home *** CD-ROM | disk | FTP | other *** search
- Xref: sparky sci.crypt:4688 alt.privacy:2224 comp.org.eff.talk:6977
- Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.privacy,comp.org.eff.talk
- Path: sparky!uunet!ferkel.ucsb.edu!taco!rock!stanford.edu!ames!sun-barr!cs.utexas.edu!milano!cactus.org!ritter
- From: ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter)
- Subject: Re: A Silver Bullet to Limit Crypto?
- Message-ID: <1992Nov12.202330.22580@cactus.org>
- Followup-To: sci.crypt
- Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx
- References: <1992Nov11.183644.14979@netcom.com> <1992Nov12.042549.11780@clarinet.com>
- Date: Thu, 12 Nov 1992 20:23:30 GMT
- Lines: 54
-
-
- In <1992Nov12.042549.11780@clarinet.com> brad@clarinet.com
- (Brad Templeton) writes:
-
-
- >Sorry to join this too-voluminous-to-read thread at this point, but I
- >don't understand why people are proposing registration of encryption keys.
- >
- >The implication seems to be that this is to placate law enforcement people
- >who want to continue to be able to tap/intercept/read private communications,
- >perhaps to stop them from trying to ban encryption altogether?
- >
- >Is this some sort of joke? Do people seriously suggest such sort of
- >placation is necessary or a good idea? Or is it law enforcement that's
- >pushing for this registration?
-
- I am reading this under sci.crypt where we have been discussing
- arguments against possible legislation. There have been a few
- posted, but none come close to the impact of preventing child
- molesting, finding terrorist plots or thwarting assassinations, the
- sort of things which would be used to propose such legislation.
-
- Basically, I would like to hear a cogent argument which would
- influence legislation. I doubt that calling it "a joke" would
- do that.
-
-
- >There is no need to compromise. Law enforcement is just going to have to
- >face a hard fact -- in a few years they won't be able to wiretap.
-
- The issue is not so much wiretapping, although we will need strong,
- cogent arguments against that as well. The questionable area is
- the (preservation of?) the ability of society to penetrate
- individual secrecy *after* due process. Two ways are suggested:
-
- 1. By requiring key registration (presumably, the use of an
- unregistered key would itself be a crime);
-
- 2. By requiring the user to provide access to enciphered
- messages (presumably by retaining ciphertext and keys), with
- the inability to provide such access itself being a crime.
-
- As to whether or not we "compromise," I can only assume that you
- expect the courts to come to our aid *after* legislation has been
- passed. Maybe they will, but I think that attitude wastes any
- opportunity we may have to influence the legislation in the first
- place.
-
- Inevitably there must be limits to all rights. What are the limits
- on the individual's right to secrecy?
-
- ---
- Terry Ritter ritter@cactus.org
-
-