The Hacker's Encyclopedia 1998/hackers_encyclopedia.iso/zines/uxu/uxu_417.txt

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         [  On Friendship  ]                         [  By The GNN  ]


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    ____________________________________________________________________



                               ON FRIENDSHIP
                      by THE GNN/DualCrew-Shining/uXu


       Not only  is this  a long and complicated textfile, it is
       also  written   within  the   tradition   of   'analytic'
       philosophy, which  makes it  pretty scientifically  stiff
       (i.e., 'boring').  I do encourage the reader to give it a
       chance, though.  The notion  of friendship is not only an
       interesting concept  to  examine  for-itself;  it  is  an
       interpersonal relation  that is  most necessary  for  our
       lives. Some people, however, have not realized this fact,
       believing that  friends come  and go  by themselves, that
       one need  not actively  uphold certain relations, as they
       are somewhat  'automatic'  to  their  character.  Nothing
       could be  more wrong.  As I  have  grown  older,  I  have
       noticed that  I am  about to lose many good friends since
       they (and  me too,  certainly) are  unable to  understand
       what it takes to be a real friend. To save you from grief
       and despair  in the future, I recommend you to study this
       text, and  think twice  what it means to truly be a 'real
       friend'. (First-time  readers may  omit section  VIII and
       the footnotes,  as they probably are only of interest for
       specialists in the field of Aristotelian ethics.)


 I. Introduction

In our seemingly cold-comfort western culture, public demonstration of
friendship is rather uncommon, limited to formalities such as greeting
cards or handshakes. But to jump to the conclusion that there is no such
thing as deep affection between people (which need not necessarily fall
into the category of 'lovers') from this shallow observation would be too
rash. A denial of the very existence of friendship and its impact on our
lives is to misconstrue an important part of the good life. Some prefer to
live in solitude - but I believe most of us do not.
   The term 'friendship' is often used and abused in various circumstances
which makes it hard to get a grip of. Of course, the difficulties are not
solely to be blamed on the excessive use of the notion. It is undoubtedly a
complicated relation. It would clearly be a mistake to believe that it is
possible for a philosopher to be able to easily organize and perfectly
define all aspects involved in it. Aware of this, I do understand that this
paper is to be understood as merely being a tentative attempt for all that
it is worth.
   The definition will be broadly Aristotelian.(1) I will not however
strive for an answer to the question whether this kind of human conduct is
morally good or not. I will only argue for what I believe this special
relation requires. These requirements will be non-instrumentality,
irreplaceability, and the existence of mutual altruistic emotions. I will
shortly deal with questions on how friendships evolve in our lives through
practice, argue that it requires certain proper attitudes - 'psychological
dispositions' - and finally that the relation in question cannot be said to
be true if it is based upon deceit.

