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1992-09-20
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Date: Thu, 27 Jun 91 11:39:59 -0700
From: gnu@TOAD.COM
Subject: NIST announces public-key digital signature standard
Statement of Raymond G. Kammer, Deputy Director
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Before the Subcommittee on Technology and Competitiveness
of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
On Computer Security Implementation
House of Representatives
June 27, 1991
Digital Signature Standard
I know that you are interested in our progress in developing a federal
digital signature standard based upon the principles of public-key
cryptography. I am pleased to tell you that we are working out the
final arrangements on the planned standard, and hope to announce later
this summer our selection of a digital signature standard based on a
variant of the ElGamal signature technique.
Our efforts in this area have been slow, difficult, and complex. We
evaluated a number of alternative digital signature techniques, and
considered a variety of factors in this review: the level of security
provided, the ease of implementation in both hardware and software,
the ease of export from the U.S., the applicability of patents and the
level of efficiency in both the signature and verification functions
that the technique performs.
In selecting digital signature technique method [sic], we followed the
mandate contained in section 2 of the Computer Security Act of 1987 to
develop standards and guidelines that ". . . assure the cost-effective
security and privacy of sensitive information in Federal systems." We
placed primary emphasis on selecting the technology that best assures
the appropriate security of Federal information. We were also
concerned with selecting the technique with the most desirable
operating and use characteristics.
In terms of operating characteristics, the digital signature technique
provides for a less computational-intensive signing function than
verification function. This matches up well with anticipated Federal
uses of the standard. The signing function is expected to be
performed in a relatively computationally modest environment such as
with smart cards. The verification process, however, is expected to
be implemented in a computationally rich environment such as on
mainframe systems or super-minicomputers.
With respect to use characteristics, the digital signature technique
is expected to be available on a royalty-free basis in the public
interest world-wide. This should result in broader use by both
government and the private sector, and bring economic benefits to both
sectors.
A few details related to the selection of this technique remain to be
worked out. The government is applying to the U.S. Patent Office for
a patent, and will also seek foreign protection as appropriate. As I
stated, we intend to make the technique available world-wide on a
royalty-free basis in the public interest.
A hashing function has not been specified by NIST for use with the
digital signature standard. NIST has been reviewing various candidate
hashing functions; however, we are not satisfied with any of the
functions we have studied thus far. We will provide a hashing
function that is complementary to the standard.
I want to speak to two issues that have been raised in the public
debate over digital signature techniques. One is the allegation that
a "trap door", a method for the surreptitious defeat of the security
of this system, has been built into the technique that we are
selecting. I state categorically that no trap door has been designed
into this standard nor does the U.S. Government know of any which is
inherent in the ElGamal signature method that is the foundation of our
technique.
Another issue raised is the lack of public key exchange capabilities.
I believe that, to avoid capricious activity, Public Key Exchange
under control of a certifying authority is required for government
applications. The details of such a process will be developed for
government/industry use.
NIST/NSA Technical Working Group
Aspects of digital signature standard were discussed by the NIST/NSA
Technical Working Group, established under the NIST/NSA Memorandum of
Understanding. The Working Group also discussed issues involving the
applicability of the digital signature algorithm to the classified
community, cryptographic key management techniques, and the hashing
function to be used in conjunction with the digital signature
standard. Progress on these items has taken place; however, as with
the digital signature standard, non-technical issues such as patents
and exportability require examination, and this can be a lengthy
process. We have found that working with NSA is productive. The
Technical Working Group provides an essential mechanism by which NIST
and NSA can conduct the technical discussions and exchange
contemplated by the Computer Security Act and also allows us to
address important issues drawing upon NSA's expertise.
------------------------------