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- From: mark_turnbull.g033@qmgate.mitre.org (Mark Turnbull)
- Subject: Re: Turing Indistinguishability is a Scientific Criterion
- Message-ID: <1992Sep8.210112.11108@linus.mitre.org>
- Sender: news@linus.mitre.org (News Service)
- Nntp-Posting-Host: mturnbull.mitre.org
- Organization: The MITRE Corporation
- References: <1992Sep6.200121.4383@Princeton.EDU>
- Date: Tue, 8 Sep 1992 21:01:12 GMT
- Lines: 53
-
- In article <1992Sep6.200121.4383@Princeton.EDU>
- harnad@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Stevan Harnad) wrote:
-
- > The real point of the TT is that if we had a
- > pen-pal whom we had corresponded with for a lifetime, we would never
- > need to have seen him to infer that he had a mind. So if a machine
- > pen-pal could do the same thing, it would be arbitrary to deny it had a
- > mind just because it was a machine. That's all there is to it!
-
- > It is arbitrary to
- > ask for more from a machine than I ask from a person, just because it's
- > a machine (especially since no one knows yet what either a person or a
- > machine REALLY is). So if the pen-pal TT is enough to allow us to
- > correctly infer that a real person has a mind, then it must by the same
- > token be enough to allow us to make the same inference about a
- > computer, given that the two are totally indistinguishable to us.
-
- > Neither the appearance of the candidate nor
- > any facts about biology play any role in my judgment about my human pen
- > pal, so there is no reason the same should not be true of my
- > TT-indistinguishable machine pen-pal.
-
- Well, that's all there would be to it if, whenever I embarked on a
- lifetime pen-pal relationship, I could make no reasonable assumptions
- about the nature of the pen-pal. I wouldn't arbitrarily deny a pen-pal
- its mind just because I knew it to be a machine of a different type than I
- am, nor would I expect its performance to be better in any respect than
- that of the human I assume has a mind, but isn't there a lot left out if one
- takes the responses, verbal and otherwise, of a device, to be the only
- relevant (and indeed, sufficient) information to be used in judging the
- presence of a mind? I'm not willing to jettison all the other things I
- believe about my currently likely pen-pals and state that biological facts
- play no part in my assessment of the chances that my correspondent has a
- mind. The TT is only "enough to allow us to correctly infer that a real
- person has a mind" with the appropriate background information. Of
- course, you may be saying (and may have said elsewhere) that we have no
- reason to even consider anything other than the responses and that those
- who do consider other factors ought to rethink their habits ...
-
- I'll feel a lot more confident about making inferences about "having a
- mind" after we DO know "what a person REALLY is." And, of course,
- creating an artifact that passes TT, TTT, and perhaps TTTT ought to at
- least provide some good clues about that. Until then, I don't know why I
- should consider expert performance by a device dissimilar to myself to be
- evidence of anything but expert performance by a device dissimilar to
- myself.
-
-
- Mark Turnbull
- all my opinions are products of the Zeitgeist only, NOT my employer or
- school
- mark_turnbull.g033@qmgate.mitre.org OR turnbull@cns.bu.edu
-
-