Classic Fond 5/ClassicFond05_nopass.iso/STRATEGI/CIVILWAR.RAR/DBDATA/INFTACT.ENG

Text File | 1995-07-04 | 6KB | 143 lines

~sINFANTRY TACTICS~

~sRoad Columns~

An army on the move, with thousands of men, horses, guns
and wagons would be strung out along many miles of road.
Columns marched in files of two or four men abreast.

An infantry brigade would take up about 1 mile, a division
4 miles, and a corps 14 miles. A cavalry brigade would take
up about 1.5 miles, and a cavalry division about 6 miles.

Hopefully your army can march on several parallel or
converging roads, with one corps on each. If the terrain
is suitable then the cavalry can move off the roads.

~sTime and Distance~
The time taken to cover any given distance depended on such
factors as the state of the roads, the weather, traffic jams, discipline
exerted over stragglers, and so on. Troops' freshness and morale was
an important factor, and, because an army marches on its stomach,
provision of an adequate breakfast could have an impact.

A division or corps might generously be reckoned to achieve 2.5 mph
over an eight-hour day, or 20 miles in all. This would actually be quite
good going. Fifteen miles might be more usual, 25 would be extremely good,
and 30 extraordinary.

Cavalry would average more than 4 mph. Artillery and wagons
moved at a similar rate to infantry, but were unable to match
infantry distances on the longer, more arduous marches.

~sDeploying for Battle~
When the advanced guard made contact with the enemy, the
commander would make his assessment and plans. Then, as the
main body of troops arrived they would deploy from their road
columns into their fighting formations.

~sFormations~
The column of route, as we've seen, was the two- or four-man
wide column formation used to march along roads. Even if the
width of the road allowed for more men, space would still be left
for ambulance wagons, artillery, messengers, stragglers, etc.

The column of maneuver was the column that moved around
the battlefield before deploying into line. It could have a frontage of
half a company, a whole company, or even two companies,
depending on battlefield conditions and the general's plan.

The line was critical. The two-man deep line was the basic
formation both in attack and defense. Depending on the terrain
and on the perceived threat, a brigade of 1500 men might occupy
a frontage of 500 yards.

The skirmishers amounted to a mobile, fluid formation
which would skirmish out ahead of the lines. One or two
companies from a regiment, or even a whole regiment, plus
some specialist light troops or riflemen (if there were any),
would swarm forward in open order, each finding his own way,
taking cover, and firing at will. The skirmishers would advance
to within 200 yards or so of the enemy, either engaging any opposing
skirmishes, or the enemy's position itself. The ensuing firefight
might ultimately take place at 50 yards or less. Thus, skirmishers
aimed to protect their own line and to disrupt the enemy's.

The square was the formation in which infantry soldiers made
a hollow square, facing outwards. Without flank or rear, it was
the classic defense against a cavalry charge. Enemy cavalry,
riding into and around the square, would encounter a double or
triple wall of guns and bayonets. Because cavalry charges were
rarely launched, this formation was seldom used. However, the
drill for forming a square from an infantry column or line continued
to be taught, just in case.

~sThe Attack~
A model attack might proceed along the following lines:

1. Begin artillery preparation. Send skirmishers forward.

2. Soften up the target for as long as it takes to win fire (say, two hours).

3. Begin any planned diversionary attack/s.

4. Judging the crucial moment, send the main assault troops forward.

5. On reaching an effective firing range (at say, 100 to 300 yds),
begin the charge. The front line races forward, firing just one
volley.

6. When the enemy position is overrun, the troops stop and reorganize
on the spot.

7. The second and any successive attacking lines now pass through the
first line, and repeat the process against the next enemy position.

More usually, however, the main assault was not carried home, and the
following would occur:

1. The first line, judging the charge too risky, goes to ground short
of its objective and engages in a firefight.

2. The second and then subsequent lines attempt to pass through the
first line, getting little further. They also go to ground and engage
in firefight.

3. The enemy holds its position. The assault grinds to a halt as the
attacking troops, taking advantage of whatever cover they can find, to
dig in.

~sThe Defense~
A defensive position based on the lie of the land, or on
entrenchments, could be crucial to the outcome of a battle.
But such positions were often more assailable than either
defenders or attackers realized. For instance, even the
notorious Bloody Angle at Antietam should have been
vulnerable to troops well-trained in small unit fire and
offensive maneuvers, according to modern soldiers who
recently examined the site.

The Civil War was a war of fieldworks. This emphasis
was partly due to the U.S. Military Academy's role in teaching
army engineering. Officers trained at West Point were
well versed in how to site and dig fieldworks and how to exploit
defensive positions. These varied from the simple scrapes
made by a soldier with his bayonet, to elaborate fortifications.
They might take advantage of features already present, such
as a line or clump of trees, or a farmer's furrows and fences.
They might consist of trenches dug by troops. Miles and miles
of defensive fortifications were built, and many still exist.

Fieldworks served a number of purposes. They afforded
protection from incoming fire. They hindered the enemy's
charge towards close-quarter combat. And they provided a
cleared open space in front, to be swept by defenders' fire and
so become a killing ground.

Although they could be invaluable, a misplaced reliance on
defenses meant that many battles bogged down and ultimately
became stalemates. Attackers were unwilling to press home their
attack, while defenders were reluctant to leave the relative safety of
their defenses in order to counterattack decisively.
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