 II. Non-Instrumentality

Friendship separates itself from certain other kinds of interpersonal
relations by being essentially non-instrumental. It is not a relation like
those which exists between business associates, doctor and patients,
students and teachers, and so on. While a relation of friendship is upheld
thanks to an interrelation between several complex parts, relations of the
former kind are sought strictly for the sake of utility. They seize to be
the very moment the purpose has been fulfilled, and the attitudes entailing
such instrumental relations do not work very well with friendship. If we
regard our beloved ones as mere instruments toward some personal goal (or
universal even), as recommended in obscure publications like 'How to Win
Friends and Influence People', we would soon find ourselves living
alone.(2)
   This quickly calls for an objection: that there is in fact no such thing
as a truly non-instrumental relation. We enter all relations, it could be
said, only because we in the end want to gain something. In friendship,
perhaps it is pleasure or self-fulfilment. The difference between business
associates and friends would only be what they seek, not how they seek it.
   This simplification is not the whole truth though. Friendship is a more
complex matter than that. Yes, we do gain things out of our friends. It
would be utmost strange and even a failure if we did not. Friendship is, as
Aristotle puts it, 'reciprocated goodwill'.(3)  Friends do things for each
other, and they gain both pleasure and self-fulfilment among other things
out of it. But the main difference is that the various things we gain are
results of the relation, not its primary goal (or 'focus', 'object'). It is
no secret that an instrumental relation has as its goal the results
themselves (money, grades, entertainment, etc.). All of the involved
parties are aware of this. A non-instrumental ditto has as its goal the
relation itself, and friends are aware of this too.(4)  Out of this non-
instrumentality follow several enjoyable results which would not follow if
we regarded it instrumentally.
   The objection seems based upon a mix-up between what it means to use
friendship as means to a further end, or to regard it as something that
partially constitutes this end. If we find out that certain personal
relations are necessary for, say, the good life, this does not
automatically imply that we in all circumstances are bound to engage in
such relations instrumentally. On the contrary, it could be a part of the
good life, not a part to it.
   Say that I enter a relation with a car dealer for the purpose of buying
a car. We talk and he amuses me with his jokes. He buys me coffee and shows
me around in the shop. If one did not know the background information
concerning my visit to the dealer, one might from mere observance believe
that we were friends. But this is something we are not. When the car is
bought, the relation between me and the dealer has vanished - perhaps until
the day I need some other favor from him.(5)  This would not have been the
case if the dealer had been my friend. When I had bought the car, our
relation would not have seized to be. Maybe I would have bought the car at
a lower cost thanks to our relation, but I would not have used it for
getting the car cheaper. I have not entered the relation, and I do not
uphold it, in the intention of getting such things. Friendship is more
about loving than being loved.(6)  In a relation of utility, we strive to
get more than we give; in friendship, we need necessarily not get more than
we give. Certainly, friendship includes reciprocity. But this is of a
special kind - radically different from the reciprocity existing in
instrumental relations. Friends 'give' each other things (affection, trust,
company, and so on) because they want to, not because they feel like they
have to. Although we do not demand our friend to always give us something,
we do expect that the other person is equally interested in being a friend.
If we hang on to a relation even though we never gain anything in return at
all, we are not really 'friends' - one of us is just exercising a form of
unconditional love. But friendship does not and ought not require this form
of love. As strict search for utility is unfitting, so is unconditional
love. Friendship lies somewhere in between those two extreme point of
views.(7) I will return to some questions concerning this in the part on
'irreplaceability' which will follow later.

 III. Emotions

Per definition, friendship involves sentiments. It requires that we are
fond of the other person.(8)  It must also involve emotions of the
altruistic kind, which is defined as a wish for the weal and woe of the
other person for his own sake.(9)  We do not expect to be let down by those
we care about, because we believe them to care for us too. Friends trust
each other. We dare to share with them.(10)  In instrumental relations
there can exist something that looks like such emotions. After all, the car
dealer might with a convincing voice assure me that he wants to know if I
am in good spirits. But what one sees is not always what one gets. Only
because a benevolent act, as asking me if I feel all right, looks like it
has sprung from an emotion it does not necessarily imply that it has.
   Even though goodwill and altruistic emotions are necessary parts, they
are not all there is to friendship. I could be fully altruistic in my
feelings and acts toward a complete stranger. But this does not mean that
we are automatically friends. Altruistic emotions are directed toward
particular persons in particular circumstances. Even though both my friend
and the stranger could be in the same situation, it does not mean that I
always feel the same for the stranger.
   Emotions of this kind have often been quite oversimplified. They are not
seldom regarded as 'unreliable' as they are said to be too closely
connected to 'moods'. Yes, altruistic emotions do have a tendency to change
with the mood, but they do not seize to exist just because we do not
temporarily 'feel' them in fullest bloom. Genuine feelings of altruism
toward particular persons do not completely disappear with moods. If they
do - they were hardly genuine in the first place.(11)  If a friend in
despair wants me to spend an evening with him it would be very strange if I
refused only because 'I did not feel for it'. If it had been a complete
stranger on the other hand, it would not have been equally surprising.
Altruistic emotions are not 'passive'. They are active in the sense that
they motivate us to act benevolent, out of a non-instrumental
perspective.(12)  Even though we cannot force ourselves to have certain
emotions, this does not mean that we are equally unable to control the
sometimes spontaneous actions that follow from them.(13)  Partially due to
the requirement of certain emotions, it seems clear that we cannot have too
many friends. If we try to become a friend with anybody we encounter, we
will probably just end up having a lot of 'fellows'. This is not to say
that it is impossible to feel 'something' for large groups. Some might
fancy certain people because they are members of a group - 'Swedes',
'liberals', 'table-tennis players'. But to claim that we can appreciate one
and every member of such a group as equally good personal friends would be
to exaggerate our emotional abilities. Imagined godlike creatures can do
this, but we are not of that kind - and, as I will argue below, such
'arbitrary' manifestations of affection are inappropriate for friendship
anyway.

