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- Path: sparky!uunet!news.claremont.edu!ucivax!news.service.uci.edu!cerritos.edu!wilbur!orville!kryton!system
- Newsgroups: comp.os.linux
- Subject: Re: clearing SUID bit on writes
- Message-ID: <8ociqB2w164w@kryton.UUCP>
- From: system@kryton.UUCP (Scott Beckstead)
- Date: Wed, 02 Sep 92 21:23:06 PDT
- References: <1992Sep1.235018.14835@fwi.uva.nl>
- Organization: Paradox Alley F&SF BBS 805-492-8789
- Lines: 38
-
- vesseur@fwi.uva.nl (Joep JJ Vesseur) writes:
-
- > Frank T Lofaro <fl0p+@andrew.cmu.edu> writes:
- >
- > > Linux should definitely un-setuid and un-setgid files on any
- > >modification (such as an append). Otherwise it could prove to be a very
- > >nasty security hole.
- > >[...] doesn't belong in a secure (well,
- > >as secure as UN*X can reasonably be) environment.
- >
- > well, i don't know to what extend linux _is_ secure (anyone out there
- > cares to make any correctness proofs?) and whether anyone uses it
- > as a real multiple user (read: different users) system at the moment,
- > but no doubt this will happen in the future.
- > i only don't think it should clean the bit on all modifications, only
- > those initiated by users with a different real-uid than the owner of
- > the file, in contrast to sysV.
- >
- > joep.
- >
- > ---
- > joep vesseur --- email: vesseur@fwi.uva.nl
-
- Well if some one who knows how to set up a secure system will do so and give me
- access to it, I'll put together a tiger team and try to break it. I have a
- knack for finding silly bugs that way too. Couldn't get near my friends
- OS9 box with out causing it to take a dump or just plain lock up.
- Oh yeah it would be nice if you were local to me too.
-
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