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- Xref: sparky sci.philosophy.tech:3949 talk.philosophy.misc:2323 talk.religion.misc:20667
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- From: nyikos@math.scarolina.edu (Peter Nyikos)
- Subject: Re: QM and Free Will
- Message-ID: <nyikos.720914856@milo.math.scarolina.edu>
- Sender: usenet@usceast.cs.scarolina.edu (USENET News System)
- Organization: USC Department of Computer Science
- References: <nyikos.719769301@milo.math.scarolina.edu> <1992Oct28.135035.7336@ulrik.uio.no> <1992Oct29.032255.24455@augean.eleceng.adelaide.edu.AU> <1992Oct29.180335.3011@guinness.idbsu.edu>
- Date: 4 Nov 92 22:07:36 GMT
- Lines: 50
-
- In <1992Oct29.180335.3011@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
-
- >In article <1992Oct29.032255.24455@augean.eleceng.adelaide.edu.AU> dabbott@augean.eleceng.adelaide.edu.AU (Derek Abbott) writes:
- >>In article <1992Oct28.135035.7336@ulrik.uio.no> solan@smauguio.no (Svein Olav G. Nyberg) writes:
- >>>It has been claimed that the indeterminist interpretations
- >>>of QM secure free will.
- >>
- >>Therefore it is tempting for scientists to claim that free will is
- >>not real. Our feeling of free will is just for comfort.
- >>However, this leads to the problem that then no one is responsible for
- >>their own actions. Responsibility then becomes just a legal fiction for
- >>covenience of organizing society.
- >>
- >>That is somehow wrong as I know that I can always stop myself doing
- >>something wrong, if I choose to. I know that I can change any decision
- >>at the last minute. It seems that responsibilty is a real ethic.
- >>To deny that would make us ethically bankrupt.
- >>
-
- >We are responsible for our actions because we cause them. Causality
- >is essential to the notion of responsibility. There may be a feeling
- >that because those causes have further causes, our responsibility is
- >somehow alleviated, but there is no reason to believe this unless some
- >other moral agent (the person holding a gun to our head at the time?)
- >can be identified as causing the act in a way extrinsic to our own
- >will.
-
- Change it around: *you* are holding a gun to the head of a dictator
- and ordering him to call off a massacre. If he agrees, he "did the
- responsible thing," but was "not responsible for his responsible
- behavior."
-
- The point of this little exercise is that there is more than one
- meaning of the word "responsible" floating around here, and we ignore
- the distinctions at our peril.
-
- > But if we do something voluntarily, and our will has not been
- >meddled with (this covers cases where other moral agents have
- >deliberately supplied us with false information, as well as cases
- >where we have been coerced) then we are responsible.
-
- "Voluntarily" is also a loose word. A true determinist has to redefine
- it in the following way: we *appeared* to have done what we did
- voluntarily, though it was not really voluntary because there is really
- no such thing. But since we have this useful little word to play around
- with, let's attach it to these illusory instances where we really
- thought we acted voluntarily.
-
- Peter Nyikos
-
-