 IV. Irreplaceability

We have now reached the single most important criterion. That a friend is
essentially irreplaceable. If I treat a stranger non-instrumentally in the
mood of pure altruism, this does not mean that we are friends. Because, to
me, the stranger could be any person. That he is who he is, is in fact of
no interest. If you are my friend, on the other hand, I like you, and do
things for you, because you are you. I like 'the whole' of you, not merely
certain parts of your character (even though I might like some more than
others); as your amusing jokes, your exquisite taste of automobiles or
views of the world. What I like are not these features in themselves, but
the combination of them: you. Even if some other person could serve my
'needs' for happiness and self-fulfilment better, or equally good as you, I
would not swap. Not because you give me more pleasure qua being you, but
because you are you and no one else. I fancy your essential features, not
your incidental; you are (to me, at least) a unique person.
   But then, how far does this 'irreplacability' stretch? What if your
character changes? What happens with our relation if you suddenly turn into
a completely different person, perhaps due to a neural disease or the wrong
company? Must I then hang on to the relation?
   No. The relation is a result of an empirical investigation, I have found
out that I like your characteristics. If those features suddenly vanish,
there is nothing left to like. You would not longer be you, but someone
else, a stranger. It would be utmost strange, however, if a relation of
friendship seized to be just because you went through some minor changes.
After all, people do change as their lives pass by. Friendship is more
elastic than less strong relations. If my favorite car dealer changed
occupation, I would probably never have anything to do with him again.
   How much you must change for me to be allowed to break the relation
without being accused for not have been a real friend is a complicated
question and cannot be answered here, if at all. If I come from a family of
a different culture and you, all of a sudden, turn into a hard-core
xenophobic with certain unappealing pragmatic final solutions concerning my
worldly existence, can we be friends? That would be utmost surprising. What
if you are badly brain damaged in a car accident and fall into a deep coma
that will last until your body dies? Can we be friends even though all your
essential features are irreversibly gone? I do not think so. My emotions
for you might last, but those alone are not all there is to friendship.
   The main issue is that it is very hard, if possible, to try to come up
with a top-ten-style index over what one fancies with a special person, and
how many of these features that must be around for the relation to
last.(14)
   A fatal change need not only be that you actually turn into someone
else. I might find out who you really are, discover something I missed when
I first encountered you. Maybe you have only pretended to be my friend, but
in reality simply need me as a tool for reaching some personal or universal
goal. As I become aware of this, my trust in you will vanish. I realize
that me-being-me does not matter in your eyes, only me-being-a-tool-for-
some-other-end. This I cannot accept. A common complaint of friends when
they break up is that they were manipulated and used, that they painfully
discovered the truth beyond the other part's seemingly good intentions. We
expect the other person to hold similar attitudes toward us as we do toward
him or her. If we do not expect any of this from the other person, but
still loved the person (unconditionally), we are not friends. Because we
need not, and ought not, love the other person unconditionally in a state
of friendship.
   Unconditional love resembles 'agape' - the kind of love that it is
claimed that omnipotent, omniscient, good, yet imagined, godlike creatures
feel for their creations. The 'problem' with this kind of appreciation is
that the lover does not love the unique and irreplaceable person for what
he is, but merely his incidental features, as 'being a human' or 'my
creation'. But friends do not appreciate such incidental features of the
other person, but the essential. Agape makes a person numerically
replaceable; any person that bears the same simple qualities (like 'being
human') deserves the same love.(15)  In instrumental relations, the person
is qualitatively replaceable, any person who bears the same qualities
('sells cheap cars') gets the same attention. Thus, unconditional love is
as instrumental love not proper for friendship - because they both fail to
appreciate the unique person.(16)  Friends are phenomenologically
irreplaceable. I cannot regard your twin brother as an equally good friend
even if you share many characteristics. I appreciate you as a friend,
because only you are your essential features.(17)
   Lastly, while we are at the subject of which kind of loving that is
proper for friendship, I do not believe that friendship is the kind of
relation that should be ascribed as existing between parents and children.
Love does exist between both friends and family members. But '[l]ove is a
feeling, but friendship is a state.'(18)  And this kind of state is
incompatible with the state that exists between parent-child, out of two
main reasons.
   Firstly, it resembles the arbitrariness of unconditional love too much.
The love of children and parents is not brought about due to an empirical
investigation in the same sense as friends. I have perceived that I like
your character; I have made a choice of being your friend (even though the
choice is not as self-conscious as when we chose what to have for
dinner).(19)  Exactly why I have found this out is hard to put a finger on.
Maybe it is because we share alike beliefs, values and interests - a shared
conception of the good.(20)  I have not just stumbled over you and without
any further motivation come to the conclusion that we ought to be friends.
Children do not choose their parents, and parents do not choose to have a
child with those-and-those essential qualities.
   Secondly, friends regard each other as equals, no one having authority
over the other, while parents (even though some would like to deny the
force, especially concerning teenagers) believe they have the power and wit
to determine the good for their children. This usually remains for the rest
of their lives, since parents have the tendency to regard their offspring
as - children, no matter how old they are.(21)  Even if we look away from
these details, which need not always be facts of the matter, I believe
there is a more fundamental reason why claiming that children can have true
friends is incorrect. We now partly turn to this.

