NetNews Usenet Archive 1993 #3/NN_1993_3.iso/spool/talk/philosop/misc/3463

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From: [e-mail] (Peter Cash)
Subject: Re: Grounding morals
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Date: Wed, 27 Jan 1993 04:14:04 GMT
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In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales) writes:
>>>The notion that an argument is required (desirable, good) to support
>>>any particular course of action is grounded in the recognition that
>>>humans a beings of a finite consciousness, able to make errors, and
>>>not possessed of an automatic code of values.  Simply put, we are
>>>human, we must decide what to do.

>>Well, one interesting question might be this: precisely what role does such
>>an argument play? Is the argument a necessary _justification_ for moral
>>conduct? Or does it in some way _define_ what moral conduct is? Does it
>>perhaps _explain_ morality? Is it the case that if we have no such
>>argument, then there is no reason to be moral? Or does having the argument
>>(or the philosophical) explication somehow make it easier to be good?

>These are interesting questions.  I could give you my answers
>(part of which would include arguments that at least some of
>these questions are ill-formed), but I would rather hear yours!

But Jimbo, just because I ask questions doesn't mean I know the answers!
Remember that my claim was quite modest; as I said:

>>... I was addressing the suggestion--made by someone else, who is by
>>now quite cross with me--that we should give arguments that support
>>statements like, "murder is wrong". I didn't say that you cannot--or ought
>>not--give _reasons_ for why one action is good or another bad; I didn't say
>>that you can't argue about whether a certain deed is good or bad.

>Well, what's the difference?  Isn't giving an argument that
>supports a statement of that sort precisely the same activity
>as giving reasons for the goodness or badness of that activity?
>But perhaps I misread you.

My point is that there's a _huge_ difference between wanting to argue about
whether "murder is wrong" and an actual, real live argument about morals.
That's all.  Philosophers _love_ to talk about statements much like "what
is good?," "what is justice?," or "why should I be good?". I think that in
doing so, they forget the meaning of the words they're using, and so the
discussion spins off into the weeds.

Let's see if I can make this clearer. Consider this statement: "taking
bribes is wrong". I suppose that a philosopher might ask, "What makes
taking bribes wrong?" or "How can you prove that taking bribes is wrong?"
And then he might follow this by providing his favorite theory of
ethics--say a utilitarian argument about how taking bribes leads to poor
government or management, and thus causes more more misery for more people
than it creates in the way of pleasure for the bribe-takers. Or if he's a
relativist, he might say that it's wrong "by convention in our culture".

If you've taken any ethics courses, you know that there are problems with
any possible answer to this sort of question--all ethical theories are
subject to counter argument. However, this is not what makes me want to
draw away from such discussions--refutability has never been been regarded
as a deadly flaw in a philosophical theory. One thing that makes me want to
back off is that I'm not clear about the _role_ that such putative answers
are supposed to fill. As I indicated before, I'm not clear about whether
such answers are supposed to be justifications, explanations, proofs, or
definitions.

I think of myself being offered a bribe, and then I think of the ethical
theories, and I try to see how they might help me decide whether or not I
should take the bribe. I do not see how they could possibly do this. I'm
not even sure if they're _supposed_ to help me do this. (Kant, for example,
would be quite happy if I were to regard his "categorical imperative" as
being of purely philosophical interest, and not as a guide to action.)  To
me, this is thin gruel, and not the robust bread of reason.

Since I'm so dissatisfied with the answers, I turn to the
question--questions of the form, "is x wrong?" or "what is 'wrong'?". What
kind of question is this? Is it even a sensible question? Why would one ask
such a question?  What does he want to understand or clarify?

You see what I'm not saying: I'm not saying that "bribery is wrong"
requires no justification, that it is simply true. If I were to say that,
then I would be--in a sense--answering the question. I am trying to say
that the question is itself nonsense, and can have no true or false
answers.

How might we talk about actual cases of taking a bribe? How might we argue
about the rightness or wrongness of such actions? Consider the following
example.

My friend Jack once showed me the new color TV he "got for Christmas".
"That's a nice TV," I said. "Who gave it to you?"

