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- From: spencer@panix.com (David Spencer)
- Newsgroups: sci.military
- Subject: strategic bombing (was: B2s v. carrier task force)
- Keywords: B2s, Carriers
- Message-ID: <C1Isy1.8xJ@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>
- Date: 27 Jan 93 16:10:49 GMT
- References: <C124LF.77x@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> <C143p5.38z@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> <C17w89.FrF@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> <C1F6tG.KH1@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM> <C1H2IH.EAv@law7.DaytonOH.NCR.COM>
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- Organization: PANIX Public Access Unix, NYC
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- Approved: military@law7.daytonoh.ncr.com
-
-
- From David Spencer <spencer@panix.com>
-
- >From holthaus@news.weeg.uiowa.edu (James R. Holthaus)
-
- >>From mat@mole-end.matawan.nj.us
-
- >>Is this entirely true? My readings about WWII indicate there there were
- >>one or two classes of targets against whic strategic bombing was effective,
- >>the first being refineries, fuel depots, oilfields, and such, and the
- >>second being large railroad yards, vital crossings, and bridges. Aren't
- >>these still valid strategic targets?
-
- >Well, German industrial production peaked in 1944. So much for the
- >strategic bombing idea. Bombing supply lines is interdiction--a different
- >goal than strategic bombing.
-
- The US Strategic Bombing Survey makes a numbingly complete case
- (including the statistical volumes, it consumes about 15 running feet
- of shelf space, if memory serves) for the ineffectiveness of strategic
- bombing in WW2.
-
- Most strategic targets are either easy to protect (like underground
- command posts and factories) or easy to rebuild (like ball-bearing
- factories). Rail yards tend to be in population centers, so if you're
- worried about civilian casualties (as we were, eg, in France), bombing
- them is a bad idea. Given that military authorities will cut civilian
- rail traffic before military traffic, and there's a long hierarchy of
- priorities for military traffic, you have to do a lot of damage to
- rail yards before you hurt strategic military transport.
-
- The strategy of bombing refineries _was_ successful, as they were
- difficult to rebuild and impossible to protect. They were also
- essential to the German war effort. By D-Day, the fuel shortage
- directly induced by refinery bombing, combined with fighter losses to
- Allied fighters that were finally able to accompany the bombers to the
- refineries, had removed German aircraft from the skies over western
- Europe.
-
- The strategic bombing survey also painfully demonstrates the
- *counter-effectiveness* of area bombing European civilian targets.
- Japanese cities, on the other hand, were highly inflammable and almost
- completely unprotected, so firebombing them was highly effective, if
- morally dubious. (Most of the senior USAAF and US Army officers were
- appalled at RAF Bomber Command's and Pacific Theater USAAF's terror
- bombing of civilian targets; on the other hand, Paul Fussel's _Thank
- God for the Atom Bomb_ presents the case from the point of view of an
- infantryman scheduled to land in the first wave of the invasion of
- Japan.)
-
- The Air Force, for obvious institutional reasons, has chosen to ignore
- these results, and similar demonstrations of the ineffectiveness of
- strategic bombing in Korea and Vietnam ....
-
- A good, accessible source on this is Williamson's _Luftwaffe: Strategy
- for Defeat_. Though the bombing survey itself makes for some fairly
- interesting reading.
-
- dhs spencer@panix.com
-