 V. Practice

If we follow Aristotle, friendship is not something we 'naturally' can do (
as we, for example, naturally can digest the food we eat). Friendship
requires training.(22)  Not mere theoretical teaching, but practical real-
life experiences. What we learn to do, we learn by doing. As we grow up,
and participate in various relations, we learn more and more about what
they really are and imply. Concerning friendship, what we learn is a
complex concept (need for non-instrumentality, emotions, irreplaceability,
among more). If we by some reason are unable to grasp and live by this
concept, we will not be able to have friends.
   This means that children and animals are unable to have any friends.
Please note that I do not claim that children or animals are unable to have
any feelings for other creatures. What I only intend to propose is that
friendship is a relation that is more advanced than the mere experience of
feelings. Children lack the experience and knowledge needed. Children make
and break 'friendships' with amazing rapidity; consult your local
sociologist if your experiences of the real world must be supplemented with
academic proof. After all, they have just entered the world, still not
aware of all of its components and rules. No blame on them.
   Animals are unable to have relations of friendship out of similar
epistemic reasons. The difference is that while children - due to the fact
that they actually grow up - are able to obtain knowledge concerning the
complexity of friendship.  Animals are not. It is popular to claim that
"dog is man's best friend" but unfortunately this is not true. A dog might
be man's best 'companion' or 'fellow', but certainly not 'friend' within
the Aristotelian definition. Friendship is solely a human conduct, since
humans are the only ones who are able to understand the concept. Well, we
invented it - what did you expect?
   Anyway, one could still deny this whole idea and for some reason claim
that friendship can be the case even though the involved objects are unable
to grasp the concept. But where will this generosity lead us? If we allow
any kind of relation to be labelled friendship, the very term itself would
quickly lose all meaning. My computer could be a friend of mine. It seldom
demands anything of me (except for occasional defragmentations), and it is
somewhat good company. Company which I can enjoy without feeling that I
must give something back - almost like a friend! This sounds mighty strange
in my ears.(23)
   Our best friends are often those we have had for a long time, as we have
learned more about both the persons and how to master the appropriate
concept.(24)  Many relations changes as we grow older. We could very well
have been involved in an instrumental relation from the beginning, but then
swung over to a non-instrumental one. Perhaps I found out that I shared
many other interests than automobiles with my car dealer, which eventually
led to a state of friendship between me and him. The opposite works too:
due to circumstances, a formerly real friend might turn into an object of
utility. Perhaps we have grown, or moved, away from each other. Our
interests and world-views have radically separated. We do not longer know
each other as we used to.(25)

