarlane gave him a tentative go-ahead. McFarlane testified: Well, as we went through them, he pointed out where my own interpretation was just not accurate . . . and he just said, you are misreading my intent, and I can make it reflect what I have said if this is ambiguous to you, and I said all right, do that. North shortly returned with a sample alteration. McFarlane's testimony indicates that the document North had altered was "FDN Military Operations," dated April 11, 1985. The recommendation in the document, "that the current donors be approached to provide $15-20 M additional between now and June 1, 1985" was replaced with a recommendation that "an effort must be made to persuade the Congress to support the Contras." North had asserted, according to McFarlane, that the problem with the documents was one of interpretation and that the changes would be slight. McFarlane acknowledged that this alteration left the document "grossly at variance with the original text." McFarlane testified that he did not replace any original NSC documents with altered documents and did not instruct North to do so. He said he took with him when he resigned the pages North had altered and eventually destroyed them. North's version of events is substantially different. McFarlane, North testified, brought the selected documents to his attention, "indicated that there were problems with them, and told me to fix them." This meant, he testified, that he was to "remove references to certain activities, certain undertakings on my behalf or his, and basically clean up the record." The documents, North acknowledged, "clearly indicated that there was a covert operation being conducted in support of the Nicaraguan Resistance." That is why, North testified, McFarlane instructed him to alter them: The documents, after all, demonstrated his [McFarlane's] knowledge and cognizance over what I was doing, and he didn't want that. He was cleaning up the historical record. He was trying to preserve the President from political damage. I don't blame him for that. North testified that he did not abide by McFarlane's instruction until shortly before his dismissal: "I saw towards the end of my tenure that this list still had not been cleaned up, and so I went and got the documents out of the system and started revising the documents." Although the record is inconclusive on what exactly McFarlane and North discussed at their meetings, it is undisputed that both the National Security Adviser and one of his principal staff members considered altering NSC documents. They discussed this course after receiving requests from several Members of Congress for access to precisely those types of documents. Responses to Congress: The Denials Within days of his document review and discussions with North, McFarlane sent the first of his responses to Congress. In addition to the broad assurance that the NSC staff was complying with the "letter and the spirit" of the Boland Amendment, the responses contain specific denials of allegations that the NSC staff had provided fundraising or military support to the Nicaraguan resistance. Fundraising McFarlane's September 11 response to Representative Barnes stated: "None of us has solicited funds, [or] facilitated contacts for prospective potential donors . . . In his October 7 letter, McFarlane replied as follows to a written question from Representative Hamilton: Mr. Hamilton: The Nicaraguan freedom fighters, in the last two months, are reported by the U.S. Embassy, Tegucigalpa, to have received a large influx of funds and equipment with some estimates of their value reaching as high as $10 million or more. Do you know where they have obtained this assistance? Mr. McFarlane: No. In fact, according to his own testimony, McFarlane not only knew how the Contras obtained financial assistance, he personally facilitated the main donation to the Contras: Q: . . . I was referring to Country Two and the fact that the actual donors had, as I understand it, Country Two was the actual donors - A: Yes. Q: And that you had not only facilitated contacts, but you had facilitated the actual contribution. A: I will accept that, yes. Furthermore, according to Assistant Secretary of State Gaston Sigur and North, McFarlane was aware of Sigur's efforts to obtain a donation from a Far Eastern country - efforts that took place while the responses to Congress were being prepared. North, of course, was aware of that approach. Indeed, on August 28, the day he and McFarlane had their first lengthy meeting to discuss the Congressional inquiries, North reassured an official from that country that the United States would be grateful if his country made a contribution to the Contras. The country responded with a $1 million gift. Also, in his letter of September 12, Representative Hamilton asked: Has Colonel North been the focal point within the NSC staff for handling contacts with private fundraising groups, such as the World Anti-Communist League and the Council for World Freedom headed by retired Major General John K. Singlaub? McFarlane replied, "No." In fact, however, North had been dealing with Singlaub on fundraising, as the December 4, 1984, North-to-McFarlane memo showed. As North told the Committees, he "certainly saw General Singlaub a lot related to support for the Nicaraguan Resistance." Military Assistance In his September 5 letter, McFarlane stated: At no time did we encourage military activities. Our emphasis on a political rather than a military solution to the situation was as close as we ever came to influencing the military aspect of their struggle. North was heavily involved in the military aspect of the Contra struggle. He testified that this statement was false. In addition to helping arm the Contras, and to providing intelligence and cash to Contra leaders, North also, beginning in the summer of 1985, coordinated the efforts to set up a resupply operation to provide lethal and nonlethal supplies to troops inside Nicaragua. Several weeks before