"Oh, a vendor where I work," Jack said nonchalantly. I knew that Jack was a
buyer for a factory--his job was to purchase parts for the machines made at
the factory from various outside companies, or "vendors".

"A vendor?" I said. "He just handed you a color TV? Doesn't that create a
conflict of interest?"

"What do you mean?" Jack said. "Why should it? He was just being nice."

"Being _nice_? Come on Jack--people don't give away color TVs to total
strangers just because they've been seized by the Christmas spirit. The
vendor expects something in return--he gave you a bribe, and he expects
that you're going to buy parts from him."

"You think so?" Jack said. "Well, I certainly won't give him any special
treatment. You can depend on that."

"But don't you see that it's still wrong to take the TV, Jack?

"Wrong? What do you mean _wrong_? Are you some kind of moralist? I've
committed a sin, is that it?"

"What you did is wrong for a thousand reasons, obviously wrong," I replied.
"First of all, taking gifts creates a feeling of obligation in the
receiver--you may favor this vendor without even realizing it, just because
you feel obligated. And if you _don't_ feel obligated, then you _should_
feel obligated--taking a valuable gift puts you in his debt. You _owe_ him
a favor. By taking this gift, you create a situation where you either favor
a vendor unfairly--thus damaging the interests of your employer, or fail to
return a favor. Thus, you're now in a position where no matter what you do,
it is wrong."

"You think I should take it back, huh?"

"Absolutely."

Unfortunately, I can't claim that my argument was successful--Jack never
did return that TV (and he wasn't fired until several years later over
something else).  Nevertheless, this seems like a pretty good example of
what I would regard as a sensible moral question, and a sensible argument.

>>>It is of course true that we could choose to pursue any old random
>>>course of action, some course of action for which we can give no
>>>reasons.  But the nature of huamn life (conditional, often precarious)
>>>on this planet (a nice place, but not a Garden of Eden where survival
>>>is guaranteed) is such that random courses of action will not
>>>likely be productive of anything other than pain, suffering, and
>>>(ultimately) death.

>>Sounds unpleasant, all right. I'm not sure why not having an argument that
>>murder is bad leaves one in such a miserable state, though.

>Not directly, not immediately, not individually, of course.  But
>intellectual arguments play a strong role in shaping culture, law,
>etc.   If there is a failure among intellectuals (philosophers) in
>defending (for example) the fundamental value of life, then a direct
>result may be: Nazi gas chambers.  We've seen it happen.

Of course intellectual arguments can be important.  But I do suspect that
gas chambers can't be prevented by arguments in favor of the sanctity of
life (see how much good they're doing against abortion today?).  In fact, I
don't see how arguments of _any_ kind could prevail against a Nazi. Nazis
are not amenable to reason on the subject of killing people they don't
like. So you see, there _are_ cases where the only appropriate argument is
a rifle.

[I can see it now: "But Mr. Eichmann, don't you understand that killing all
these people is _murder_?"

"It is not. They're not people--they're subhuman."

"What do you mean, 'subhuman'? Look at them--they're people!"

"Ah," says Eichmann, signing another transportation order, "that is an
interesting position. I wonder, how do you define 'human', anyway? You do
have a definition, don't you? Some proof you can offer me that these are
not vermin, but true human beings?" ]

>So no, you don't have to know arguments, my grocer doesn't need to
>know arguments, but - by golly- someone had better, or we may all
>be in deep trouble.

Sure. But let's be careful that they're _important_ arguments--arguments
that teach us something.

>>Gosh. I don't think I ever said anything that would contradict this. Why
>>would I want to reject philosophy? I'd as soon reject my liver. I did try
>>to make a teensy suggestion about the proper _role_ of philosophy--a
>>suggestion that I hoped someone might take up and help me think about. But
>>I guess this is the kind of suggestion that gets you served hemlock tea.

>Perhaps such a suggestion might get you served hemlock tea -- but
>not by me...

Ah, then you have understood me only incompletely!  8^)

--
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             |      Die Welt ist alles, was Zerfall ist.     |
Peter Cash   |       (apologies to Ludwig Wittgenstein)      |[e-mail]
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