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- From: smb@ulysses.att.com (Steven Bellovin)
- Subject: Re: Deterring plaintext attacks
- Message-ID: <1992Nov5.154602.28033@ulysses.att.com>
- Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1992 15:46:02 GMT
- References: <gilchr.720707527@ee.ualberta.ca> <1992Nov5.000740.1755@qiclab.scn.rain.com>
- Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories
- Lines: 26
-
- In article <1992Nov5.000740.1755@qiclab.scn.rain.com>, leonard@qiclab.scn.rain.com (Leonard Erickson) writes:
- > gilchr@ee.ualberta.ca (Andrew Gilchrist) writes:
- >
- >
- > >What are theoretic ways to deter a plaintext attack?
- >
- > >i.e. The opponent is given two ciphertext messages, the plaintext of
- > >the first message, and the encryption method.
- >
- >
- > >Now, obviously the longest key in the world will not help.
- >
- > >How does one protect the key, so that it can be reused.
- >
- > You *can't*.
- >
- > Reusing keys *will* compromise the key if the enmey has the known
- > plaintext.
-
- That's not true at all. Rather, it's not true for most types of
- cryptosystems. Consider DES -- as far as the non-classified world
- knows, it's immune to known-plaintext attacks. Even if you run DES
- in output feedback mode, generating an XOR stream similar to what
- the original poster asked about, the *key* is the 56 bits you fed
- into the DES engine, not the output from DES acting as a cryptographically
- strong random number generator.
-