 VI. Deceit

Can any form of deceived beliefs or corrupt attitudes be reconciled with
the proper form of friendship? That all depends on which belief that is
false or which attitude that is corrupt. Children and animals cannot have
friends since they lack the appropriate knowledge. But what about those who
fully know about the concepts of friendship, but in a state of it yet aim
at something else - since they with the help of deception to a certain
extent have 'forgotten' about this aim? Could such a person be said to
truly be in a state of friendship?
   No. To state the obvious: I could believe I am someone's friend; but
this belief alone does not mean that I am someone's friend. I might look
and act as if I were a friend. Yet, this charade does not automatically
make me one. The relation requires the above criteria, and if these are not
fulfilled, well, when we do not have a relation of friendship. We might
have pseudo-friendship, but that is something else.(26)
   Say that I realize that I will be able to come across a car cheaper if I
work on becoming a friend with the dealer. I also realize that acting as a
friend will not work if I do not believe that I really am one, as
professional actors claim that they must truly believe that they are the
character they play on stage to succeed. Still, they are not the character
they play - and neither am I a friend only because I believe so. The actor
is not really angry, happy, good, evil, while playing, but he has forced
himself into believing so. Likewise, I do not really care for the car
dealer, he as a unique person is not really something I value; I only make
believe, for the sake of buying a car.
   Still, this is way too vague. What exactly is missing in pseudo-
friendship? Well, I would not have fled to vagueness if I did not have a
hard time putting the finger on the problem. What is for certain is that
friendship is built upon a special set of attitudes and dispositions.
Deception on the other hand is built upon another set, which can hardly be
logically compatible with those required for friendship. Simply feeling
like a friend cannot be all there is to friendship.
   But then, what would happen if it turned out that we all are deceived?
Maybe there is no such thing as friendship in the terms described? Maybe
all our attitudes, actions and emotions can be reduced to our sexual
drive?(27) Or maybe we (or more precisely, me) are nothing more than brains
in a vat, dreaming fully determined experiences. If that were so, what we
believed to be friendship would not be so. We would not 'really' care for
our friends, just for our personal reproduction, or, the other person in
our dreams would not be a friend, since 'he' would be unable to have any
kind of proper attitudes toward us. But speculations of this kind neither
add nor reduce anything of interest from the present context. Those kinds
of deception are totally beyond our control. There is nothing we can do,
since we cannot have any knowledge about them. They would be incorporated
in ourselves to the extent that they are impossible to notice. We must
assume that the world is constituted in certain ways, otherwise we cannot
discuss this subject at all. If these assumptions one day turn out to be
untrue, we will have to reconsider. But that day has yet not come.
   What is of interest here is thus only the kind of deception that we
knowingly and intentionally enters, that is, self-deception. We could
engage in such deception in relation to friendship for a number of reasons.
Perhaps for the sake of making money, getting to buy a car cheaper or
preserving the world from its oncoming doom. But even though such deception
is logically incompatible with friendship, it need not be a psychological
problem. Our heads do not explode only because we hold incompatible
beliefs.
   Contrary to brains-in-the-vat variants of deception, however, self-
deception is more within our control. We create it ourselves - and what we
create, we can pull down. This is of course not to say that it might not be
all that easy though. But it is hardly impossible, as we are not biological
robots that can be programmed to do anything, but simply flexible human
beings. To claim that it is possible for us to completely alienate
ourselves from ourselves to the extent that we never in any way notice it
is to ascribe us capacities we do not possess. Someone suffering from deep
insanity could of course believe anything - but such extreme cases are
seldom due to the kind of self-deception most people practice now and then.
   As I mentioned earlier, a relation might begin on the basis of
instrumentality, and later become one of non-instrumentality. Can
friendship equally begin on the basis of self-deception, and then 'swing
over' to become a genuine, non-deceived, relation? Of course it can - but
any switch will not do. The person must first come to understand that he is
practising self-deception. Otherwise no fundamental change will ever occur.
This is not necessary between the switch between instrumentality and non-
instrumentality. Because there is nothing 'hidden' in the closet of those
relations.

This concludes the main subject of this paper. In the last part I will make
some final unfounded remarks on the notion of friendship and morality, yet
not try to answer any question on rightness or goodness.

