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- From: holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes)
- Subject: Re: GOD - THE FINAL CHAPTER
- Message-ID: <1992Sep8.164128.17178@guinness.idbsu.edu>
- Sender: usenet@guinness.idbsu.edu (Usenet News mail)
- Nntp-Posting-Host: opal
- Organization: Boise State University Math Dept.
- References: <1992Sep8.001627.90029@vaxc.cc.monash.edu.au>
- Date: Tue, 8 Sep 1992 16:41:28 GMT
- Lines: 170
-
- In article <1992Sep8.001627.90029@vaxc.cc.monash.edu.au> kevin@vaxc.cc.monash.edu.au writes:
- >I posted earlier the following argument:
- >1. It is possible to imagine a world epistemically quivalent to ours, in which
- >god exists.
- >2. Likewise, where God doesn't exist.
- >Thus, given the existence of these worlds, a proof of the existence of God
- >is impossible.
- >Criticisms that have been recently raised are the following:
- >First, is it so clear that both worlds exists?
- >Take the first. Imagine simply the scenario of the detatched God, a God who
- >made the universe, then completely ignored it; left it to itself and the
- >laws of nature, and didn't interfere. Sure, the existence of this god will
- >have absolutely no effect on it, apart from its existence, but still, he's
- >there. It seems to me that this is an EPISTEMIC possibility, i.e, a
- >possibility completely consistent with all your current 'knowledge' of
- >the universe. Although it may be unlikely, whatever that may mean, still,
- >it's logically possible. It seems that even a hard line aethiest must concede
- >this.
-
- The hard-line atheist must agree that the creation of the world by God
- is a logical possibility for this to work. This is open to doubt.
-
- >Now take the second, and more controversial. Once again, I will suggest a
- >possible state of affairs, epistemically equivalent to ours, in which there
- >is no God. I'm not denying that what I'm about to suggest is crazy - but
- >logically consistent with our epistemic data. Simply this - imagine that you
- >(the reader) have been taken since birth, and embedded in a tank by a mad
- >psychiatrist who has connected electrodes to every part of your brain. All
- >the sense datum - in fact everything (inluding thoughts that aren't sensory
- >in nature) are fed to you from him - and no-one else. You have absolutely
- >no idea about the 'real' world - only the world the mad scientist has created
- >for you. In fact, the real world can consist of anything logically consistent,
- >perhaps epistemically wildly different from our own - in particular, a
- >world in which God don't exist. It seems likely that even a God fearing
- >man must concede this as an EPISTEMIC possibility - no matter how much
- >an insult to his dignity this may be.
-
- Here, you _assume_ that the non-existence of God is logically
- consistent. Not a legitimate move. (I agree with your conclusions,
- but your argument is invalid).
-
- >
- >Thus, it seems that these two worlds can exists as EPISTEMIC possibilities -
- >i.e, worlds indistinguishable from our own .
- >(I challenge anyone to show me otherwise- these sorts of examples, in
- >particular the latter, have been running around philosophy since Descartes,
- >and, it seems, though silly, can't be resolved. Do not take the bizzare
- >but logically possible lightly - this is the whole topic of conversation -
- >PROOFS of the existence of God - i.e, where such possibilities can be
- >logically eliminated.)
- >
- >The second point raised in critisism was the notion of existence. What do I
- >mean when I say these worlds 'exist'? Am I conceding that there are actually
- >two different world existing, one in which god is, and the other in which
- >he aint? A bit of model theory should resolve this problem. Take an
- >undecidable statement about the (standard) natural numbers. The way we can
- >show such a statement undecidable is by constructing two models, M and M' of
- >the axioms of the arithmetic, one in which the statement is true, and the other
- >in which it's false. Neither of these models need be the standard one, none-
- >theless, it gives us information about the standard model.
-
- It gives you information about the _theory_; what does it tell you
- about the standard model, exactly?
-
- Note also, that
- >in thestandard model, the statement is still precisely one of true or false -
- >its just that we can't get to it using the axioms.
- >Let's consider this as an analogy. I have constructed two worlds - M and M',
- >one in which a certain statement is true - the other in which it's false.
