The Hacker's Encyclopedia 1998/hackers_encyclopedia.iso/zines/cud/cud521.txt

Text File | 2003-06-11 | 36.4 KB | 825 lines

       Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer ([e-mail])
       Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
       Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
                          Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
                          Ian Dickinson
       Copy Eater: Etaion Shrdlu, Senior

CONTENTS, #5.21 (Mar 21 1993)
File 1--CuD Mirror Update
File 2--New Info in 2600 Case
File 3--Official virus-writing contest
File 4--comments on proposed virus writing contest (Bontchev)
File 5--Comments on proposed virus writing contest (Frisk)
File 6--Response: virus-writing contest
File 7--Comments on the Virus Writing Contest
File 8--Bruce Sterling on GEnie (#5.20)
File 9--Re:  The White House Communication Project (#5.18)

Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
available at no cost from [e-mail]. The editors may be
contacted by voice (815-753-6430), fax [phone]) or U.S. mail at:
Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL 60115.

Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest
news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of
LAWSIG, and DL0 and DL12 of TELECOM; on GEnie in the PF*NPC RT
libraries and in the VIRUS/SECURITY library; from America Online in
the PC Telecom forum under "computing newsletters;"
On Delphi in the General Discussion database of the Internet SIG;
on the PC-EXEC BBS at [phone];
in Europe from the ComNet in Luxembourg BBS (++352) 466893;

ANONYMOUS FTP SITES:
  UNITED STATES:  ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in /pub/cud
                  uglymouse.css.itd.umich.edu (141.211.182.53) in /cud
                  halcyon.com( 202.135.191.2) in /pub/mirror/cud
  AUSTRALIA:      ftp.ee.mu.oz.au (128.250.77.2) in /pub/text/CuD.
  EUROPE:         nic.funet.fi in pub/doc/cud. (Finland)
                  ftp.warwick.ac.uk in pub/cud (United Kingdom)

Back issues also may be obtained from the mail server at
[e-mail].

COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
diverse views.  CuD material may  be reprinted for non-profit as long
as the source is cited.  Some authors do copyright their material, and
they should be contacted for reprint permission.  It is assumed that
non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise
specified.  Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles
relating to computer culture and communication.  Articles are
preferred to short responses.  Please avoid quoting previous posts
unless absolutely necessary.

DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
            the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all
            responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not
            violate copyright protections.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Sun, 21 Mar 1993 00:26:24 -0500 (EST)
From: Paul Southworth <[e-mail]>
Subject: File 1--CuD Mirror Update

We've been having some technical problems with the political archive
site, red.css.itd.umich.edu that are not yet cleared up.

Here's a brief update:

1. The machine is now uglymouse.css.itd.umich.edu (141.211.182.53).

2. Valid DNS aliases for that machine are:
   - mouse.css.itd.umich.edu
   - red.css.itd.umich.edu
   - redspread.css.itd.umich.edu

3. Domain Name Service is not currently working.

4. Routing is not currently working.

5. We have a new 760mb disk on line with a lot of new space.

6. The Myers' (Wuarchive) ftpd server is not working on that
   machine, so we are back to the plain NeXT ftpd.  This means
   you cannot grab whole directories, or ask for compress or tar
   processing on uploads or downloads.  I'm working on that.

So in short, you can't connect to the archives right now.  We should
have it up and running in the next few days.

If you have materials archived on the site, they're all still there
but nobody can get at them right now.

If you have new submissions, please email them to [e-mail].

Please don't request that I mail you files from the site; there are too
many requests and too little time -- I need to work on getting it back
on line for everyone to use.

Thanks!

I will notify everyone when we are back on line.

Paul Southworth
Archivist

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 17 Mar 1993 16:47:03 EST
From: David Sobel <[e-mail]>
Subject: File 2--New Info in 2600 Case

     One month after being sued under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), the Secret Service has officially acknowledged that it
possesses "information relating to the breakup of a meeting of
individuals at the Pentagon City Mall in Arlington, Virginia." The
admission, contained in a letter to Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility (CPSR), confirms widespread suspicions that the agency
played a role in the detention and search of individuals affiliated
with "2600" Magazine at the suburban Washington mall on November 6,
1992.

