The Best of the Bureau/The_Best_of_the_Bureau_Bureau_Development_Inc._1992.iso/dp/0102/01025.txt

Text File | 1992-08-07 | 20KB | 343 lines

$Unique_ID{bob01025}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Chapter 5B   Reward for a Friend}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Various}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{north
prince
fbi
miller
agent
official
terrell
department
revell
contras}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Title:       Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Author:      Various
Date:        1987

Chapter 5B   Reward for a Friend

     In one episode, the NSC staff undertook to persuade the Department of
Justice to "reward" someone characterized by North as a "friend" who had been
convicted of plotting to assassinate a Central American leader.  In that
episode, the NSC staff's motive appears to have been a desire to prevent
disclosure of certain questionable activities.

     According to a North PROF to Poindexter, the "friend" was an official in
a Central American country with whom North, the U.S. Ambassador, General
Gorman, and Dewey Clarridge arranged for bases for the Contras as well as
overall logistics, training and support.

     This official and other plotters were indicted prior to 1986 for
conspiracy to assassinate a Central American leader.  Pursuant to a plea
agreement, the official pleaded guilty to two felony counts which carried a
significant maximum sentence; and he was later sentenced to two shorter,
though still significant, prison terms to run concurrently.

     At the sentencing hearing, U.S. military officials assigned to the State
Department testified on behalf of the official.  The court provided that the
official could be immediately eligible for parole if so determined by the
Parole Commission and recommended he serve his sentence at a minimum security
institution.  Meanwhile, Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams promised
the official's government that he would look into the case.

     In a September 17, 1986 PROF message to Poindexter, North noted that the
official was under the impression he would serve only a matter of days or
weeks at the minimum security institution and then be released.  North was
concerned that once the official realized he was really going to serve a long
sentence, "he will break his longstanding silence about the Nic[araguan]
Resistance and other sensitive operations."  North noted the next morning he
would meet with Oliver Revell, Steven Trott, and Elliott Abrams to explore the
possibility of a pardon, clemency, deportation, or sentence reduction.  The
objective of this exercise, as North put it, was "to keep [the official] from
feeling like he was lied to in legal process and start spilling the beans."
Admiral Poindexter responded:  "You may advise all concerned that the
President will want to be as helpful as possible to settle this matter."

     Representatives of different agencies of the Administration met to
discuss the request for leniency.  Deputy Assistant Attorney General Mark
Richard attended a meeting where Defense Department representatives argued on
the official's behalf.  Richard concluded their reasons were not sufficiently
specific.  No one ever gave a detailed account of what the official had
actually done for the United States to deserve leniency.  He was always simply
described as a "friend of the United States."  The State Department agreed
with the Department of Justice that the official was a terrorist and should be
punished.  The CIA did not express an opinion.

     At a subsequent meeting in North's office on September 24, 1986, North
tried to convince Trott, Revell, C/CATF (CIA) and James Michel, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State, that the official was only tangentially involved
in the assassination plot and deserved leniency.  Revell disagreed.  North
asked them to consider recommending a minimum security correctional
institution rather than the federal prison to which the official had been
assigned, despite the court's recommendation, by the Bureau of Prisons.

     In early October, North tried again with the Department of Justice, this
time with help from General Gorman and Dewey Clarridge.  Also at this meeting
were Mark Richard (filling in for Trott), Revell, and Elliott Abrams.  North,
Gorman and Clarridge all argued for leniency for the official, explaining only
that the official was a "friend of the government" who was "always ready to
assist us" and "was helpful in accommodating our military."  Abrams agreed
that the U.S. should do what it could for the official, thereby reversing the
State Department's earlier position.  According to Richard, he offered to meet
with others in the Department and determine whether the Department would
oppose the transfer of the official to the minimum security institution.

     North's contemporaneous account of that meeting portrayed the Justice
Department as more committed to assisting the official.  In a PROF note to
Poindexter, North indicated that, after the last co-conspirator was convicted
and sentenced, the Department of Justice would have the defense attorney file
a motion to reduce the sentence to time served and arrange to have General
Gorman brief the court in camera on the equities.  North said Trott and Revell
believed this should result in the release and deportation of the official.
North suggested that the official's attorney should be discreetly briefed to
mollify the concerns of those involved that the official "will start singing
songs nobody wants to hear."

     Richard soon determined that neither Trott nor Kellner had any objection
to redesignating the official to the minimum security institution, as
contemplated in the original court's recommendation and made the appropriate
arrangements with the Bureau of Prisons.

The Fake Prince

     As explained briefly in the previous chapter, an individual named Kevin
Kattke contacted North in March or April 1985 about a Saudi "prince" who
proposed donating to the Contras approximately $14 million in proceeds derived
from the sale of the prince's oil.  North referred the "prince" to Richard
Miller. Miller and the "prince" met regularly over the course of the next
several months.  The "prince" sought Miller's help in marketing the oil,
agreeing to pay Miller $1 million of the profits earned.  Miller kept North
regularly apprised of his dealings with the "prince", which eventually also
included both a proposed gold transaction and assistance in freeing the
hostages held in Lebanon.  Indeed, Miller saw himself as "an agent working on
[North's] behalf" in connection with these activities.  Yet while North was
attempting to develop the "prince" as an asset in both his Iran and Contra
initiatives, the FBI was investigating the "prince" for bank fraud.

     From the start, Miller had misgivings about the bona fides of the
"prince."  He did library research without much success in an effort to
establish the "prince's" authenticity.  According to Miller, North told him
that the CIA had confirmed both the "prince's" identity and the veracity of
the "prince's" information about the hostages.

     Early in their relationship, the "prince" told Miller that he had
information about the hostages in Lebanon that would be useful to U.S. efforts
to locate and extricate the hostages.  At North's suggestion, Miller related
this information to the Hostage Location Task Force, representatives of which
met with and interviewed the "prince" in Houston. Miller continued to inform
North of the hostage-related information conveyed by the "prince."

     In July 1985, North asked a DEA agent (Agent 1) - who was detailed to
North in connection with hostage release efforts - to accompany Miller and the
"prince" to England to assist the "prince's" entry into the country, if
necessary.  Agent 1 agreed, and North arranged for payment of his travel
expenses.

     The three men stayed in London for five or six days.  Based on
discussions with the "prince" about the situation in the Middle East, Agent 1
concluded that it would be worthwhile to develop the "prince" as a source in
the hostage location effort.

     In August 1985, the DEA agents embarked on further activities with the
"princ