home
***
CD-ROM
|
disk
|
FTP
|
other
***
search
/
The Best of the Bureau
/
The_Best_of_the_Bureau_Bureau_Development_Inc._1992.iso
/
dp
/
0102
/
01026.txt
< prev
next >
Wrap
Text File
|
1992-08-07
|
22KB
|
390 lines
$Unique_ID{bob01026}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Chapter 6A Keeping 'USG Fingerprints' Off: 1984-1985}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Various}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{contras
country
congress
funding
cia
mcfarlane
casey
administration
countries
intelligence}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Title: Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Author: Various
Date: 1987
Chapter 6A Keeping "USG Fingerprints" Off: 1984-1985
["USG fingerprints" is North's term used in two PROF notes to Poindexter
dealing with the possible disclosure of the U.S. Government link to the Costra
operation. (Exhibits OLN-131 and OLN-307, Hearings, 100-7, Part III.)]
In October 1984, the President signed into law a version of the Boland
Amendment barring the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense,
and "any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence
activities" from providing support to Contra military activities. Explaining
the statute on the floor of the House of Representatives immediately before
its passage, Representative Edward P. Boland, then Chairman, of the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, was clear about the legislation's
intent: the provision "ends U.S. support for the war in Nicaragua." National
Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane acknowledged that intent: "the Boland
Amendment governed our actions," he told these Committees. Although Congress
eventually approved humanitarian aid for the Contras and authorized
intelligence sharing, the full prohibition on lethal support remained in
effect until October 1986.
Despite the Boland Amendment's prohibition, U.S. support for the
Nicaraguan Resistance continued. As set forth fully in Chapters 2 and 3,
members of the National Security Council staff - with help from officials of
other Government agencies - supervised a covert operation supporting the
Contras. They provided weapons and military intelligence to the Resistance
and resupplied troops inside Nicaragua, using funds raised from foreign
countries, private citizens, and ultimately the Iranian arms sales. They did
so despite the unambiguous intent of Congress that the U.S. Government,
including the NSC staff, could not aid the Contras' military effort.
Secrecy, therefore, was vital to the success of the Contra operation.
Disclosure of U.S. support, Oliver North wrote to John Poindexter in May 1986,
"could well become a political embarrassment for the President and you."
Moreover, disclosure would surely doom the project. Poindexter told these
Committees: "It was very likely if it became obvious what we were doing that
Members of Congress would have maybe tightened it [the law] up. I didn't want
that to happen."
But just as secrecy was vital to the operation's success, even limited
success jeopardized that secrecy. As the Contras continued to purchase
supplies and equipment despite the cut-off of aid, Congress and the media
inquired, inevitably, about the sources of Resistance support and funding.
Officials involved in the Contra support operation took every precaution
to ensure that the project remained secret. They withheld the facts from some
Administration officials who spoke out frequently on U.S. policy in Central
America, forcing them to mislead Congress and the American people. They
discouraged reporters from pursuing the link between the NSC staff and the
Contras. And they responded to direct inquiries with half truths and false
statements.
1983-1984: Suspicions, and the "Casey Accords"
Even before the full-prohibition Boland Amendment was enacted in October
1984, Members of Congress were concerned that the Administration was not
providing sufficient information about the covert program in support of the
Nicaraguan Resistance.
In April 1983, Senator Daniel Moynihan, Vice Chairman of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, spoke of a "crisis of confidence" between
Congress and the intelligence agencies running the operation. A year later,
Committee Chairman Barry Goldwater rebuked the CIA in the wake of the
revelations related to Nicaragua harbor mining. He wrote to CIA Director
William Casey: "[W]e were not given the information we were entitled to
receive." Expressing the sense of many in Congress, Goldwater said at an
Intelligence Committee hearing: "We cannot play guessing games with the
intelligence community if the relationship between legislative and executive
branches is to work."
After the mining incident became public in April 1984, Director Casey was
called before an extraordinary secret session of the Senate - 60 Members were
present - to explain the failure to consult adequately ahead of time. The
Director apologized at the session, and promised a new spirit of cooperation.
The promise would soon be formalized in what became known as the "Casey
Accords," an agreement between the CIA and the Senate Intelligence Committee
on consultation guidelines for covert operations. Under the agreement, the CIA
would share explanatory material outlining the exact nature, goals, and risks
of the covert operation. The CIA would also give prior notice of any
"significant, anticipated intelligence activity," even if the planned activity
was part of an ongoing covert operation.
The accords reflected the recognition that cooperation and forthrightness
on covert activities were essential in the relationship between the Executive
and Congress. But the subsequent actions of Casey and members of the NSC
staff did not reflect that recognition.
1984: Testimony Before Congress on Third-Country Assistance
In December 1983, the President signed into law legislation limiting
funding for the Contras in fiscal year 1984 to $24 million. The limit was the
result of a compromise between the House, which hoped to curtail support for
the Contras, and the Senate, which favored continuing the aid. Explaining the
compromise on the floor of the House, Representative Boland said the $24
million, which would likely run out by June 1984, represented a "cap on
funding from whatever source." Representative J. Kenneth Robinson, the
ranking Republican on the House Intelligence Committee, said that the $24
million compromise meant "no additional funding could be made available" for
the Nicaraguan Resistance "unless additional authorization and/or
appropriations are approved by both Houses."
The Administration, however, sought funding for the Contras beyond the
$24 million appropriation. On several occasions in 1984, officials tried to
obtain aid for the Contras from third-country sources. Those attempts
occurred as early as February, when the Administration began to suspect that
Congress was not likely to approve supplemental funding for the Contras when
the $24 million ran out. Shortly thereafter, McFarlane sought to obtain
equipment, materiel and training for the Contras from Country l.
In a March 27, 1984, memo, CIA Director Casey urged McFarlane to proceed
with his plans to obtain aid from Country 1, and told him that the CIA was
working along a second track to obtain assistance from that Country. Casey
added in the memo that the CIA also was exploring "the procurement of
assistance from [Country 6]." That country had "indicated" that it might make
"some equipment and training available" to the Contras. Country 1 rejected
McFarlane's approach, and the advance to Country 6 was called off, in part
because of the revelations in April relating to the Nicaraguan harbor mining.
As McFarlane testified, those revelations left a "zero probability" that
Congress would provide supplemental funding for the Contras, "and no amount of
wringing our hands was going to change that." In May or June, the National
Security Adviser obtained a $1 million-a-month donation from Country 2, and
informed the President, who expressed "satisfaction and pleasure" with the
gift. McFarlane testified that he also shared the news with the Vice
President.
McFarlane informed the Pres