     CPSR filed suit against the Secret Service on February 4 after
the agency failed to respond to the organization's FOIA request within
the statutory time limit.  In its recent response, the Secret Service
released copies of three news clippings concerning the Pentagon City
incident but withheld other information "because the documents in the
requested file contain information compiled for law enforcement
purposes."  While the agency asserts that it possesses no
"documentation created by the Secret Service chronicling, reporting,
or describing the breakup of the meeting," it does admit to possessing
"information provided to the Secret Service by a confidential source
which is information relating to the breakup of [the] meeting."
Federal agencies classify other law enforcement agencies and corporate
entities, as well as individuals, as "confidential sources."

     The propriety of the Secret Service's decision to withhold the
material will be determined in CPSR's pending federal lawsuit.  A copy
of the agency's letter is reprinted below.

David L. Sobel                               [e-mail]
Legal Counsel                                [phone] (voice)
CPSR Washington Office               [phone] (fax)

    ************************************************

       DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

                              MAR 5 1993

                                920508


David L. Sobel
Legal Counsel
Computer Professionals for
Social Responsibility
666 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E.
Suite 303
Washington, D.C.  20003

Dear Mr. Sobel:

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
request for access to "copies of all records related to the
breakup of a meeting of individuals affiliated with "2600
Magazine" at the Pentagon City Mall in Arlington, Virginia on
November 6, 1992."

Enclosed, please find copies of materials which are responsive to
your request and are being released to you in their entirety.

Other information has been withheld because the documents in the
requested file contain information compiled for law enforcement
purposes.  Pursuant to Title 5, United States Code, Section
552(b)(7)(A); (C); and (D), the information has been  exempted
since disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with
enforcement proceedings; could reasonably be expected to
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy to other
persons; and could reasonably be expected to disclose the
identity of a confidential source and/or information furnished by
a confidential source.  The citations of the above exemptions are
not to be construed as the only exemptions that are available
under the Freedom of Information Act.

In regard to this matter it is, however, noted that your FOIA
request is somewhat vague and very broadly written.  Please be
advised, that the information being withheld consists of
information provided to the Secret Service by a confidential
source which is information relating to the breakup of a meeting
of individuals at the Pentagon City Mall in Arlington, Virginia,
and, therefore, appears to be responsive to your request as it
was written. If, however, the information you are seeking is
information concerning the Secret Service's involvement in the
breakup of this meeting, such as any type of documentation
created by the Secret service chronicling, reporting, or
describing the breakup of the meeting, please be advised that no
such information exists.

If you disagree with our determination, you have the right of
administrative appeal within 35 days by writing to Freedom of
Information Appeal, Deputy Director, U. S. Secret Service,
1800 G Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20223.  If you choose to
file an administrative appeal, please explain the basis of your
appeal.

                                    Sincerely,

                                    /Sig/
                                    Melvin E. Laska
                                    ATSAIC
                                    Freedom of Information &
                                    Privacy Acts Officer

Enclosure

------------------------------

Date: 02 Mar 93 11:56:08 EST
From: Crypt_Newsletter <[e-mail]>
Subject: File 3--Official virus-writing contest


                            W E L C O M E
                                 T O
                                T H E
                              F I R S T

           * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
           *                                                     *
           *               I N T E R N A T I O N A L             *
           *                                                     *
           *                     C O M P U T E R                 *
           *                                                     *
           *                        V I R U S                    *
           *                                                     *
           *                     W R I T I N G                   *
           *                                                     *
           *                     C O N T E S T                   *
           *                                                     *
           * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

                             -  1 9 9 3 -

  Final Date For Submissions:  APRIL 1, 1993

 This Contest is Sponsored by:

      American Eagle Publications, Inc.
      P. O. Box 41401
      Tucson, AZ 85717 USA

     Publisher of The Little Black Book of Computer Viruses

Ok, all you genius hackers out there! Here is a challenge for you.
Prove your stuff!

This is an INTERNATIONAL contest, and this file is being circulated
all over the world, so if you want to compete, be forewarned, you've
got worldwide competition. Only the best have a chance in this game.

Still up to the challenge?

