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- From: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu (Rich Winkel)
- Subject: El Salvador: Proceso 527: Editorial
- Message-ID: <1992Sep1.233351.12680@mont.cs.missouri.edu>
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- Originator: rich@pencil.cs.missouri.edu
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- Date: Tue, 1 Sep 1992 23:33:51 GMT
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- /** reg.elsalvador: 162.0 **/
- ** Topic: Proceso 527: Editorial **
- ** Written 9:39 pm Aug 31, 1992 by cidai@huracan.cr in cdp:reg.elsalvador **
- From: cidai@huracan.cr (Centro de Informacion Documentacion y Apoyo a la Invest. - UCAJSC)
- Subject: Proceso 527: Editorial
-
- Center for Information, Documentation and Research Support (CIDAI)
- Central American University (UCA)
- San Salvador, El Salvador
-
- PROCESO 527
- August 26, 1992
-
- EDITORIAL:
- The peace process weathers its second crisis
-
- The call to order made by U.N. Secretary Adjunct for
- Peacekeeping Operations, Marrack Goulding, asking both sides to
- demonstrate in practice that they have the political will to
- achieve peace in El Salvador, has had positive results. Goulding
- warned them that it was no longer the time for discussions and
- debates, but rather for complying with the accords concretely and
- swiftly. In effect, the two sides have agreed on key issues
- contained in the revised schedule that Goulding left on the
- negotiating table before leaving the country.
- The fundamental aspects of re-starting the peace process are
- the following: First, the FMLN promised to concentrate all its
- forces and deposit the corresponding weapons on the indicated
- dates. Once this commitment is fulfilled, the FMLN will leave the
- government without any pretext to continue accusing it of non-
- compliance, nor can the government continue to delay its own
- compliance with the accords.
- The second element is the government's commitment to begin
- programs to aid former combatants to rejoin civilian life,
- including the so-called emergency packages. So far, the government
- has been alleging a lack of financing as a pretext to delay
- beginning the programs.
- The third element is the government's commitment to begin
- classes at the National Academy for Public Security as soon as
- possible, and to adopt all necessary measures to get the National
- Civilian Police in the streets in the near future. This area has
- been one of unexplained delays on the part of the government.
- Fourth, both sides committed to re-establish public
- administration in former conflict zones as soon as possible, and to
- define a special security regimen there.
- Fifth, the government committed itself to adopting all
- necessary legislative measures to replace the Armed Forces
- Territorial Service with a new military and reserve service.
- Finally, the two sides committed to promoting pending
- legislation demanded by the accords, to step up efforts to acquire
- additional financial resources, to facilitate the incorporation of
- private enterprise into the Forum for Economic and Social
- Consensus-Building, and to facilitate its operation.
- These commitments constitute a happy ending to the second
- crisis in the peace process. Objectively, the above list shows that
- the side with more commitments is the side which has complied
- least, and the one who will have to work the hardest between now
- and September 16, when compliance will be evaluated: the Cristiani
- government. Of course, the FMLN also has pending commitments, but
- this is the side which has demonstrated greater honesty and
- political will. The FMLN has not concealed its failures to comply
- and has always provided an acceptable explanation for them.
- This has not been the case with the Cristiani government, who
- in the weeks prior to the crisis used propaganda tactics to try to
- conceal its lack of commitment, using a discourse aimed at
- projecting an image of normality. Even its charges against the FMLN
- bore a softer tone. Thus, while the government has refused to meet
- its promises, its official representatives, including the
- president, projected an image of total commitment to the peace
- process. They spoke of peace and democracy with the same serenity,
- but without committing the resources necessary for both to become
- reality.
- This serenity takes the form of indifference in the area of
- human rights, since the government's passivity toward the
- increasing spiral of attacks by and victims of the death squads and
- common criminals is the same attitude it maintained throughout the
- war. It displays the same attitude toward clandestine right-wing
- groups which threaten and intimidate, securely shielded by
- impunity. If the government were to act according to its
- constitutional mandate, we would soon see those responsible for
- these crimes in the courts.
- Time is running short, and the political space necessary for
- these maneuvers is closing rapidly around the ARENA government.
- When President Cristiani speaks before the U.N. General Assembly
- next month, he cannot show up empty-handed. The community of
- nations will not accept another speech full of ideas and promises.
- By then, the Secretary General will have his own report and
- recommendations for the Security Council, based on the evaluation
- to be made by Goulding in mid-September. Goulding clearly stated
- that this is no one-month grace period for the two sides, but
- rather a very short time in which they must demonstrate their
- willingness to comply and show concrete results.
- The United Nations firmly maintains the original deadline of
- October 31. By then the peace process must conclude, but it must
- conclude with full compliance of all the accords. This is why
- catching up with delayed accords is so urgent and places so much
- pressure on both sides.
- Now that the second crisis has been overcome, one is forced to
- wonder why the situation was allowed to deteriorate so far as to
- drive the peace process into a crisis. Couldn't these dangerous
- situations have been avoided with firmer and swifter progress
- toward solid and lasting peace?
-
-
- ** End of text from cdp:reg.elsalvador **
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