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- From: spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za (David Spurrett)
- Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
- Subject: DETERMINISM 1: `Refutation' the first
- Message-ID: <spurrett.23.720960465@superbowl.und.ac.za>
- Date: 5 Nov 92 10:47:45 GMT
- Article-I.D.: superbow.spurrett.23.720960465
- References: <spurrett.17.720882610@superbowl.und.ac.za>
- Organization: University Of Natal (Durban)
- Lines: 50
- NNTP-Posting-Host: pc13.superbowl.und.ac.za
-
- DETERMINISM 1: `Refutation' number one.
-
- o-----------------------------------------------------------------------o
- | This posting is part of a series of monomaniac diatribes. Please |
- | email if you want to follow anything up. |
- o-----------------------------------------------------------------------o
-
- Here is one possible argument to the effect that determinism cannot be
- true. It is not a `physical' argument (see `refutation' number two for one
- of them) and has a few slightly contentious assumptions, but does serve to
- illustrate a basic conflict between determinism and the way we normally
- think of ourselves:
-
- The argument starts from a factual observation. Our legal systems
- (this is not a modern Western point, it seems universal) acknowledge a
- distinction between `do-ers' and `do-ees' in a fundamental and strong
- way. For example when one person pushes another over a cliff we direct
- our criticism/ revenge/ abuse/ rehabilitation/ whatever at the person who
- `did' the pushing. Some archaic legal systems had different economies of
- `do-ers' and, for example, tried crows for crop damage. NO LEGAL SYSTEM
- HAS EVER `TRIED' A LAW OF NATURE, OR A MECHANICAL DEVICE. Certainly any-
- one wanting to haul the gravitational attraction which exists between
- bodies possessing mass before the bench would look stupendously silly,
- despite the fact that that attraction would have been an essential part
- of the total cause of the death of a person pushed off a building.
-
- An analysis of the workings of the proceedings shows that what is
- presupposed of a `doer', what defines him/her is that there is believed
- to be someting like a `possibility for having done otherwise.' (ie Free
- Will) Indeed if it is possible to prove that the person who did the
- pushing could not have done otherwise (they were hypnotised, compelled by
- another person etc) then that counts as a defence. The defence works by
- showing that with respect to that act they were not free; that they were,
- in that respect, like the attractive force.
-
- If we allow only the assumption that the world be in some way which al-
- lows our legal procedures to be grounded in truth (which we certainly
- seem to assume when using them) then the _way_ in which they work seems
- to constitute an argument against determinism. This is becuase
- determinism holds, in effect, that there are no `do-ers', that nothing
- has the possibility of being other than it is.
-
- The intelligibility of our legal systems can thus be seen as a sort of
- _reductio ad absurdum_ of determinism. Any thoughts? [especially any
- other arguments of this sort, and, of course, refutations.]
- o------------------------------------------o------------------------------o
- | David Spurrett, department of Philosophy | `I have seen the truth, and |
- | University of Natal, Durban | it makes no sense.' |
- | email: spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za | - OFFICIAL! |
- o------------------------------------------o------------------------------o
-