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- Path: sparky!uunet!ogicse!emory!gwinnett!mona!jmowen
- From: jmowen@mona.Gwinnett.COM (John M. Owen)
- Newsgroups: sci.space
- Subject: Is NASA doing what Feynman deplored again? -- Was: NASA Town Meeting
- Message-ID: <ZFV6TB1w165w@mona.Gwinnett.COM>
- Date: 13 Nov 92 04:53:34 GMT
- Article-I.D.: mona.ZFV6TB1w165w
- References: <1992Nov11.223533.7243@samba.oit.unc.edu>
- Organization: Flat On My Back in Bed With Mona, Duluth, GA, USA
- Lines: 70
-
- cecil@physics.unc.edu (Gerald Cecil) writes:
-
- > In article 20255@access.usask.ca, choy@skorpio.usask.ca
- > >I was reading Feynman's account of his work investigating
- > >the Challenger and he was complaining about how NASA is so
- > >backward. Now the shuttles are flying again, what is
- > >NASA's situation?
- >
- > Based on the 1st NASA Town Meeting in Rayleigh on Monday
- > that I attended, some in NASA are still denying reality.
- > The lone astronaut chairing the pane took issue with the
- > question I posed to Goldin regarding shuttle reliability.
- > [...]
- > [...] the astronaut stridently stated that (I paraphrase):
- > ``I want to clear up some misconceptions regarding the
- > Shuttle. The Shuttle is the most reliabl space vehicle
- > that's every flown. We have a reliablity of .987, etc
- > etc etc.[..."]
- > OK, so use his number, raised to the 45th power
- > (i.e. approx # of shuttle flight until SSF is assembled)
- > to get a 45% probability of losing an orbiter. Feynman
- > must be spinning in his grave. [...]
-
- The key summary of Feynman's report, IMHO,
- was along the lines of:
- "For a successful technology, reality must take precedence
- over public relations, for Nature can not be fooled."
- The decision-making process where P.R. goals and the desire
- to get along with management goals took precedence
- over real-world limits is insidious. NASA needed to make
- sure it was eradicated (at least w/r/t go/no go decisions).
- After the SSME hydrogen leak episodes, I felt like NASA
- management had demonstrated the lesson as learned.
-
- But now I wonder if we see signs of a shift towards
- the old insidious attitudes. Urgh. in AW&ST Oct 26 '92,
- pg. 15, _NewsBreaks_, _Columbia Begins Mission 52_ :
- "the mission management team granted last-minute rule
- waivers to permit the launch in wind conditions which
- exceeded the normal limits and under conditions likely
- to impose excess structural loads."
- "The weather waiver was granted despite reservations
- expressed by Jeff Bantle, mission flight director,
- who said he considered the weather ''no go," but that
- he would ''execute the launch.''
- (pardon me if Mr. Spencer has already covered this)
- The article goes on to say that the weather waiver was
- granted (regarding crosswinds on the KSC runway in event of
- RTLS abort, I assume):
- "...after the [management?] team determined the average
- wind velocity value was less than the maximum permitted."
- The loads prompting the load waiver were not reached
- during launch, but the gust limit (15 kt) was exceeded
- (during the period an RTLS might have occurred, I assume).
-
- I wonder who asked for the waivers? I suspect everything
- was still within some tolerance which exceeds the normal
- limits. On the other hand, is the flight director being
- quoted in context? In any case, average wind velocity
- seems to be a slightly half-baked basis for a decision.
-
- Is there a followup to this story, esp. regarding Mr.
- Bantle's comments, and the relevance of the particular
- safety limits? Certainly the AW&ST article makes me
- feel a bit uneasy. It's not enough to make me believe
- the attitudes that led to the Challenger accident are
- affecting shuttle operations again.
-
- -- jmowen@mona.Gwinnett.COM (John M. Owen)
- -- My .sig is bigger than yours - but I keep it offline.
-