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$Unique_ID{bob01024}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Chapter 5A NSC Staff in Criminal Investigations & Prosecutions}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Various}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{feldman
kellner
investigation
north
rosenblatt
fbi
customs
jury
agents
meese}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Title: Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Author: Various
Date: 1987
Chapter 5A NSC Staff in Criminal Investigations & Prosecutions
During the period covered by the Boland Amendment, federal law
enforcement agencies conducted investigations that touched upon various
aspects of the secret Contra support operation. Concerned that these
investigations, if pursued, would expose the NSC staff's covert operations,
North and Poindexter reacted by contacting the agencies involved. They sought
to monitor investigations and, in some cases, to delay or impede their
progress by suggesting that national security was at stake. Confronted with
such assertions from White House officials involved with the nation's
security, law enforcement agencies understandably cooperated with the NSC
staff by delaying some investigations, arranging to move a convicted former
foreign official whom North was afraid would disclose facts about the Contras
to a minimum security prison, and giving Poindexter and North information
about other investigations.
The Committees are aware of seven such episodes, three involving the
United States Customs Service and four involving the Department of Justice.
They represent an integral part of the NSC staff's efforts to keep its
operations even from those with legitimate law enforcement interests.
North and the Customs Service
Maule Aircraft Corporation
In the summer of 1986, the United States Customs Service, following up on
a CBS news report, began an investigation into allegations that Maule Aircraft
Corporation of Macon, Georgia, had shipped four aircraft into Central America
to support the Contras in possible violation of U.S. export control laws.
In August 1986, the Commissioner of the U.S. Customs Service, William von
Raab, was approached by North, who told him that Customs agents in Georgia
were giving Maule Aircraft Corporation a hard time. North said the Maule
Corporation shipped aircraft such as "Piper Cubs" down south. North also said
that Maule was "a close friend of the President." Commissioner von Raab told
North he would look into the Customs Service investigation and assigned the
matter to William Rosenblatt, Assistant Commissioner for Enforcement.
Rosenblatt contacted North, who told Rosenblatt that the people involved
in the sale and export of the four Maule aircraft were "good guys" and had
done nothing illegal. North insisted that the aircraft were simply "super
Piper Cubs" and were exported only to a Central American country, where they
were used to supply the Contras with medical and humanitarian supplies.
Rosenblatt explained that in order to verify the legality of the transactions,
Customs needed certain documents and photographs of the aircraft, which North
promised to produce. In exchange, Rosenblatt agreed to postpone issuance of
subpoenas.
Over the course of the next several weeks, Rosenblatt continued to
contact North periodically to request the promised documentation, which North
led him to believe would be forthcoming "momentarily." Because of North's
promises, Rosenblatt told the agent in charge to suspend issuing a grand jury
subpoena for Maule, although the agent asserted that the Maule officials were
"stone-walling" him. In the interim, Rosenblatt found himself dealing with
North on two other matters, one involving a Customs informant named Joseph
Kelso and another involving Southern Air Transport's role in the Hasenfus
aircraft, where North asked Customs to narrow a subpoena so as not to expose
other sensitive operations.
On November 10, Rosenblatt met with Commissioner von Raab to discuss
North's assertions that the Customs investigation could compromise national
security, including an effort to obtain the release of the hostages. At that
meeting, von Raab advised Rosenblatt to speak with Robert Kimmitt, General
Counsel to the Treasury Department, about his inability to obtain the Maule
and SAT records. Rosenblatt scheduled that meeting for the afternoon of
November 17.
On the morning of November 17, Rosenblatt called North to attempt again
to get the promised documents on Maule Aircraft. To Rosenblatt's surprise,
North indicated that he had the documents and would send them right over.
When they arrived, however, Rosenblatt was quite disappointed. They did not
include purchase orders, photographs, or other documents sufficient to dispose
of the Customs inquiry. That afternoon, Rosenblatt met with Kimmitt and
related the entire episode involving Maule and SAT. At that point, the
investigation resumed, 6 weeks after it had been halted at North's request.
While Rosenblatt testified he never mentioned the Kimmitt or von Raab
meetings to North and he had no contact with North after November 17, North's
notes suggest that Rosenblatt did brief him on these matters after November
17. A note dated "19 Nov. 86" reads:
- Bill Rosenblatt
- Joe Ladow - P/M Maule
- Letter from Justice
- Talk to Commissioner next week
- Talked to Kimmitt re relationship
- Profs w/C-123 military configuration required sojourn
- Names in document - La dodge needed advice on how to handle
- Call Von Raab
Kelso
Another matter on which Customs had dealings with North involved Joseph
Kelso. Kelso was on probation after a conviction for illegally exporting arms
to Iraq. In 1986, he approached Customs under an alias and offered to work as
an informant.
In the spring of 1986, Kelso, accompanied by a Customs informant,
traveled to Costa Rica to gather information on an alleged counterfeiting and
drug ring that supposedly included corrupt DEA agents. Kelso and the
informant had not notified the U.S. Embassy or Costa Rican authorities of
their investigation, and Kelso was detained and questioned by the Costa Rican
authorities and DEA agents as to what he was doing in the country. Kelso was
then taken to John Hull's farm. Hull reported the incident to North and Owen
in a letter. At the same time, Tambs complained to Customs about their
sending informants into Costa Rica without notifying the Embassy.
After returning to the United States, Kelso, who faced charges of
violating his probation, turned over tape recordings of his activities to
Customs, and claimed that, apart from his trip for Customs, he was working for
the intelligence community. In or about September 1986, Rosenblatt called
North to find out if Kelso was working for the intelligence community. North,
who was already aware of Kelso's visit to Costa Rica, suggested that
Rosenblatt allow Owen, whom Rosenblatt did not know, to listen to Kelso's
tapes to verify his claims. Rosenblatt agreed on the assumption that Owen was
part of the NSC staff, or otherwise assisting North.
After receiving the Kelso tapes from Rosenblatt in October, Owen made two
trips to Central America where he met with DEA agents. Although Owen was
purporting to investigate Kelso's status, he never communicated further with
Rosenblatt, and Rosenblatt concluded from this silence that Kelso had not been
working for the intelligence community.
Miami Neutrality Investigation
In connection with another investigation, this one conducted by the
Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida,
North and Poindexter were able to obtain information concerning the
vulnerability of the Enterprise.
The Roots of the Investigation
On July 21, 1985, the Miami Herald published an article by reporters
Martha Honey and Tony Avirgan. In that article, a mercenary for Civilian
Military Assistance (CMA) named Steven Carr, who was then imprisoned in Costa
Rica, spoke of an arms shipment from Fort La