NetNews Usenet Archive 1992 #26/NN_1992_26.iso/spool/misc/activism/progress/8241

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From: [e-mail] (Paul Harvey)
Subject: Why did George Bush lure Saddam Hussein into war?
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From "It's a Conspiracy!", EarthWorks Press, Berkeley, CA
ISBN:1-879682-10-9

Theory #1: Oil

Low oil prices had sent American oil-producing states into a tailspin,
so former Texas oilmen George Bush and Jim Baker may have tailored US
foreign policy to help them out. Washington's staunch ally, Saudi
Arabia, also smiled on Hussein's attempts to raise oil prices. Saudi
Arabia even encouraged negotiations with the Kuwaitis, hoping that there
would be modest price increases without an invasion.

According to Helga Graham of the London Observer, the Bush
administration had been encouraging Hussein to pursue an "aggressive
policy of higher oil prices" seven months before he invaded Kuwait.
Grahan wrote, "It was discreetly suggested at a New York meeting in
January ... between an American former ambassador and one of Saddam's
top Ministers ... that Iraq should engineer a big oil price rise at
OPEC."

In his July 25 meeeting with Glaspie, Saddam announced that Kuwait's
actions had hurt Iraq and that he hoped to drive the price of oil up to
$25. State Department cables show that Glaspie responded: "We have many
Americans who would like to see the price go above $25 because they come
from oil-producing states."

At best, Washington was sending mixed signals. It's possible that the
administration was willing to let Iraq take a few oil fields. (Even
while Hussein threatened OPEC members, Washington continued to talk
about "improved relations" with Iraq.) But, apparently, the US was
surprised when Hussein took the whole country. Glaspie, for example, was
quoted in The New York Times as commenting: "Obviously I didn't think,
and nobody else did, that the Iraqis were going to take *all* of
Kuwait."

Theory #2: The US needed an excuse to staff a top-secret base in the
Middle East.

Investigative reporter Scott Armstrong may have uncovered a key to the
Gulf War. In a Mother Jones article, he revealed something that most
Americans and even most members of Congress had not been aware of - the
White House, the Pentagon, and the Saudi royal family have worked
together secretly for the last decade to build a network of high-tech
military superbases in the Saudi Arabian desert.

Built at a cost of more than $200 billion, the network includes five
regional outposts and offers the Saudis "the most advanced warfare
command system in the world, with conventional military capabilities
beyond those available to defend Europe or even the continental US."
(Mother Jones)

The "sophisticated network of superbases and advanced weapons systems"
was designed to protect the region's oil fields from Soviet or Islamic
revolutionary attacks. The bases were fully armed and equipped - in the
event of war, all they needed were several thousand US troops to run
them."

But stationing those troops permanently in Saudi Arabia was unacceptable
to the royal family. In fact, some Saudi princes bitterly objected to
the plan, for religious reasons. Since the Saudi royal family claims to
be the "protector of Islam", it must keep "infidels" from ever entering
the holiest mosques in Medina and Mecca. Even the *appearance* of
working too closely with the US could undermine the royal family's
legitimacy.

However, the Bush administration had compelling reasons to staff the
bases as soon as possible. The secret defense agreement with Saudi
Arabia was legally shaky - "under the Constitution, the president may
enter into treaties with other governments only with the advice and
consent of the Senate." If the secret agreement with the Saudis became
known, pro-Israel senators in Congress might have tried to kill it. But
more important, the secret bases are so advanced that they essentially
determine who controls the Middle East. What if they were seized by
Islamic fundamentalists?

Thus Bush may have decided to startle the Saudis into action. The Bush
administration had been arming and sharing intelligence with Saddam
Hussein for years (until, in fact, only a few months before the
invasion). Then, suddenly, after encouraging Hussein to invade Kuwait,
the US turned against him and rushed to Saudi Arabia's rescue.

Scott Armstrong makes it clear that the superbases were the focus of the
US war effort: without them, the US could not have won the Gulf War so
quickly - and perhaps not at all. According to Armstrong, even after the
war King Fahd still resisted staffing the bases, but a compromise was
reached. "While the Saudis have apparently agreed to station as many as
seven thousand military personnel at Saudi bases, including at least
some Special Forces advisers, the deployment will be treated publicly
... merely as rotating units of technicians on temporary excercises and
training assignments." Thus, when hundreds of thousands of Desert Storm
troops left Saudi Arabia, seven thousand Americans quietly stayed
behind. (Mother Jones)

In that light, leaving Hussein in power makes a lot of sense. With the
Beast of Baghdad still around, that's one more reason why we've got to
stay over there. Ironically, Secretary of State Baker may have spelled
it all out on September 4, months before the Gulf War - if you knew how
to read between the lines. When some people hoped aloud that an Iraqi
withdrawal might avert war, Baker replied, "the Administration intends
to maintain a long-term military persence in the Persian Gulf even if
Iraq agrees to withdraw from Kuwait." (The New York Times)

Theory #3: The defense industry pushed for a war to keep itself in
business.

As the Soviet threat began to dissipate in 1990, the American public
began talking about a "peace dividend." The US military budget was in
danger.

By sending so many troops to the Middle East while negotations were
still under way and by refusing to consider any of Hussein's overtures
before the war, Bush made it clear he wasn't interested in negotiations.
Even the Saudis - whose defense was our official reason for being there
- thought some of Hussein's proposals looked promising. But Bush
dismissed them all and went ahead with the war.

After the war, America was so supportive of the military - a feeling
created in part, by the government's manipulation of news coverage in
Kuwait - that budget cuts that had seemed inevitable only months earlier
never happened.

Defense contractors even wound up with *more* business as a result of
the Gulf War: "The war itself," said The New York Times, "has done the
most to stir interest in the acquisition of high-tech weapons. Even the
most backward and isolated national leader can hardly be unaware today
that Iraq's vaunted army - said to be the world's fourth-largest - was
quickly blown to pieces by the advanced armaments of the US and its
allies used so effectively."

Recommended Reading:

Compilations of newspaper articles are available from:
DataCenter, 464 19th Street, Oakland, Ca, 94612:
    The Persian Gulf War, Background and Analysis
    The Persian Gulf War, The Media and Our Right to Know

"Eye of the Storm" by Scott Armstrong (Mother Jones, Nov/Dec 1991)

"Who Lost Kuwait?" by Murray Waas (Village Voice, Jan 22, 1991)