the letters were drafted, North asked Secord to set up the operation, and he called on Ambassador Lewis Tambs to facilitate the construction of an airfield for refueling resupply aircraft. Yet, McFarlane wrote to Representative Hamilton on October 7: Lieutenant Colonel North did not use his influence to facilitate the movement of supplies to the resistance. North acknowledged that this statement was false. It is unclear whether McFarlane was fully aware of North's activities. McFarlane testified he was not. But the documents McFarlane reviewed and about which he was concerned shortly before drafting the first response to Congress showed that North repeatedly attempted to influence the military aspect of the Contras' struggle. Furthermore, McFarlane specifically denied in his October 7 letter to Representative Hamilton that North had provided the Contras "tactical advice": The allegation that Lieutenant Colonel North offered the resistance tactical advice and direction is, as I indicated in my briefing, patently untrue. North acknowledged to the Committees that although he never "sat down in the battlefield and offered direct tactical advice . . . I certainly did have a number of discussions with the Resistance about military activities, yes, to include the broader strategy for the Southern front and an Atlantic front and an internal front." And McFarlane testified: "I felt it was likely that an officer of the qualifications and excellence of Col. North, when he was down visiting in Central America, probably did extend advice." Indeed, McFarlane admitted in his testimony that he felt in 1985 that "it was likely" that North had gone "beyond the law" on giving military advice to the Contras. He testified: "But without certain evidence of it, not being able to disapprove it, I accepted that [the denials McFarlane said North gave him] as sufficient grounds for saying it as truth, and I believe that I was wrong to do so. But that is why I sent it." McFarlane maintained that he believed at the time that such advice was not the "central concern" of Congress. "It seemed to me that was inconsequential to the outcome of the conflict, and probably not in the eyes of Congress a serious matter," he said. Representative Barnes' letter, however, shows that one of his main concerns was about reports that North had provided "'tactical influence' on rebel military operations." In addition, Representative Hamilton, in his first letter, expressed an interest "in actions that supported the military activity of the contras." Each of the other letters from Congress asks McFarlane to respond to specific allegations about NSC military support for the Contras. In any case, McFarlane in his letters offered no such explanation, merely a flat denial. Finally, despite his assertion in his letters to Congress, McFarlane himself influenced the Contras' military struggle. The $32 million obtained with his help from Country 2 enabled the Resistance to purchase weapons to continue fighting. The April 11, 1985, memo from North describing how the funds were expended stated clearly that the donation was being used to purchase lethal supplies. McFarlane's Meetings with Members The denials McFarlane made in his letters were repeated in face-to-face meetings with Members of Congress. On September 5, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Durenberger and Vice Chairman Leahy questioned McFarlane in an hour-long private briefing. At the start of their meeting, McFarlane showed the two Senators a copy of the letter he would send to Representative Hamilton that day. McFarlane assured Senators Durenberger and Leahy that "no law had been broken," and that "there was no intent to circumvent restrictions Congress placed on aid to the Nicaraguan Resistance." Asserting that he had grilled North on his involvement with supporters of the Resistance, McFarlane said he was confident that "[N]o NSC staff member either personally assisted the Resistance or solicited outside assistance on their behalf." Senator Leahy described the meeting in a letter written shortly thereafter: Mr. McFarlane said that the officer [North] had frequently received calls from persons wishing to donate funds, and that he referred them to the Contra leaders themselves. He insisted that the officer never solicited funds, encouraged donations or initiated contacts with potential donors. He further denied that the officer, in several personal meetings with Contra leaders, both in Washington and in Central America, ever offered military advice. The officer's authorized role, Mr. McFarlane said, was to assure the Contras during the time of the Congressional aid cutoff of the President's continued moral support . . . . McFarlane concluded by telling the Senators, "I can't believe everything everyone says, but I do believe Ollie." After the session, Senator Durenberger told a reporter that he felt McFarlane was candid about his knowledge, but that questions about U.S. Government support for the Contras remained: So we came away from the meeting feeling that from Bud McFarlane we're getting what he believes to be the situation with regard to his staff. Are we satisfied that this sort of concludes the matter and that no one in any way involved was directing the effort? No, you can't be satisfied. On September 10, McFarlane met with Representative Hamilton and other Members of the House Intelligence Committee. As Representative Hamilton later summarized the meeting in a letter to a colleague, McFarlane told the Committee Members that President Reagan had made clear that the entire executive branch had to comply with the Boland Amendment. McFarlane said he had conducted a thorough investigation into allegations made about the NSC staff and concluded that North had not "given military advice of any kind to the Contras," nor had he "solicited, accepted, transmitted or in any other way been involved with funds for the Contras." The House Intelligence Committee Chairman accepted the denials of the National