Ok, here it is:

I am writing Volume 2 of The Little Black Book of Computer Viruses.
This is a study of the scientific applications of computer viruses,
and their use in artificial life research, and all of that neat stuff.
One of the things I want to discuss in the book is the limit on the
size of a virus for a given level of functionality. So I took the
TIMID virus from Volume 1 and tore it down to the bare minimum. Not
good enough. I wrote a virus that worked a little differently. I tore
that one down to the bare minimum. Good enough? Well maybe. But maybe
not.  I have some pretty compact code, but is it the absolute best?
I'm guessing somebody out there can top it.

Here are the rules:

   (1) The object of this game is to write the smallest
       virus you can with the required level of functionality.

   (2) The virus must be capable of infecting all COM files
       on the logged drive in the current directory of a PC,
       no matter how many COM files are there. It may infect
       them as quickly or as slowly as you like, so long as
       it can be demonstrated that it will do so in an hour,
       when running the programs in that directory one after
       the other in sequential order.

   (3) The virus must recognize itself and avoid re-infecting
       files that have been infected. At most, only one in
       fifty thousand files should get accidentally re-infected,
       assuming that the data in unknown COM files is random.

   (4) The virus must terminate gracefully if it cannot find a
       file to infect.

   (5) The virus must not destroy any of the code in any file
       which it infects. It must allow that code to execute
       properly, or refuse to infect a file.

   (6) The virus must be self-contained. It cannot hide
       code in some common location on disk.

   (7) The virus must function properly under MS-DOS 5.0 with
       no TSR's resident, and nothing loaded high.

   (8) The size will be determined by the larger of (A) the
       number of bytes the virus code itself takes up in
       an infected file, and (B) the largest number of bytes
       the virus adds to a program when it infects it.

The best code I have for a virus that follows these rules right now is
139 bytes long. Both source and executable are included in the ZIP,
named LITTLE.ASM and LITTLE.COM.

In the event of a tie for size, originality and ingenuity of the code
will break the tie. All judges decisions are final.

$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$

The winner will receive the following:

    (1) A $100 CASH REWARD.

    (2) Your code will be published in The Little Black Book of
Computer Viruses, Volume 2.

    (3) I will give you credit for the code and for winning the
International Virus Contest in the book, using either your real name
or an alias, your choice, published in the book.

    (4) Your name will be posted on the MISS bulletin board as the
contest winner.

    (5) A free copy of The Little Black Book of Computer Viruses,
Volume 2, and a one year subscription to Computer Virus Developments
Quarterly ($95 value).

Three honorable mention winners will receive a free copy of The Little
Black Book of Computer Viruses, Volume 2.

$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$

You may make an entry in two ways:

(1) Mail your entry on a PC format floppy disk to American Eagle
Publications, Inc., PO Box 41401, Tucson, AZ 85717 USA.

(2) Upload your entry to the M.I.S.S. bulletin board at [phone]
in the USA. Log on as GUEST, password VIRUS, last 4 digits of phone
number 0000, and upload to the CONTEST UPLOADS directory.

A valid entry consists of the following items:

(A) Complete source code for a virus, which can be assembled using
either TASM, MASM, or A86. If you use another assembler and don't know
if one of the above will work, then send the assembler along with the
submission. If you do anything tricky that we may not understand, you
must explain it in comments in the assembler source.

(B) A statement of who you are (aliases accepted) and how to get in
touch with you in case you win the contest. This information will be
kept strictly confidential, and encrypted at all times.

By submitting an entry to the contest, you agree that the copyright to
your entry will be considered the property of American Eagle
Publications. The copyright to any losing entry will be returned to
the owner upon written request.  In the event that you win or receive
honorable mention in the contest, the copyright to the code will
remain the property of American Eagle Publications, Inc.

You may submit your entry encrypted with PGP 2.1 if you desire. Use
the following public key to encrypt:

 -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.1

mQBNAitZ9w4AAAECAOXJYOsJNavAAWFBRwf4/u0QWMJ9IHj8eajgOfDRdlCNwEBJ
wMs1vb5GcdJCaeoCgBR3Xxzh6oEo2nrwfru8mqMABRG0CE1BTHVkd2ln
=P6d4
 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
*end*

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 3 Mar 1993 23:04:03 +0100 (MET)
From: [e-mail](Vesselin Bontchev)
Subject: File 4--comments on proposed virus writing contest (Bontchev)

Mark Ludwig's virus writing contest is yet another attempt to incite
the creation of computer viruses that hides behind seemingly
legitimate reasons. Just like his book and newsletter, which hide
behind the right of the US citizens of freedom of expression, the
"legitimate" reasons of the contest fall apart, if you look carefully
at them.

