The Best of the Bureau/The_Best_of_the_Bureau_Bureau_Development_Inc._1992.iso/dp/0102/01027.txt

Text File | 1992-08-07 | 26KB | 474 lines

$Unique_ID{bob01027}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Chapter 6B   Casey Briefing of Senate Intelligence Committee}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Various}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{north
memo
mcfarlane
contras
nsc
staff
military
support
intelligence
operations}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Title:       Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Author:      Various
Date:        1987

Chapter 6B   Casey Briefing of Senate Intelligence Committee

     In late 1984 and early 1985, North sent CIA intelligence information to
the Contras through Robert Owen.  The CIA Chief of the Central American Task
Force (C/CATF), who ordinarily passed that information to North, denied to
these Committees that he knew intelligence was being transmitted by North via
Owen to the Contras.  On April 17, 1985, CIA Director Casey, accompanied by
Deputy Secretary of State Dam, briefed the Senate Intelligence Committee on
intelligence operations in Nicaragua.  Casey told Committee members that,
apart from intelligence which might jeopardize the lives of Americans, "we've
kept out of any intelligence exchange . . . .  We haven't been providing
intelligence."

     Prior to the date of the briefing, North had obtained Richard Secord's
assistance to purchase weapons for the Contras with the funds donated from
Country 2.  North testified that Casey suggested Secord for this purpose.
However, Casey assured the Members that "over the past year, we strictly
honored in practice and in spirit the Congressionally mandated restrictions on
military aid to the Contras."  He testified:

     CASEY:  [W]e have carefully kept away from anything which would suggest
involvement in their activities which have been carried on quite effectively
and with considerable success in getting support and getting weapons and
getting ammunition on their own.  They've gone into the international arms
markets.  We know that from lots of sources that they were buying things from
other countries and bringing in ammunition and been raising money.  But we
don't have any idea as to the quantity, what they got in the pipeline or -

     CHAIRMAN:  That's all I wanted to establish.

Deflecting Media Inquiries

     By June 1985, reporters were close to establishing a link between the NSC
staff and Contra support.  A June 3 memo from North to Poindexter illustrates
North's efforts to discourage reporters from pursuing the story.  North
boasted in the memo that at his request, Adolfo Calero told Alfonso Chardy of
the Miami Herald "that if he (Chardi) [sic] printed any derogatory comments
about the FDN or its funding sources that Chardi [sic] would never again be
allowed to visit FDN bases or travel with their units."  North added:  "At no
time did my name or an NSC connection arise during their discussion."

     North and retired Major General John K. Singlaub had already devised a
plan to divert press attention away from the NSC staffs Contra operation,
which by then was being coordinated under North by Richard Secord, Richard
Gadd, and their employees.  North encouraged Singlaub to court the media,
realizing that, as Singlaub put it, "If I [Singlaub] had high visibility, I
might be the lightning rod and take the attention away from himself [North]
and others who were involved in the covert side of support."

     The plan seems to have had some success.  Shortly after his discussion
with North, Singlaub was the subject of a long article in The Washington Post
connecting him to support for the Contras, and in the coming months, he would
be featured in virtually all the major newspapers.  Although North himself
soon would be the subject of press reports, Secord was not mentioned in the
media until mid-1986, and details of North's resupply operation were not
revealed until the plane carrying Eugene Hasenfus was shot down in October
1986.

June-August 1985:  Press Reports on NSC Staff and Contra Support

     By April, third-country funding had not only sustained the Contras but
had "allowed the growth of the Resistance from 9,500 personnel in June 1984 to
over 16,000 today - all with arms," according to an April 11, 1985, memo from
North to McFarlane.  During May, according to a May 31 memo, "the Nicaraguan
Resistance recorded significant advances in their struggle against the
Sandinistas."

     In June, reporters first linked the Contras' success with North.  By
mid-August, most major news organizations had published or broadcast reports
on this "influential and occasionally controversial character in the
implementation of the Reagan Administration's foreign policy."

     News stories in June 1985 explored the sources of Contra funding.  On
June 10, the Associated Press distributed an article by Robert Parry
suggesting that the White House had lent support to private fundraising
efforts.  The article named North as the White House contact for such efforts,
which according to the report, revolved around John Singlaub.

     Two weeks later, the Miami Herald reported that the Administration
"helped organize" and continued to support "supposedly spontaneous" private
fundraising efforts.  The article quoted extensively from ousted Nicaraguan
Democratic Force (FDN) leader Edgar Chamorro, who described a trip by North
and a CIA officer to a Contra base in the spring of 1984.  North and the CIA
officer assured the rebels, according to the article, that the White House
would "find a way" to keep the movement alive.  Neither North nor the CIA
officer specifically promised private aid, although "it was clear that was
their intent," Chamorro was quoted as saying.

     In August, reports in The New York Times, The Washington Post, and other
major newspapers asserted that White House support for the Contras involved
more than fundraising.  Oliver North had given the Contras "direct military
advice" on rebel attacks, exercising "tactical influence" on military
operations, The New York Times reported.  The newspaper reported that North
had also "facilitated the supplying of logistical help" to the Contras,
filling in where the CIA could no longer help.  The information was attributed
to anonymous "administration officials."

Denials

     The day after this story appeared, President Reagan responded to the
allegations.  "[W]e're not violating any laws," the President said as he
signed legislation providing $27 million in humanitarian aid for the Contras
and authorizing the exchange of intelligence.  In a statement released later
that day, the President added that he would "continue to work with Congress to
carry out the program as effectively as possible and take care that the law be
faithfully executed."

     The National Security Adviser made his first comments on the allegations
about North in an interview with The Washington Post.  In an August 11
article, McFarlane said he had told his staff to comply with the Boland
Amendment.  "We could not provide any support," he said, but he also stated
that the NSC staff could and did maintain contact with the Contras.

Summer and Fall August 1985:  Congressional Inquiries

     In the third week of August, Representative Michael Barnes, Chairman of
the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and Representative Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman of the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, separately wrote the President's
National Security Adviser, inquiring into NSC support for the Contras.
Representative Barnes' letter, dated August 16, cited press accounts as the
cause of concern about NSC staff support for the Contras. The reports, Barnes
wrote, "raise serious questions regarding the violation of the letter and
spirit of U.S. law."  The letter summarized the focus of his inquiry: Whether
the NSC staff provided "tactical influence on rebel military operations;"
whether the NSC staff was engaged in "facilitating contacts for prospective
financial donors;" and whether the NSC staff was involved in "otherwise
organizing and coordinating rebel efforts."

     Barnes made clear his view that