- >Now, I'm not claiming either of them actually correspond to the real world.
- >Nonetheless, both model all knowledge any individual has, had has and ever
- >may have. Thus- whatever you take as axioms (I have mentioned problems with
- >this previously)- they can be nothing more than epistimological statements -
- >all of which are true in both worlds.
- >Certainly, however, in the real world God either exists or doesn't exist.
- >All I'm saying, is we can't decide in an EPISTEMIC fashion which one is the
- >case. Ultimately, what's needed is faith - which is necessarily irrational
- >(be it faith in the existence or non-existence of God.)
- >I hope that answers all queries - further queries (all answerable, of course)
- >are welcomed both in private or in public.
- >
- >In closing, I have also noted another line of argument running - something
- >like the following.
- >1. God is existence.
- >2. You can prove the existence of existence in some modified set theory
- >(Of course, in normal set theory, you can't.)
- >Actually, I have a problem with both points.
- >First, din't kid yourself. This sort of New Testament "God is existence"
- >new-age lets be philosophical and use words which we don't really understand
- >so no-one can really pin us down IS WRONG.
-
- First, I was not entirely serious. But suppose that I were.
-
- Second, I am not being "New Age"; I intended to be taken literally.
- Conclusions follow -- see below.
-
- >God is more than existence - he must be, because pretty much all aethiests
- >agree exsitence exists.
-
- Maybe they thereby admit the existence of God without knowing it.
- Spinoza claims to prove in his _Ethics_ that everyone loves God,
- including the atheists...
-
- God is more than that. God is a creature who makes
- >moral judgements. God tells us what's good and whats bad. God gives tablets
- >to old men on mountain tops. God blows up ancient cities with too many
- >homosexuals in them. God has a son who rises from the dead.
-
- One of the points of my posting on "God is existence" was to draw the
- conclusion that God is V (the logical universe), which certainly does
- not do any of these things!
-
- >Existence is not a creature who makes moral judgements. Existence doesn't
- >tell us what's good or bad. Existence doesn't give tables to old men on
- >mountain tops. Existence doesn't blow up ancient cities with too many
- >homosexuals in them. That's just absurd.
-
- Thus God does not do any of these things either, since God = Existence!
-
- >You are misrepresenting religion if you just claim God is existence - few
- >would argue that existence doesn't exist. God -to any Christian - is a lot
- >more than that. That cannot be denied while maintaining credibility.
-
- I am not a Christian. I'm not misrepresenting -- I am refuting (at
- least humorously). The philosophical concept of God is hard to
- distinguish from the logical universe; I follow Spinoza (for
- argument's sake, at least) and take the philosophical concept to be
- God and the rest to be mythology.
-
- >But lets look at point 2- you can prove the existence of existence in some
- >modified set theory.
-
- Actually, the existence of V is an _axiom_ of NFU ( a case of the
- comprehension scheme), so the proof is very short.
-
- Well, how odd. It sounds to me, (and do correct me if
- >I'm worng) that what's being claimed is that there is some modified set
- >theory, of which one can prove the constintency, from within.
-
- Nope. The consistency is proved in ZFC See R. B. Jensen, The
- consistency of a slight (!) variation on Quine's 'New Foundations',
- Synthese, vol. 19. I am a professional set theorist; I do know what I
- am doing (as set theorist, if not theologian).
-
- Well, the
- >second theorem of Godel tells us then that that system can't even code
- >in a uniform way each recursive set! So it couldn't be too much of
- >a set theory could it let alone EXISTENCE ITSELF - i.e, GOD!
- >What would dear old john paul say when he opened the local mathematical
- >bulletin and read
- >THEOREM: God's missing a recursive set !!!!
-
- See above.
-
- >Please, darlings!!!!!!!!!!
- >Love
- >Kevin Davey
- >Monash University
- >Australia.
- >
- >
- >
-
-
-
- --
- The opinions expressed | --Sincerely,
- above are not the "official" | M. Randall Holmes
- opinions of any person | Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
- or institution. | holmes@opal.idbsu.edu
-