Let's consider some questions which naturally arise when reading a
proposal like that.

What are the values/dangers of such contests?

In the beginning of the proposal, the author boasts that he needs the
virus for the second volume of his book, which will discuss "the
scientific applications of computer viruses, and their use in
artificial life research". However, actually the contest it for
writing the shortest possible non-overwriting MS-DOS COM file
infector. What does this have in common with artificial life? What are
the scientific applications of such a silly (but small) virus? And
what does all this have to do with "research" in general? Actually, it
is nothing more than a contest to hack the smallest program that
performs given actions - nothing more. In fact, the author even
addresses the potential participants of the contest as "hackers", not
as researchers or scientists. And indeed, the goal of the contest has
nothing to do with scientific research.

The result of this contest is easily predictable. A few hundreds of
kids will write hundreds of smart, not so smart, and completely buggy
viruses. One of them will win the $100 prize. The others will have to
decide what to do with the viruses in their disposition that have not
won the contest. In all probability, they will upload them to the
nearest virus exchange BBS, where other irresponsible people will be
able to download and spread them further. "K00l dudez, I've got one of
the participants in Mark Ludwig's contest for you"...

The winner of the contest will have his name, or more probably, his
handle, mentioned in the book, which will stimulate his ego and incite
hundreds of others to imitate him and to create more viruses.

Of course, all those viruses will end up in the hands of the
anti-virus researchers, who will have to update their scanners to be
able to recognize them, just in case some of them accidentally
"escapes". And, since most of those researchers don't work for free,
the users of their anti-virus programs will have to pay for yet
another update.

Who wins of all that? Mr. Mark Ludwig sells a new volume of his book,
a few irresponsible kids get their ego teased, a few anti-virus
researchers spend a few nights to disassemble silly viruses, and all
of you have to pay - pay for updates of your scanners, pay for the
data and time lost in an outbreak of a silly and buggy virus, and so
on. Indeed, what a service does Mr. Mark Ludwig to the society!

In fact, the outcome of the first volume of his book already proves
that the above reasoning is correct. There are already at least 7
different variants of the silly Timid virus, published in the book...

How do we distinguish between "benign" and "malevolent" virus writers?

Some people like to speak about the possibility to develop "benign"
and even "beneficial" viruses and about how much this kind of research
will make our life easier. In fact, all that began with Dr. Fred Cohen
and his papers on the subject. Dr. Cohen means something very
particular, something that most people will never call a virus.
Unfortunately, in his papers he tends to use formulae, instead of
easily understandable language, so it is no wonder that many people
are misunderstanding him.

I cannot decide whether Mr. Mark Ludwig has indeed misunderstood Dr.
Cohen's ideas, or if he intentionally misuses the general
misunderstanding of the subject, in order to masquerade his virus
writing contest as something legitimate. However, fact is, that what
he proposes has nothing to do with Dr. Cohen's ideas for beneficial
viruses, will have absolutely no positive value, and will rise yet
another wave of stupid viruses written across the world.

Actually, there is no such thing as "benign" or even "non-destructive"
virus, as Mr. Mark Ludwig seems to understand it. The virus that is
proposed in his contest will infect real, executable programs. The
author of the virus has absolutely no way to know how will his virus
behave in some situations. In fact, it may turn to be even highly
destructive in some of these situations.

Just an example. One of the first versions of Microsoft Word (1.0, I
think) used to checksum itself, and, if the checksum didn't match,
displayed a message on the screen (something like "The tree of evil
has bitter fruits; crime does not pay") and trashes the current disk.
Obviously, if it becomes infected with the virus described in the
contest, this destructive code will trigger - with sad consequences.

Several other self-checking programs will not react that violently,
but will simply refuse to run when infected. Thus, the virus will be
guilty for denial of services - maybe lost time, money, business...

Even worse, the virus author is not able to predict the future, so he
has no way to know how his virus will behave in situations that simply
don't exist yet. Maybe it will turn out to be highly destructive -
recall what the "benign" Stoned virus does with high-capacity floppies
that have been simply not available at the time it has been
written...