 VII. Aristotelian Friendship and Rivalling Moral Systems

Ought we aim for genuine, non-deceived forms of friendship? Not obviously.
Perhaps the world will become a much better place if more people tactically
aimed for instrumental relations with the help of deceit. But many
philosophers have argued that genuine friendship is one important part of a
world that goes around in an acceptable manner. Aristotle claimed that no
one would choose to live without friends, as it is 'most necessary for our
lives'.(28)  If this is true or an exaggeration is another discussion. But
it seems somewhat clear that personal relations do play an important role.
We see ourselves through others; thus, relations gives shape and meaning to
our lives.
   But do we really have this kind of relation to those we refer to as
'friends' Or is the Aristotelian definition merely an ideal image that does
not really exist, proposed by philosophical hermits who have never
experienced how the world actually works? Even if that is so, which I
hardly believe, the blame need not be put on the concept anyway. Perhaps
the world has increasingly been made to make it superfluous. If so, there
might be something wrong with the world, not with this kind of
friendship.(29)
   It need not only be the world as we know it that makes friendship a
practical problem however. Some moral philosophers do not hesitate to
criticize certain ethical theories on the basis that they are unable to
incorporate and explain the notion of friendship in a satisfying manner,
leaving us only with the possibility of having pseudo-friends if we want to
be fully moral. Due to this, these theories are said to malfunction, being
only theoretical constructions which either are hard to follow as a
personal moral theory, or, if followed, a menace to the well-being of the
human race.
   Not all that unexpected, the defenders equally without hesitation claim
the opposite. In a traditional philosophical manner the debate seemingly
goes nowhere. But this is maybe not due to mutually convincing arguments,
but because the opponents are viewing not only friendship but the whole
concept of morality from different viewpoints.
   In between the battle between - taking the standpoints to their most
extreme outlooks - moral theories which rest on unfounded opinions
supported by emotional outbursts (even though some of its defenders seldom
hesitate to claim that the to be friends.
Chlly endorsed by 'God'), and
theories which more resembles mathematics than moral philosophy with the
result of being completely useless (even though the defenders seldom
hesitate to argue that they mainly aim for the abstract notions of 'truth'
and 'clarity') we might find a third alternative: versions of Aristotelian
virtue ethics, despite its age still not sunk into oblivion, but then, not
fully developed either. And even if we discover that Aristotle really had
no acceptable moral system to offer, a closer examination of this different
kind of ethics might perhaps help us come closer to a understanding of
where and why the debate in question went wrong.