Security Adviser. At the close of the session, Mr. Hamilton told McFarlane, "I for one am willing to take you at your word." McFarlane-Barnes Document Dispute In his first response to Representative Barnes on September 12, McFarlane ignored the Congressman's request for documents. A PROF note to Paul Thompson on September 20 indicated that McFarlane believed he had successfully sidestepped the document issue: "Now that we have the Barnes letter behind us you can return the Contra papers to Ollie please." Ten days later, however, Representative Barnes renewed his document request. In a letter to McFarlane dated September 30, 1985, the Congressman wrote: I am sure you understand that the pertinent documents must be provided if the Committee is to be able to fulfill its obligation to adopt legislation governing the conduct of United States foreign policy and to oversee the implementation of that policy under the law. Congressman Barnes went on to explain why he felt strongly about his Committee's need to review the documents: It may be helpful if I spell out more clearly the interest of the Committee. The Committee retains its concern about possible violations of federal law by members of the NSC staff. However, that is not the Committee's only - or even primary - concern, given that the enforcement of the law is an Executive Branch function. It is the Committee's responsibility, however, to conduct oversight of laws that limit the activities of the Executive Branch under the Committee's jurisdiction, and to reach judgments as to whether changes in the law are indicated by those activities. Even if the Committee determined that the activities of the NSC staff on this matter were entirely legal, the Committee might still determine that changes in the law were necessary. I am sure it is obvious to you that the Committee cannot make those judgments unless it has in its possession all information, including memorandums and other documents, pertaining to any contact between the NSC staff and Nicaraguan rebel leaders. I would hereby renew my request for such information, both oral and documentary. Thus, the Barnes letter of September 30 emphasized that Congress was entitled to know about the NSC's efforts to support the Contras, even if those efforts were legal. Once apprised of the facts, Congress would determine whether additional legislation was required, including closing any loophole in the Boland Amendment that the NSC staff might have claimed. Representative Barnes and McFarlane met at the White House on October 17. The day before the meeting, NSC General Counsel Paul Thompson prepared a memo for McFarlane suggesting that Representative Barnes should be told that the National Security Adviser had no legal authority to turn over the documents. North's actions, Thompson wrote, were at the National Security Adviser's direction "in furtherance of the President's initiatives." Documents pertaining to North's actions in carrying out the President's instructions "are internal and deliberative in nature and are furthermore not NSC agency documents. As Presidential advisory papers, they fall under the dominion of the President and are no longer subject to your disposition." At the meeting with Congressman Barnes, McFarlane, referring to a stack of documents on his desk, explained that a document search had been made and that McFarlane had selected documents relevant to Congressional inquiries. He told Congressman Barnes he would not permit the documents to leave his office but would allow the Congressman to read them there. McFarlane acknowledged that he made the offer knowing Representative Barnes would likely refuse it: Q: And I take it - it was part of your thinking that if a busy Congressman came down to your office and saw a substantial stack of documents, and you were having a short meeting [McFarlane had budgeted one hour for the session], it was very unlikely that he would ask to read through the documents from one end to the other? A: I think that is true, yes. Indeed, Representative Barnes deemed the offer not to be serious. He understood McFarlane to imply that the documents on the desk were not all the documents but only the ones McFarlane had concluded were "relevant." This, Barnes felt, "was not an adequate way to ascertain the truth of the allegations." Furthermore, Representative Barnes believed that prohibiting staff from reviewing the documents would result in an incomplete investigation: "[I]n my experience the only way you can do a good investigation is to compare documents - one to another - and to analyze these with staff who have the time and background to work at putting them in context." McFarlane's offer, therefore, "didn't seem like a serious proposal." On October 29, Representative Barnes wrote McFarlane again expressing his view that the procedures mandated by McFarlane were "inadequate." He requested that McFarlane turn the documents over to the House Intelligence Committee, thereby assuring that the classified materials would be appropriately handled. Representative Barnes wrote: "I believe that this proposal would surely resolve any concerns that the Administration might have about the security of the information, while at the same time fulfilling the responsibilities of the House." This was the last correspondence between McFarlane and Representative Barnes on this issue. North, however, tried unsuccessfully to convince McFarlane to send one more letter - a response North maintained he would have preferred to send at the start. In the draft letter, McFarlane refused outright to turn over documents claiming that they were "internal Presidential documents regarding sensitive relations with other governments." The executive branch, the letter said, "must abide by its commitments to other governments not to compromise sensitive information." The letter stated that disclosure of the documents sought by Barnes would "adversely effect the national security of the United States and endanger our citizens."