Is there any educational value in those contests?

Mr. Mark Ludwig claims to write his book for educational reasons. But
what does actually he teach his readers? How to write viruses? Even if
we leave alone the doubtful value of this knowledge, there are already
a few books and many more electronic articles, circulating in the
underground, that teach exactly that.

Maybe he wants to teach his readers to write good assembly language
programs? But, at least his first book, does not discuss the good
programming practices at all, and in fact contains many samples of
sloppy and clumsy code.

So, maybe he wants to teach his readers about the top technology
employed by viruses to bypass the different security systems? Even
this is not true - he does not address such modern concepts as
armouring, polymorphism, slow viruses, fast infectors, multi-partite
viruses, or even fully stealth file infectors... For instance, nowhere
in the book there is a discussion of the different kinds of attacks
that can be employed by viral programs to circumvent discretional
access controls, integrity-based systems, and so on. All we see is a
bunch of silly MS-DOS viruses that barely work.

This rises yet another question - are the virus writers able to teach
the security specialists to something that the latter don't know
already? Many virus writers sincerely believe that; for instance Mark
Washburn has written his V2Px series of viruses, in order to "prove"
that scanning is unreliable virus defense.

However, it turns out that in all cases the security specialists are
aware of the problems since a long time. Even the concept of a
computer virus and the difficulties connected with its detection and
prevention have been first invented by a security specialist - Dr.
Fred Cohen, not by John Random Virus Writer... In all cases when the
virus writers have come up with something new and original, the
security specialists have thought about it since a long time, but have
been ethical enough to only discuss it in closed circles, instead of
implementing it and releasing it to damage other people's data...

At last, one could ask the question whether Mr. Ludwig's contest is
legal. In the text he boasts it as an "international" contest.
However, this demonstrates an amazing ignorance of the local law in
some countries. Participating the contest and writing viruses for it
may be illegal in some countries, as the recent arrests of the ARCV
virus writing group in the UK have proven. Freedom of expression is a
wonderful right, but Mr. Ludwig should be aware that the US
constitution does not apply to the whole Universe and thus, some
things allowed by it might be illegal in some other countries.
Therefore, anybody who decides to participate Mr. Ludwig's contest, is
strongly advised to consult a local lawyer. Of course, it would be
much better to ponder a bit how unethical the whole thing is and to
refuse to participate the contest at all...

But maybe Mr. Ludwig is not that ignorant, after all. The text of the
contest encourages the participants to use handles and other forms of
anonymity. Maybe this is because Mr. Ludwig understands that those
people might be hold legally responsible in some countries for such
activities? In this case, his contest is nothing more than an
incitement to commit a crime (in those countries where virus writing
is considered illegal). I wonder whether some of them have
extradition treaties with the USA...

Regards,
Vesselin
--
Vesselin Vladimirov Bontchev          Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg
Tel.:[phone], Fax: [phone]      Fachbereich Informatik - AGN
< PGP 2.1 public key available on request. > Vogt-Koelln-Strasse 30, rm. 107 C
e-mail: [e-mail]    D-2000 Hamburg 54, Germany

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 3 Mar 93 22:04:23 WET
From: [e-mail](Fridrik Skulason)
Subject: File 5--Comments on proposed virus writing contest (Frisk)

> 1) What are the values/dangers of such contests?

that is a stupid question....it has no value whatsoever.  It will only
mean more work for anti-virus people.

> 2) How do we distinguish between "benign" and "malevolent"
>    virus writers?

why bother...a virus is a virus...

> 3) Do virus writers have anything of value to teach security
>    specialists?

no.

> These are suggestive, and feel free to develop any line of
> discussion you feel appropriate.

How about the following:  one of the viruses submitted to the
competition gets loose, and manages to infect somebody in the UK. He
files a complaint, and as a result of that the sponsors of the
competition are charged with an "incitement to commit a computer
crime", and as demonstrated in the Popp case, he can be extradited
(sp?) to the UK, where prosecuting someone for virus writing is a lot
easier than in the US.

anyhow, I have more significant things to do with my time than to
spend my time commenting on a stupid idea like this one.