 --- (1)  As put forward in the Nichomachean Ethics, book viii and ix
(translated by Terence Irwin, Indiana: Hacket Publishing Company, 1985).
For this paper I have also used Lawrence Blum's Friendship, Altruism and
Morality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Limited, 1980), Laurence Thomas'
article "Friendship" (Synthese, 72, 1987, pp. 217-236), but mainly Neera
Badhwar Kapur's "Friends as Ends in Themselves" (Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 48, 1987, pp. 1-23). A few less philosophical,
but more sociological and anthropological, aspects have been found in
Robert Brain's Friends and Lovers (London: Macgibbon Limited, 1976) and
Rosemary Blieszner and Rebecca Adams' Adult Friendship (London: Sage
Publications Inc., 1992).
   (2)  This is not a problem which should be mixed up with those like 'the
paradox of hedonism' or similar. It is not merely the case that we fail
with our friendship because we view it from an instrumental angle. That
would be to put the cart before the horse. The problem is more fundamental;
if we view the relation from this angle, we actually have no friendship at
all.
   (3)  NE, 1155b30.
   (4)  Of course, friends do not really have 'the relation' as the goal,
but the friend himself. It is not some abstract idea of 'friendly relation'
that is in focus, but the other person.
   (5)  Aristotle do not say that it is something immediately wrong with
relations for utility. They are useful - and we need such relations
sometimes - but that is all. True friendships are more than useful. To
knowingly enter a relation and fool the other person into believing that it
is friendship, while it is not, is not a 'bad friendship', because
friendship cannot by definition be so - it is simply some other kind of
relation.
   (6)  NE, 1159a30.
   (7)  C.f. Aristotle's 'doctrine of the mean', NE book vi.
   (8)  NE, 1126b20.
   (9)  NE,1156a20-1158b5; Blum pp. 43-44. It should be kept in mind that
it is not true by definition that 'altruistic acts' automatically imply
'self-sacrifice' or 'self-neglect'.
   (10)  Laurence, 224.
   (11)  Blum, p. 18, 30.
   (12)  Blum, p. 13.
   (13)  C.f. Aristotle 1111b15 and 1121a.
   (14)  Mainly because persons are not built upon a variety of individual
features which can be separated from each other. Persons are more of a
bundle of features, and a few of these cannot be 'separated' from the rest,
as they all hang together. Some features are more shallow than others -
your way of eating or walking for example. But certainly not the most
interesting and deep ones, as your conception of the good, those which
really constitutes your personality. In a relation of utility with a car
dealer it is easier to point out which feature one likes - the ability of
selling cars, nothing more.
   (15)  Aristotle points out that the most complete friendships are those
between the most virtuous. This could mean some kind of  'god'. This,
however, does not run counter with the arguments put forward here, as 'the
gods' in the ancient Greece more resembled real people than the 'God' in
Christian tradition, which is too perfect for comfort.
   (16)  Kapur, pp. 5-8.
   (17)  But what happens if you copy yourself in some science fiction
device; would I regard both of you as equally good friends? I guess I would
do. But not for long. The two of you would not be qualitatively the same _
forever.
   (18)  NE 1158a30.
   (19)  Laurence, 218.
   (20)  NE 1167a25, Laurence 220. Friends cannot be too alike though. The
best friendships are those in which the involved people differ in some
respects from each other. I would not be able to have a copy of myself as
my best friend, as I, firstly, cannot stand people who believes they always
know best, and secondly, would neither be able to give nor receive any new
perspectives on my life to and from myself.
   (21)  Laurence, 221-223.
   (22)  Friendship is a Aristotelian virtue and all such virtues requires
practice. See NE, book ii.
   (23)  And it does not work very well with Aristotle either. 'Love for a
soulless thing is not called friendship, since there is no mutual loving,
and you do not wish good to it. (...) To a friend, however, it is said, you
must wish goods for his own sake.' (NE, 1155b30.) 'Soul' need not be
interpreted into meaning a cartesian transcendent substance, but 'those
which posses the ability of loving' - i.e. humans.
   (24)  Following from this, it is better to have few friends than many.
Not only because we should avoid 'god-like' manifestations of arbitrary
love, but also because good friendships cannot properly develop if we are
unable to take the time needed for actually developing them. For the sake
of our friends, we should take care of them and do things for them, and let
them do things for us; but this we cannot do if they are too many. We would
rush from friend to friend, eventually ending up with a bunch of shallow
friendships (or none at all), (NE, 1171a10).
   (25)  'Living together is essential for the best friendship' (NE,
1171a30). What Aristotle meant was not 'the same house', but shared
activities. Without the presence of such activities, friendships will
decline. Lack of activities might be due an excess in the number of friends
or simply because the persons are due to distance unable to spend time with
each other. (Mere physical distance alone is not a problem nowadays,
however, as we can use modern means of communication for those purposes.)
   (26)  I have throughout this paper mainly talked about how we regard our
friends. Is this all there is to friendship, the mere need for the proper
set of psychological dispositions, attitudes? Maybe not. But in this
context, complex metaphysical speculations seems superfluous, as this paper
does not deal with the morality of friendship or its ontological status.
   (27)  A popular way to come up with theories of 'natural deception' is
by misconstruing Darwin's theories of evolution. By observing the way
nature and mankind has evolved, some people conclude that it is
'scientifically proven' that we 'by nature' are only interested in the weal
and woe of ourselves. Friendship would then be completely impossible, as it
has been defined here. A short glance reveals though that the theories of
evolutionary egoism in question are not 'scientific' in the usual sense, as
they extrapolate beyond what is acceptable. They thus deserve no attention,
unless they add something of importance to the question on how we ought to
be. But since their conclusions are based upon how we are, and these
conclusions are highly dubious, their prescriptions for ought becomes
nothing more than uninteresting speculations extracted from nothing.
   (28)  NE, 1155a-1155a5.
   (29)  Because the Aristotelian requirements are neither radical nor
controversial. They are not 'romantic', demanding the impossible.
Furthermore, they are not even tied to any particular culture. A closer
look reveals that people all over the world regards friendship as built
upon these requirements. Certainly, people of different cultures do
different things to demonstrate their affection -  some send greeting
cards, others cut their veins and mix blood, certain tribes in Africa throw
excrement at their beloved ones. Striking differences indeed. But only on
the surface. Deeper down it is virtually the same concept for everybody.
---

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