-frisk

------------------------------

Date: 10 Mar 93 14:27:01 EST
From: Crypt_Newsletter <[e-mail]>
Subject: File 6--Response: virus-writing contest

          What is the danger of Mark Ludwig's international
                        virus-writing contest?

Well, according to contest rules, the winning virus code is destined
for publication in the second installment of "The Little Black Book"
series.

"Oh, terrible, terrible!," wail anti-virus software developers
throughout the land.

        "More virus code in the hands of anyone who wants it!
         These miscreants and electronic sociopaths are
         already making computing untrustworthy enough!"

Bunk. Publishing any or all of the code collected in Mark Ludwig's
contest won't make any difference.  Why?  Because there already exists
more well-commented virus source code in general circulation than any
one person has time to analyze.  Taxpayers can download it by the
megabyte from the Bureau of Public Dept.'s bulletin board system 24
hours-a-day, no strings attached.  Or if you feel the need to be more
"elyte," more "politically correct," it can be had from the favorite
whipping boy of the anti-virus community -  shhshhh - your friendly,
neighborhood virus exchange sysop.

Beating on Mark Ludwig for his virus-writing contest, then, strikes me
as stupid.  It's hypocritical, too, because as some involved in virus
research know, a great many of the working samples of viruses found on
virus exchange BBS's come attached to "sacrificial goat" files bearing
the trademark of a number of anti-virus vendors. You can find
extremely detailed virus disassemblies on virus exchanges, too. Not so
surprisingly, some of these are composed by the same anti-virus
researchers who whine in electronic publications like Virus-L Digest
about the unrestricted flow of viruses and their source code.

So if the virus-writing contest is dangerous because it subverts the
control of "sensitive" information, the anti-virus community lost that
battle a while ago, soundly beaten by a large number from its own
rank.

Next, do security specialists have something to learn from virus
programmers or sponsors of virus-writing contests?  Yes, indeed.

For example, about a year ago I wrote a couple of stories on the
Michelangelo phenomenon for a daily newspaper. In the course of my
research I tried to dig up a few books to recommend to sophisticated
readers.

Mark Ludwig's "Little Black Book" was the only one I could find that
wasn't either horribly wooden or written for someone with the
attention span of a very small child. I endorsed it in the pages of a
daily newspaper.  The sky did not fall. The region's computers weren't
besieged by a horde of Ludwig viruses.

In addition, a number of computer security workers within different
arms of the U.S. government already consult virus programmers on
various security problems.  When I asked one of them why, he replied
that he didn't want to be backed into relying on the anti-virus
community for advice, advice he saw as too self-serving.

That leaves the question of how to distinguish between "benign" and
"malevolent" virus programmers.

Hmmmmm.  That's a tough one, because the picture's more complex than
that. Unless you buy the idea that virus programmers either write
disk-corruptors set to go off with a bang on weird holidays or make
them for courses like Patrick Toulme's "Virus 101," you're stuck
coming up with an answer.

You might decide to go with the popular stereotypes of young men with
too much pent up hostility or unemployed programmers from politically
and economically uncool locales like Russia, Bulgaria and China. But
that dog won't hunt if you think of Fred Cohen.

Or you can try to describe them as "groups" like NuKe, TridenT or
Phalcon/Skism.  And THAT leaves out a great many loners who collect
viruses like stamps and occasionally need to come up with a fresh one
as barter for that new, rare "tunnelling, polymorphic full stealth"
beauty from Outer Slobovia.

These guys could care less whether any virus they have gets into the
wild.  In fact, they probably would like to see less of that - keeps
the collection more unique, more "valuable," you see.

Clearly none of these are an answer.  So try asking a better question.

George Smith edits the Crypt Newsletter which has published virus
source code.

------------------------------

Date: 16 Mar 93 21:35:03 EST
From: kim clancy <[e-mail]>
Subject: File 7--Comments on the Virus Writing Contest

      Comments on the first international virus writing contest
                            by Kim Clancy

My comments on the 1st International Virus Writing Contest is that I
don't care about the first international virus writing contest.  I
don't care if someone sits in the privacy of their home and develops a
computer program to destroy every type of computer on the face of the
earth.   I don't care if they post them as public information on
bbses, magazines, or print them in books for profit.  I don't care!  I
believe it is everyones' constitutional right to be able to write any
type of computer code they want, discuss it with others, share the
code and document the process.  I believe that to remove this right
from individuals is removing their freedom and individual rights.

On the other hand, I do care about someone intentionally destroying
the property of others.   I do care about harm done to others and I do
care about someone planting viruses for that purpose.  But, this
contest is not called the "1st International See How Much You Can
Destroy by Planting a Virus Contest."  I just don't care (did you pick
up on that yet?)

I know there are hundreds of viruses available.  I have many of them
myself, most of them sent to me from anti-virus researchers (that is
another story in itself though.)  All the harm that could be done by
viruses could more than likely be done with existing code.  Running a
contest asking for better code doesn't appear to offer a significant
threat.  At the same time, I can't see any need for such a contest and
fail to understand what good it could produce.  Nonetheless,
individuals should have the right to participate in this contest.

By the way, while this may be the 1st International Virus Writing
Contest, I think (although haven't confirmed) that Fred Cohen told me
(on the one and only occasion I talked to him) that he had held a
virus writing contest and offered $1000.  He received no entries.

------------------------------

Date: 16 Mar 1993 08:23:00 -0800 (PST)
From: James Still <[e-mail]>
Subject: File 8--Bruce Sterling on GEnie (#5.20)

((In CuD's #5.20 GEnie interview with Bruce Sterling, it is reported:))

><[Guest] BRUCES> Generally I go with the cop definition, since it's the one
in
>greater public usage, meaning a [hacker is a] computer trespasser.
><[Katie] DANTECH> I wonder if you think there's any way we can reclaim the
>term?
><[Guest] BRUCES> Reclaim the term "hacker?"  Sure.  About the same time
that I
>reclaim the term "cyberpunk."  Ha ha ha ha!

Everyone wants to return to some construct of the 'good ole days.'  We
are going through a transition period where the semantics of the word
'hacker' is changing rapidly and no longer means the same thing as it
did in the sixties.  The sixties also produced 'ska reggae' and the
first skinheads;

Jamaican and East Indians who migrated to Britain and created a whole
genre of brotherhood and anti-racism.  These ska skinheads sparked a
wave of rude boy counter-culture leading to dub reggae (what most
people think of when the word 'reggae' is mentioned) and Post-Mod
bands like The Who and The Jam.

Unfortunately British fascists twisted the skinhead movement in the
70's and adopted its look and feel for their youth brigades that we
now think of when we hear the word 'skinhead.'  Does this mean that
the original ska skinheads of the 60's have lost their legitimacy?
Hardly, we just have to remember them in the context of what skinheads
were *then* and not get caught up in the twisted meaning of the word
*now*.

If we can stop playing 'Spin the Nostalgia Wheel' to reclaim our
so-called 'hacker' definition of the 60's, and realize that everything
changes, *especially the meaning of colloquial words* we'll be better
off.  The world is changing too fast to patent for those of us
enamored with the past to attempt to hold onto it.  Let's move on and
create a better future in cyberspace, inventing words when necessary,
and knowing when to leave them behind when obsolete.

------------------------------

From: Pat <[e-mail]>
Subject: File 9--Re:  The White House Communication Project (#5.18)
Date: Tue, 16 Mar 1993 13:10:19 -0500 (EST)

>   (1)  When you get thousands of messages a day, how do you
>        respond effectively?

The same way you handle written correspondence.  Lots of old ladies
in bee-hive hairdos  answering the mail.

>   (2)  How do you make a public e-mail system inclusive
>        and accessible?

I would suggest multiple points of contact.   rather then

[e-mail]   or [e-mail].

have topic based mail receptors.

[e-mail]  or
[e-mail]
[e-mail].
[e-mail].......

Then  people can be tasked to read mail, based upon the area of
expertise.  also, key subject extraction programs could be run,  and
the users could be mailed  response letters, based upon the primary
areas of interest.

>   (3)  What would happen if e-mail became the primary
>        mode of(mediated) access to government?
>

Well, there would probably be a little more flaming then before.
Could you imagine some of the correspondence?  Besides, one would need
some form of digital authentication mechanism.   Let's not have more
bogus mail....

------------------------------

End of Computer Underground Digest #5.21
************************************